موارد نقض مقررات و هنجارهای بین­المللی از جمله NPT توسط کشورهای دارای سلاح هسته­ای

باسمه تعالی

1.   استقرار بیش از 240 کلاهک هسته­ای در کشورهای غیرهسته­ای از جمله بلژیک، هلند، آلمان، ایتالیا، ترکیه بر اساس سیستم چتر هسته­ای ناتو؛ این اقدام برخلاف تعهدات آنها بر اساس مواد 1 و 2 پیمان NPT است.

2.   کشورهای هسته­ای عضو پیمان NPT مشروعیت رأی اجماعی دادگاه جهانی[1] که حکم کرده بود ماده پنجم NPT نیازمند دستیابی عملی به خلع سلاح هسته­ای در همه ابعاد آن ­است را به­رسمیت نشناخته است.

3.   آمریکا، روسیه، انگلیس و فرانسه حتی قبول ندارند که حتی وارد مذاکرات مربوط به دستیابی به خلع سلاح هسته­ای در همه ابعاد آن شوند. ماده پنجم خواستار "مساعی جمیله و حسن­نیت" در راستای خلع سلاح هسته­ای است.

4.   آمریکا عملاً به­دنبال ارتقاء سطح کلاهک­های هسته­ای، ساخت تأسیسات جدیدی در لوس آلاموس و  تولید نسل جدیدی از کلاهک­های هسته­ای با عنوان Reliable Replacement warheads است که در تناقض با ماده ششم NPT است.

5.   تمدید موافقت­نامه 1958 برای همکاری جهت استفاده از انرژی اتمی در راستای اهداف دفاعی متقابل بین آمریکا و انگلیس دلالت بر این دارد که این پیمان دوجانبه تضعیف­کننده تعهدات آمریکا و انگلیس ذیل ماده اول NPT است. بر اساس ماده اول پیمان NPT که این دو کشور را به­عنوان کشور امین معرفی می­کند، در ماده اول خود تصریح می­کند که هر کشور هسته­ای عضو NPT موظف است هیچ­گونه انتقال هسته­ای اعم از سلاح، ابزار انفجار هسته­ای یا کنترل چنین تسلیحات یا ابزارهایی را بصورت مستقیم یا غیرمستقیم به هیچ دریافت کننده­ای اعم از آنکه کشور هسته­ای یا غیرهسته­ای باشد انجام ندهد.

6.   آمریکا و انگلیس برخلاف تعهدات خود، ذیل ماده اول NPT، توافق کرده­اند که ارتش آمریکا از کارخانه تسلیحات اتمی انگلیس برای انجام تحقیقات برنامه­های نظامی هسته­ای خود استفاده کند. مقامات نظامی آمریکا تصریح کرده­اند که تحقیقات "بسیار ارزشمندی" درباره کلاهک­های هسته­ای در سیاست تسلیحات هسته­ای در آلدرماستون که در برک شایر (aldermaston in Berkshire) قرار دارد بر اساس قرارداد جاری و سری بین دولت­های انگلیس و آمریکا انجام گرفته است.

7.   پیمان NPT خواستار آن است که کشورهای دارنده سلاح هسته­ای در توسعه برنامه­های انرژی هسته­ای صلح­آمیز به دیگر امضا کنندگان NPT کمک کنند. در واقع کشورهای دارا، ایران را بایکوت کرده و به سه کشور هند، پاکستان و اسرائیل که خارج از NPT بوده و سلاح هسته­ای ساخته­اند کمک و حمایت می­کنند.

8.   فرانسه در تناقض با تعهدات خود ذیل مواد یک و دو NPT، در اواخر دهه 1950 در دیمونا (اسرائیل) رآکتور آب سنگین ساخته است و نسبت به آموزش نیروها و نصب قطعات و تجهیزات برای تولید مواد هسته­ای در سطح استفاده برای سلاح اتمی اقدام کرده است. هزینه مالی این تأسیسات را آلمان پرداخت کرده است.

9.   انگلیس به­دنبال ارتقاء سطح سلا­ح­های هسته­ای موشک – پایه ترایدنت می­باشد که بر ضد تعهدات این کشور ذیل ماده ششم است. طبق این برنامه، نیروی دریایی انگلیس 58 موشک بالستیک هسته­ای ترایدنت (IID-5) زیر دریا – پایه و حدود 200 کلاهک هسته­ای بر چهار موشک بالستیک زیردریا - پایه کلاس "ونگوارد" را در پایگاه دریایی کلاید (clyde) در سواحل غربی اسکاتلند عملیاتی کرده است. اگر چه دولت انگلیس ادعا می­کند که کلاهک­های مورد استفاده در سیستم ترایدنت انگلیس "در مرکز هسته­ای آلدرماستون طراحی و ساخته شده­اند" اما اسناد از طبقه­بندی خارج شده وزارت انرژی آمریکا دلالت بر این دارد که سیستم کلاهک در چارچوب طراحی­های غیرهسته­ای انجام شده است.

10. آمریکا و هند در آگوست 2007 موافقتانه همکاری در عرصه استفاده صلح­آمیز از انرژی هسته­ای را امضا کردند که در تناقض با مواد یک و دو پیمان NPT است. کشورهای دیگر از جمله فرانسه، روسیه، استرالیا و کانادا نیز طبق همین رفتار آمریکا اقدام کرده­اند.

11. آمریکا و هند در 29 مارس 2010، موافقت­نامه دیگری درباره بازفراوری پس ماندهای سوخت هسته­ای آمریکا در هند امضا کردند. بر اساس این توافقنامه، هند اجازه دارد پلوتونیوم را از پس­ماندهای رآکتورهای هند که مواد هسته­ای آمریکا به آنها تزریق شده است جدا سازد. قبلاً فقط ژاپن و کشورهای عضو جامعه انرژی هسته­ای اروپا (Euratom) چنین امتیازی داشتند.

12.  در بیانیه مشترک روسای جمهور آمریکا و هند در 8 نوامبر 2010 بر دو نکته غیرقانونی تاکید شده است:

-    حمایت آمریکا از گفتگوی جدی و معنادار بین تمامی کشورهای دارنده تسلیحات هسته­ای (اعم از کشورهای عضو یا غیرعضو NPT)

13.  فرانسه و انگلیس در دوم نوامبر 2010 – در کنار موارد دیگر – توافق کرده­اند که تأسیسات مشترک آزمایش هسته­ای که در تناقض آشکار با تعهدات آنها ذیل پیمان­های CTBT و NPT است ایجاد نمایند. این امر باعث شگفتی بسیاری از تحلیل­گران این حوزه شده است. بر این اساس، در منطقه والدوک (valduc) فرانسه که حدوداً در 45 کیلومتری شمال شرقی شهر دیجون (Dijon) است تأسیسات شبیه­سازی هسته­ای ایجاد می­شود. طبق اعلام ریاست جمهوری فرانسه، این تأسیسات در سال 2012 آغاز به­کار می­کند و به دانشمندان انگلیس و فرانسوی کمک می­کند که با مدل­سازی عملکرد مواد هسته­ای از "کارآیی، اعتبار و امنیت بلندمدت" زرادخانه هسته­ای خود اطمینان یابند.

14. عدم تأمین سوخت رآکتور تحقیقاتی تهران توسط آمریکا، علیرغم آنکه قرارداد معتبر وجود داشته و حتی هزینه سوخت هم پرداخت شده بود نقض آشکار ماده چهار NPT می­باشد. امتناع آلمان از ادامه سوخت نیروگاه بوشهر و امتناع فرانسه از ساخت نیروگاه دارخوین و عدم اجازه به استفاده از سهم ایران در یوردیف فرانسه از موارد نقض آشکار ماده چهار NPT محسوب می­شود.

15. تأکید بر حفظ و تداوم اهمیت و جایگاه تسلیحات هسته­ای و بحث بازدارندگی در دکترین جدید هسته­ای آمریکا و انگلیس و ناتو و تهدید هسته­ای آمریکا علیه ایران برخلاف تعهدات این کشور از جمله قطعنامه 984 که در آستانه تمدید ناحدود NPT در سال 1995 صادر شده است می­باشد.

16. تداوم آزمایش­های هسته­ای مجازی (Virtual) با استفاده از ابر رایانه­ها توسط آمریکا در تناقض با تعهدات ذیل CTBT است. آزمایش اخیر آمریکا در 15 سپتامبر 2010 با عکس­العمل شدید شهروندان هیروشیما و ناکازاکی مواجه شد.

موارد نقض مفاد کنوانسیون منع سلاح­های شیمیایی توسط انگلستان و امریکا

1.    انگلستان

انگلستان مواد متعددی از کنوانسیون منع سلا­ح­های شیمیایی (CWC) را در زمینه ذیل نقض نموده است:

1-    قصور در اظهار سلاح­های شیمیایی مکشوفه در عراق

2-    انهدام سلاح­های شیمیایی مکشوفه و نقض مفاد کنوانسیون

3-    انتقال غیرمجاز برخی از سلاح­های شیمیایی مکشوفه و یا نمونه­های آنها به خارج از عراق

4-    نمونه­برداری و آنالیز غیرمجاز سلاح­های شیمیایی مکشوفه

5-    انهدام غیرمجاز نمونه­های انتقال یافته به خارج از عراق

6-    مخفی­کاری در ارائه اطلاعات به دبیرخانه فنی سازمان حتی پس از انتقال مقدماتی اطلاعات به آن دبیرخانه،

7-    اعلام عدم آمادگی برای رعایت ضرب­الاجل تمدید شده نهایی

·  مخفی­کاری در ارائه اطلاعات به دبیرخانه فنی سازمان حتی پس از انتقال مقدماتی اطلاعات به آن دبیرخانه

·  اعلام عدم آمادگی برای رعایت ضرب­الاجل تمدید شده نهایی

2.   آمریکا

· جمهوری اسلامی ایران نگرانی جدی خود را بابت وسعت نقض کنوانسیون توسط ایالات متحده از سال 2003 و تآثیر بالقوه عملیات نیرهای ائتلاف در عراق بر سلامت و امنیت مردم ایران و نیز محیط زیست در گذشته و آینده ابراز می­نماید.

· ایالات متحده به سبب مخفی نگهداشتن اطلاعات مربوط به کشف و انهدام سلاح­های شیمیایی در عراق و نیز خودداری از تسلیم اظهارنامه­های لازم تحت مفاد پاراگراف 1 (a) از ماده سوم کنوانسیون، این کنوانسیون را نقض نموده است.

· بر اساس کنوانسیون، ایالات متحده متعهد بوده است سلاح­هایی را که در قلمروی تحت حاکمیت یا کنترل او قرار داشته است اظهار کند. به چه علت ایالات متحده سه سال بعد از کشف سلاح­های شیمیایی در عراق، در حالی­که این کشور در قلمروی تحت حاکمیت یا کنترل او قرار داشته است موضوع را به دبیرخانه فنی سازمان منع سلاح­های شیمیایی اطلاع داده است؟

· ماده سه، پاراگراف 1 (a)، بند فرعی (ii) دولت­های عضو را ملزم ساخته است: "در مورد سلاح­های شیمیایی محل دقیق، کل مقادیر و جزئیات فهرست سلاح­های شیمیایی را که در تملک یا در اختیار دارد یا در قلمرو تحت حاکمیت یا کنترل او هستند، طبق بند 1 الی 3 از بخش چهارم (A)  از پیوست راستی­آزمایی ... را مشخص نماید."

· ایالات متحده محل دقیق، کل مقادیر و جزئیات فهرست سلاح­های شیمیایی را که در قلمرو تحت حاکمیت یا کنترل او بوده است، مشخص نکرده و مفاد بند 1 الی 3 از بخش چهارم (A) از پیوست راستی­آزمایی کنوانسیون را نقض نموده است.

· بر اساس اطلاعات ارائه شده توسط دبیرخانه فنی سازمان منع سلاح­های شیمیایی، "فهرست و مشخصات الام مکشوفه و رویه انهدام آنها در نامه مقدماتی ایالات متحده در ماه ژوئیه 2006 ارائه نشده است."

· مخفی­کاری ایالات متحده در مورد اطلاعات مربوط به فهرست و مشخصات اقلام مکشوفه و خودداری از تسلیم رویه انهدام آنها در مغایرت با مفاد پاراگراف فرعی (ii)، پاراگراف یکم (a) از ماده سوم کنوانسیون منع سلاح­های شیمیایی و نقض آشکار مفاد این کنوانسیون است.

· ایالات متحده تا روز 7 آوریل 2009 ( شش ال پس از اقدام به انهدام سلاح­های شیمیایی مکشوفه در عراق) نسبت به ارائه­ی اطلاعات تکمیلی اقدام ننموده است/ این نیز به نوبه­ی خود نقض مفاد کنوانسیون منع سلاح­های شیمیایی محسوب می­گردد. در عین حال، هنوز مشخص نیست که نیت واقعی آمریکا از این تأخیر و مخفی­کاری چه بوده است.

· ایالات متحده تاکنون به تعهدات خود در خصوص تسلیم اطلاعات جزئی انهدام سلاح­های شیمیایی در عراق از طریق ارائه­ی اظهارنامه­ها تحت مفاد بخش چهارم (A)، پاراگراف­های یکم تا سوم از پیوست راستی­آزمایی کنوانسیون عمل ننموده است.

· ایالات متحده علاوه بر مخفی نمودن اطلاعات مربوط به کشف سلاح­های شیمیایی در عراق، به تعهدات خود تحت مفاد پاراگراف فرعی (V)، پاراگراف یکم (a) از ماده سوم کنوانسیون منع سلاح­های شیمیایی عمل نکرده و مغایر با مفاد کنوانسیون، طرح انهدام را برای تأیید توسط شورای اجرایی سازمان منع سلاح­های شیمیایی (EC) به این شورا ارائه ننموده است.

· انتقال نمونه­ها به ایالات متحده مغایر با مفاد پاراگراف فرعی (iv)، پاراگراف یکم (a) از ماده سوم کنوانسیون منع سلاح­های شیمیایی بوده است.

· انهدام نمونه­های سلاح­های شیمیایی در قلمروی ایالات متحده ناقض مفاد پاراگراف چهارم از ماده چهارم کنوانسیون منع سلاح­های شیمیایی بوده است.

عملکرد آمریکا در قبال حمله اسراویل به کاروان آزادی

·  هماهنگی واشنگتن و تل­آویو در سطح عالی درباره نحوه موضع­گیری آمریکا در قبال حمله اسرائیل

· مارک رگو (Mark Regev) سخنگوی دولت اسرائیل: "ما تمایل داریم که تشکرات خود را از ایالات متحده بخاطر تلاش­های پشت پرده­اش برای رقیق کردن لحن و ادبیات بیانیه (شورای امنیت) سازمان ملل ابراز کنیم."

· تلشا جهت واگذاری موضوع تحقیق و تفحص از واقعه به خود اسرائیل که مجرم ماجراست. الجاندرو وولف معاون سوزان رایس می­گوید: "آمریکا کاملاً مطمئن است که اسرائیل می­تواند تحقیقات معتبر، بی­طرفانه، شفاف و فوری درباره این واقعه انجام دهد."

· رأی منفی واشنگتن به قطعنامه شورای حقوق بشر سازمان ملل در محکومیت حمله اسرائیل به ناوگان آزادی (انگلیس و فرانسه رأی ممتنع داد)

· کلینتون درباره موضوع ناوگان آزادی با تأکید بر حق اسرائیل در دفاع خود تضریح کرد که "به هرحال نیازمندی­های امنیتی اسرائیل باید تأمین شوند" و بایدن نیز گفت که "این حق مسلم اسرائیل است که منافع امنیتی خود را تأمین کند"

موضع آمریکا به رویکرد سند نهایی اجلاس بازنگری NPT (2010) به اسرائیل

·  بیانیه اوباما

ما قویاً با تلاش­های صورت گرفته برای انگشت­نما شدن (single out) اسرائیل مخالفت می­کنیم و با اقداماتی که امنیت ملی اسرائیل را به مخاطره بیافکند مقابله خواهیم کرد."

·  بیانیه رسمی جونز مشاور امنیت ملی اوباما (28 می 2010)

ایالات متحده به یک کنفرانس با یک سری اقدامات اجازه نمی­دهد که امنیت ملی اسرائیل را به خطر اندازد. ما هیچ رویکردی را که اسرائیل برجسته سازد (single out) یا انتظارات غیرواقعی ایجاد نماید را قبول نخواهیم کرد. موضع بلندمدت آمریکا در قبال صلح و امنیت خاورمیانه از جمله تعهد تزلزل ناپذیر به امنیت اسرائیل تغییری نخواهد کرد.

الن تاچر معاون کنترل تسلیحات و امنیت بین­الملل وزارت خارجه آمریکا (28 می 2010)

(در رابطه با کنفرانس خاورمیانه عاری از تسلیحات هسته­ای 2012) توانایی ما برای انجام این کار به­شدت تضعیف شده چرا که در سند نهایی کنفرانس NPT، اسرائیل در بخش خاورمیانه انگتش­نما شده و این واقعیتی است که آمریکا به­شدت از آن نگران است.

تفاوت رویکردها

· ایران دو دور مذاکرات رسمی با 1+5 را با جدیت برگزار کرد و به تعهدات خود پایبند ماند اما آمریکا پس از مذاکرات، روند فشار را تقویت کرد.

·  در عرصه هسته­ای، ایران بیاینه تهران را داد اما غرب قطعنامه 1929 را داد

ایران کنفرانس خلع سلاح هسته­ای با شعار انرژی هسته­ای برای همه، سلاح هسته­ای برای هیچ­کس را برگزار کرد اما آمریکا ایران را به حمله هسته­ای تهدید کرد.

---

[1] world court که بعداً به دیوان دائمی دادگستری بین­المللی تغییر نام یافت  permanent court of lnternational justicey)



China targeting U.S. deterrence

MICHAEL RICHARDSON

 

The Japan Times

SINGAPORE — In 1996, China fired ballistic missiles and held military exercises in waters close to Taiwan to warn the electorate not to vote for a pro-independence candidate in presidential elections. In response, the United States sent two aircraft carriers and their warship escorts to the area. It was a display of American naval might and striking power that Beijing could not counter.

Since then, China has given top priority to developing a defense system known in military jargon as anti-access area denial. A key part is the world's first hypersonic ballistic missile armed with a high-explosive warhead capable of tracking and hitting U.S. carriers 1,500 km or more from the Chinese mainland.

If China had such a weapon, it would make it more difficult, perhaps even impossible, for Washington to send aircraft carrier battle groups to help defend Japan, South Korea, Taiwan or any other ally or friendly nation in the western Pacific from being threatened or attacked by Chinese forces.

Since World War II, America's global nonnuclear deterrent power has rested heavily on its ability to send carrier groups to far-flung trouble spots, including the Asia-Pacific region, without serious risk that they would be damaged or sunk. If China could challenge such deployments with its anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), the basis of U.S. deterrence in Asia might be questioned and the value of its alliances in the region called into doubt.

But would they? In a Japanese newspaper interview published Dec. 28, the head of U.S. Pacific Command Adm. Robert Willard said that China's increasingly powerful military had "achieved initial operational capability" with its ASBM, although full flight testing might take several more years. Exactly what he meant by "initial operational capability" of the land-based Dong Feng-21D missile is not completely clear. U.S. military manuals say it means that some units scheduled to get the weapons have got them, and can maintain and use them.

Andrew Erickson, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College who follows China's ASBM development, said that the Second Artillery, China's strategic missile force, "already has a capability to attempt to use the DF-21 D against U.S. carrier strike groups, and therefore likely expects to achieve a growing degree of deterrence with it." Other analysts say that even if the ASBM is in the early stages of deployment, there is still enough time for the U.S. to develop effective missile defenses or take other countermeasures.

However, some of the latter would be profoundly destabilizing. The warhead of the DF-21 D would be guided to its target with the help of Chinese satellites, over-the-horizon radar and unmanned aerial vehicles. If the U.S. was unable to shoot down incoming ASBMs, it would have to attack Chinese missiles and radar on land, or the guidance satellites in space. This could trigger a wider war with China, possibly escalating into a mutually devastating exchange of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, if China hit and sank a U.S. carrier with an ASBM it would be "bigger than Pearl Harbor and 9/11 combined," according to John Pike, founder of the Washington-based think tank Global Security. "America would want payback," he added. "Would Beijing want to go there?"

With such high stakes involved, under what circumstances, if any, would China use ASBMs to attack the U.S. Navy?

Still, the Obama administration is taking the threat seriously. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in September that China's "investments in anti-ship weaponry and ballistic missiles could threaten America's primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific, particularly our forward bases and carrier strike groups."

The U.S. Navy has 11 big aircraft carriers, all nuclear-powered. It also has 10 large-deck amphibious ships that can operate as sea bases for helicopters and vertical takeoff jets that could be vulnerable to ASBMs.

Gates, who is scheduled to visit China from Jan. 9-12, pointed out in May that a modern U.S. carrier with its full complement of the latest aircraft would "represent potentially a $15 to $20 billion set of hardware at risk." He added that the virtual American monopoly on precision guided weapons was eroding and that the U.S. "will also face increasingly sophisticated underwater combat systems — including numbers of stealthy subs — all of which could end the operational sanctuary our navy has enjoyed in the Western Pacific for the better part of six decades."

In his interview with Japan's Asahi Shimbun, Adm. Willard said that China's anti-access area denial strategy affected not only Japan and other economies in Northeast Asia, but also countries in Southeast Asia. Beijing, is using its growing power to enforce extensive sovereignty claims in the South and East China seas.

Willard said that Beijing was also "interested in minimizing foreign military influence" in a vast maritime zone that extended south from the main island of Japan, skirting the east coast Taiwan and the west coast of the Philippines, and encircling virtually the whole of the South China Sea, deep in the maritime heart of Southeast Asia. This zone, which encompasses Beijing's offshore sovereignty claims, is known as the First Island Chain in Chinese military theory. It forms a geographic basis for China's inner maritime defense perimeter.

Beijing appears intent on trying to exercise control over the zone by scaring the U.S. away and ousting rival claimants, including Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. But at what cost to relations with many neighbors and other countries alarmed by its muscle-flexing?

They know that East Asia's rise from the ruins of World War II to global economic powerhouse has depended on freedom of navigation and maritime trade. China's self-declared maritime defense perimeter covers inter-connected seas and straits used by international shipping to carry more than $5 trillion in annual commerce, including $1.3 trillion in U.S. trade.

As China pushes ahead with anti-access area denial by developing more and better ASBMs, submarines, anti-ship cruise missiles and other weapons in an integrated command and control network, it will have to choose between a disruptive grab for sole control or a sharing of policing power with other countries that have a strong interest in preserving free-flowing maritime arteries.

Some Analyses on US trategy Review December 2010

Sober Take in Afghanistan

Petraeus Gives Gates an Upbeat Assessment

U.S. has failed on main Afghan goals, ex-spy chief says

Review Won't Alter Pakistan's Behavior 

Forging a Four-Sided Afghan Deal 

 

 

U.S. Preventive Priorities for 2011

see the file here

محورهای اقدامات خصمانه انگلیس علیه ایران

1-     تلاش جهت تشدید اسلام ستیزی از طریق تداوم حمایت از سلمان رشدی و اعطای نشان "سر" به وی و همچنین دعوت از تری جونز (کشیش آمریکایی که طرح آنش سوزی را در 11 سپتامبر مطرح کرد) برای سفر به انگلیس

2-     تلاش جهت استخدام جاسوس از ایران تحت عناوین مختلف ازجمله کارمندان محلی و ایجاد موسسات غیرقانونی آموزش زبان انگلیسی در کشور

3-     تلاش جهت به بن بست کشاندن مذاکرات ایران با 1+5 از طریق خرابکاری در جریان مذاکرات توسط نمایندگان انگلیس، و اعمال تحریم های مالی و بانکی علیه ایران در کمتر از یک هفته بعد از مذاکرات ژنو 2 در اکتبر 2009 (در حالیکه در آن زمان همه از پیشرفت مذاکرات سخن می گفتند)

4-     راه اندازی و تقویت بی بی سی فارسی برای تحریک جامعه داخلی ایران و دروغ پردازی درباره تحولات اجتماعی ایران

5-     تهدید نظامی ایران و تحریک کشورهای عرب منطقه در تشدید نظامی گری علیه ایران و تقویت حضور نظامی خود در منطقه

6-     نقش فعال در صدور قطعنامه های شورای امنیت علیه برنامه هسته ای ایران

7-     آزار، ربایش و انتقال اتباع ایرانی مورد درخواست واشنگتن از انگلیس به آمریکا (مثل مورد دستگیری دیپلمات ایرانی آقای هادی سلیمان پور به اتهام ارتباط با انفجار آمیا و یا مورد حبس آقای تاجیک)

8-     حمایت مادی، آموزشی و تسلیحاتی از گروههای تروریستی و جریان های تجزیه طلب

9-     تاکید صریح جان ساورز رئیس سرویس انگلیس به لزوم انجام عملیات های اطلاعات- پایه ( اعم از خرابکاری صنعتی و ترور) برای توقف برنامه هسته ای ایران

10-  تلاش جدی برای خروج نام گروهک منافقین از لیست تروریسم اتحادیه اروپا

11-  تعرض به آب های سرزمینی ایران

12-  همکاری تنگاتنگ سرویس انگلیس از طریق سفارت لندن در تهران با سرویس های اسرائیل و آمریکا جهت رفع کاستی های اطلاعاتی آنها از ایران و عملیات بر ضد مردم و برنامه هسته ای ایران

How Petraeus has changed the Afghanistan war

Gen. David Petraeus replaced Gen. Stanley McChrystal as head of US forces in the Afghanistan war this year. One change he's made represents something of a gamble to some in the Pentagon.

Anna Mulrine, Staff writer 

December 31, 2010 

When Gen. David Petraeus took over as head of US forces in Afghanistan earlier this year, there was some speculation about the extent to which he would run the war differently from his predecessor.
The general consensus was that there wouldn’t be much difference between Petraeus and Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who was forced to resign in June after he made impolitic comments about members of the Obama administration. Both were known as staunch adherents of counterinsurgency warfare, which tends to emphasize protecting the population over, say, body counts as a measure of success.
In many ways, this conventional wisdom has been borne out. But as the year draws to a close, there are, say senior US military officials, some clear differences emerging in the way Petraeus is now handling the Afghanistan war. Chief among the changes is one that represents something of a gamble to some in the Pentagon.

IN PICTURES: Winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan

Specifically, Petraeus has chosen to emphasize the violence that the Taliban and other insurgent groups have inflicted on the general Afghan population. This may seem like an obvious approach. Why not highlight the harm that your enemy is doing to the civilians you’re trying to win over?
But it’s not so simple, says a senior military official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he has not been authorized to speak to the press on this issue. “If you draw attention to the enemies’ impact on Afghan civilians, does that make them feel less secure” – and consequently, less willing to support NATO forces?
“That is the debate: Do they perceive a greater insecurity or do they perceive the enemy in a more negative way?” adds the official. “There are arguments on both sides.”
In most respects, Petraeus and McChrystal have run the war similarly. “You’re talking about vanilla versus French vanilla," says Andrew Krepinevich, Pentagon adviser and president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, a Washington think tank. "At the end of the day it takes a very sophisticated palate to discern the differences between the two.”
But McChyrstal chose not to emphasize Taliban violence against the population for fear of making Afghans wary of a war that was not going well, and of a NATO force that was failing to protect them, says the official. “With M-4” – the military’s nickname for four-star general McChrystal – “there was a lot of discussion among his staff on the impact on the population.”
The focus of the generals is a product of their experiences. “Both officers come from very different operational backgrounds,” says Andrew Exum, a former Army Ranger and fellow with the Center for a New American Security in Washington. “General Petraeus – his experience in the Army has been such that he spent a lot of time at a young age doing strategic assignments and thinking about the big implications of operations.”
While “General McChrystal brought operational art to a new level, General Petraeus is more experienced dealing with larger strategic issues,” he adds.
The decision to emphasize or de-emphasize Taliban violence has also hinged on the audience that the generals have wanted to reach. For Petraeus, that audience is international – he recognizes the importance of keeping the NATO coalition together in the face of home populations that are increasingly skeptical of the war, says the official.
“The thinking is that if he can draw more attention to Taliban atrocities, it will garner more support for among European partners who are sympathetic to human rights appeals," the official says.
But this comes with risks as well. “What Petraeus is emphasizing a bit more than McChrystal is winning hearts: Can you convince the population that you’re the side that should remain victorious?” says Mr. Krepinevich. “Part of doing this is also to show people that the Taliban don’t respect human rights and human dignity.”
But winning minds is a key part of counterinsurgency warfare too, Krepinevich adds. “That has to do with convincing the population that not only should they want you to win, but they have confidence that you will.”
The problem is that, “No matter how much he may want you to win, if he thinks your adversary is going to win he’s going to remain aloof, and he’s going to withhold his support.” And that, military officials add, is the challenge that Petraeus will continue to face in the months to come.

Senator proposes permanent bases in Afghanistan

The Associated Press
 Jan 2, 2011

WASHINGTON — A leading GOP lawmaker on U.S. military policy says he wants American officials to consider establishing permanent military bases in Afghanistan.
Sen. Lindsay Graham of South Carolina says that having a few U.S. air bases in Afghanistan would be a benefit to the region and would give Afghan security forces an edge against the Taliban.
Graham tells NBC's "Meet the Press" that he wants to see the U.S. have "an enduring relationship" with Afghanistan to ensure that it never falls back into the hands of terrorists.
President Barack Obama plans to begin drawing down American forces in Afghanistan next year and hand over security to Afghan forces in 2014.
Obama has talked about an enduring presence in Afghanistan but not exactly what that would entail.

The Logic of Our Iran Sanctions: Accelerate them now

Reuel Marc Gerecht and Mark Dubowitz 

The Weekly Standard

January 3 - January 10, 2011, Vol. 16, No. 16

Even before the recent inconclusive nuclear talks with Iran in Geneva, President Barack Obama undoubtedly agreed with France’s national security adviser, Jean-David Levitte, when he described Tehran’s approach to nuclear negotiations with the West as a “farce” and the dictatorship of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as “fascist.” More aggressively than any president since Jimmy Carter, Obama has used sanctions against the Islamic Republic. The White House and the State Department have deployed a “coalition of the willing.” Washington has assiduously avoided punishing any major European, Russian, or Chinese transgressor of U.S.-mandated sanctions; rather, the administration has chosen to encourage compliance by underscoring the common threat of an Iranian bomb while suggesting that an American economic hammer, wielded by an increasingly pugnacious Congress, will eventually come down on malefactors.
Administration officials will tell you that the president aims only to coerce Khamenei into a compromise; privately, they’ll admit that his aim is to contain a nuclear Iran if sanctions fail to stop uranium enrichment. But few in the administration now believe that Khamenei will compromise unless sanctions endanger his regime. And containment, which is what Washington does when it wants to wage war without direct confrontation, is a regime-change strategy: Political and economic isolation is designed to nurture Iran’s convulsive internal contradictions, vividly on display after the June 12, 2009, elections. The contentious issue in Iran policy isn’t the goal​—​do we want Khamenei and his Revolutionary Guards to fall? Democrats and Republicans differ on this far less than they did when President George W. Bush saw an “axis of evil.” The issue is timing: Can we put enough pressure on Khamenei and his praetorians to either crack the regime or make the supreme leader believe that the nuclear program actually threatens his rule?
The administration may try to avoid the inevitable​—​sanctions that significantly curtail the export of Iranian oil​—​by playing with the idea that the West and Tehran can settle for some enrichment inside the Islamic Republic that doesn’t allow for processing the quality and quantity of uranium for nuclear weapons. But such a “compromise” doesn’t pass the pinch test: There is no way the West can monitor Iranian compliance without an intrusive inspections regime, which Khamenei has adamantly refused. Tehran has often dodged the International Atomic Energy Agency’s current, polite inspection procedures and questions about suspicious Iranian behavior. And as the French, who’ve been deadly serious about nuclear proliferation since the first Gulf war in 1990-91, constantly point out, any enrichment will now allow Tehran the intellectual and mechanical means to advance weaponization. Western advocates of some enrichment are usually the same folks who don’t see Khamenei’s and the Revolutionary Guards’ possession of nuclear weaponry as all that worrisome. If you’ve already conceded the supreme leader an atomic bomb, enrichment isn’t an issue.
A negotiated “deal” with Tehran that concedes Iranian enrichment is a face-saving way for the West to avoid confessing that it would rather risk Khamenei’s having a nuke than face the two alternatives: a crippling sanctions regime, which could spike the price of oil, or an American preventive military strike.
But this avenue of escape isn’t open to the White House for a few simple reasons. First, such a deal would leave Khamenei apoplectic. Any agreement that would effectively stop the bomb potential of Iran’s 20-year nuclear program would be an enormous defeat. It’s now clear that the supreme leader wasn’t particularly fond of the nuclear talks with the European Union that began in 2003. Those talks, which dead-ended in 2005, became unacceptable when EU demands for a (temporary) suspension of uranium enrichment and the “Additional Protocol”​—providing for intrusive inspections​—​became unavoidable. Since the elections of June 12, 2009, we have watched the supreme leader unleash his security forces to torture his country into political quiescence. He has manhandled, driven into exile, and imprisoned most of the “moderate” forces with whom the West once hoped to deal. Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, one of the architects of the enrichment-pausing “Paris Agreement” of November 2004, now lives in exile in the United States, having fled Iran with his family. Has Khamenei triumphed over his internal enemies only to trade away the historic achievement of his regime? Psychologically, culturally, and religiously, this option for him makes no sense.
Conversely, no one else in the region will believe that a deal that leaves Iranian uranium enrichment in place is anything other than a rout of the West. The “EU-3” nuclear negotiations with Iran are the most important diplomatic undertaking that Brussels has attempted. (France, Great Britain, and Germany have represented the EU in these talks.) The Europeans, like the Americans, like the United Nations Security Council, have stated repeatedly and clearly that uranium enrichment by Iran without a full accounting of its nuclear program and complete access by IAEA inspectors to Iran’s known and suspected nuclear facilities is “unacceptable.” Such an enrichment “compromise” now would most likely guarantee that the Saudis would remind the nuclear-armed Pakistanis that it’s time for a little brotherly, Sunni Muslim tech transfer. The odds that others​—​especially the Egyptians and Turks​—​will also start down the nuclear path aren’t small. And unless Benjamin Netanyahu and much of Jerusalem’s political elite are just bluffing, the countdown for an Israeli preventive strike starts when the West concedes uranium enrichment to the supreme leader and his Revolutionary Guards.
And third, such a deal politically offers Obama nothing. Many Democrats and most Republicans would pounce on him for agreeing to “monitored” Iranian enrichment, which would likely collapse before American negotiators could fly home. The U.S.-led sanctions regime has shown that Washington can still have a significant impact on the Islamic Republic’s economy and politics (the foreign minister just got fired, and to minimize the impact of sanctions, the regime is cutting gasoline subsidies, which will either save the treasury billions or lead to crushing inflation). The near-miraculous attack of the centrifuge-destroying Stuxnet virus has bought the administration time and further strengthened those who want to use sticks to stop Khamenei’s nuclear aspirations.
In Washington, an unrelenting sanctions logic has developed. It has also anchored itself in Ottawa and jumped the Atlantic and the Pacific. United Nations Security Council resolution 1929 has been much more powerful than the three resolutions before it because the Europeans, the Japanese, and the South Koreans have chosen to interpret it more aggressively than they have in the past. The trick for Washington now is how to ratchet up significantly the pain in Tehran while encouraging our allies to continue to do more than they’d originally thought possible. The administration may be right (though we remain skeptical): As long as the Americans, the Europeans, and some of the big Asian players are voluntarily implementing more and more sanctions, the cumulative effect may be a punishing tidal wave, which any transgressions by the Chinese, Russians, and our allies are powerless to stop. Washington needs an incremental approach​—​implemented rapidly​—​that does not spook the oil markets and that allows for the market and increasing oil supplies from Iran’s competitors to dull the effect of less Iranian crude being traded. We need to continue to invest the Europeans in the project, allowing them to own, as they have since 2003, negotiations with the Islamic Republic.
Thinking always of Khamenei’s Achilles’ heel, Washington should aim its efforts at cutting foreign Iranian crude oil purchases. The Europeans have already cut tech transfers to and future investments in Iranian oil and natural gas, severely damaging Tehran’s ability to sustain current production. The Chinese, while backfilling on some of these investment deals, are sharply reducing their purchases of Iranian crude. China cut crude imports from Iran between January and September 2010 by approximately 17 percent from the same period in 2009, even as the world’s biggest energy consumer bought more oil. Japan, too, is cutting back. The Japanese reduced purchases of Iranian crude by over 19 percent in the first eight months of 2010; in August alone, Japan cut its purchases by 31 percent. While Iran was Japan’s third- largest supplier of oil in June 2010, by August of this year it was in sixth place. Neither the Japanese nor the Chinese want to bet their economic security on an Iranian energy sector in rapid decline.
The administration can greatly intensify the “hassle factor” in buying Iranian crude by exposing the role of the Revolutionary Guards in the crude-oil export supply chain​—​and then using the law prohibiting commerce with the Guards to sanction foreign enterprises involved with them. The Treasury Department’s recent decision to sanction the Pars Oil and Gas Company, which is a Revolutionary Guard front company involved in gasoline trading and the development of some of the largest oil and natural gas fields in the Middle East, is a good example of the type of punitive designation that can greatly complicate Iran’s energy planning.
Using the preamble of Security Council resolution 1929, which establishes the nexus between Iran’s cash-generating energy sector and the sanctioned nuclear program, the United States and its allies can also pass additional measures to prohibit long-term purchase contracts for Iranian oil and natural gas. And large up-front cash payments by foreign companies for Iranian oil and natural gas can be banned, as well as any energy bond issued by an Iranian entity (by prohibiting any foreign underwriter, purchaser, or financial institution from facilitating the issuance of a bond).
Current U.S. and EU rules severely limit investments in the Islamic Republic’s oil and natural gas sectors. In the case of U.S. law, the investment limit is $20 million per year. Large upfront cash payments on oil or natural gas purchases give the Iranians instant access to money to invest in their increasingly capital-starved energy sector. And by using long-term supply contracts to collateralize billions of dollars in energy bonds, the regime could circumvent sanctions. Bondholders require evidence that Iran can make payments on bonds, and one simple way to produce such evidence would be to sign a long-term supply contract, using the resulting guaranteed revenue stream in hard currencies to collateralize the paper issued.
The United States and the EU need to close any loopholes that would allow this kind of investment activity. Using the political cover of the preamble of resolution 1929, Washington or the EU can also introduce measures to sanction any pipeline project (and its participating partners) transporting Iranian oil or natural gas, or any shipping company, insurance company, or financial institution that provides support to an Iranian oil or natural gas trade. Needless to say, Washington or the EU can disqualify for any government contracting in America or Europe anyone buying Iranian oil or natural gas. As crude oil and natural gas buyers find it increasingly difficult to use banks to settle or extend credit for Iranian oil and natural gas trades, these buyers will seek alternative sources. Washington can also bar the participation in any U.S. energy deal (shale and offshore leases, for example) of any company that buys or facilitates the purchase of Iranian oil or natural gas. Nor would it be difficult for Western governments to sanction any company participating in overseas energy development or production involving an official Iranian company or any Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated entity.
Such punitive measures could significantly reduce the Islamic Republic’s ability to produce 3.7 million barrels of oil per day, just over 4 percent of daily world production. Provided the United States and its allies could get more oil on the market—the Iran-loathing Saudis could increase production, for example, and more oil from Canada’s enormous tar sands could hit the market, and President Obama could lift the moratorium on offshore oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico—then the world oil market would have considerably more elasticity than does the Iranian economy, which is already under stress.
Some of the possibilities above have been introduced into the Sherman-Casey-Brown bill in Congress. It would probably take little time for this legislation and other measures like it to cause a financial crisis in Tehran the likes of which the mullahs have not seen since the Iran-Iraq war.
The issue for the Obama administration is whether it will have the foresight to accelerate sanctions that are probably coming in any case. The next round of Euro-American talks with Iran is scheduled for January. Gary Samore, the White House’s nuclear proliferation point man, has already let it be known that more sanctions are on the way. Yet it is one thing for the administration to know intellectually that Khamenei will not buckle without the severest pain; it is another matter to overcome the State Department’s love of diplomatic gradualism. Anyone who has spoken to administration officials who are doggedly trying to stop the Iranian bomb knows how easily the love of the sanctions process can turn that process into an end in itself. But the key to successful diplomacy with Khamenei’s Iran is to view engagement as the supreme leader does: All scenarios are win-lose. If the West is to stop Tehran’s quest for a nuke, it must convince the supreme leader, and the Revolutionary Guards who oversee Iran’s nuclear program, that their pursuit of the bomb will destroy the regime.
When dealing with Tehran, it’s always good to remember Ruhollah Khomeini, whose iron-willed charisma gave birth to the Islamic Republic. The ayatollah relented in his war against Saddam Hussein, who’d invaded Iran in 1980, when he finally saw that the conflict would destroy his new nation. One of the men who convinced Khomeini that Iran had to sue for peace was Khamenei. He understood that the Islamic Republic could not possibly win with the West​—​especially the United States​—​aligned against it. (The accidental downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes in the Persian Gulf in July 1988 was viewed as an intentional, heart-stopping act of war by Tehran’s ruling elite.) Khamenei undoubtedly remembers what it took to break his will​—​what it took to crack Khomeini’s bellicose determination​—​to fight. The objective of American diplomacy should be to reanimate those memories.
Indirect demand-side sanctions on the Islamic Republic could possibly accomplish what an embargo could do without the diplomatic trauma. If the European Union can lay the groundwork for the slow-motion death of Iran’s oil and gas exploration business, which it already has, it can probably see its way to further constricting Iran’s energy sector. Nuclear counterproliferation is a holy of holies for Europeans. This is even truer in Washington, where surrender just isn’t an option for a Democratic president soon facing reelection.
So let us see whether Khamenei can withstand a united West. With these sanctions, we just might not need the Chinese and the Russians to help out. Even though the Stuxnet virus has bought us some time, Iran’s nuclear program is still advancing. The old Persian counsel against complacency and sloth would be wise to remember. Harcheh zudtar behtar​—​the sooner we find out whether we can make the supreme leader conceive again of the awfulness of 1988, when surrender became thinkable, the better. Current sanctions and the regime’s atrocious economic management have brought hard times. For the United States and its allies to be successful, the times need to be made a good deal harder still.
Reuel Marc Gerecht is a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and the author of the forthcoming The Wave: Man, God, and the Ballot Box in the Middle East. Mark Dubowitz is the executive director of FDD.

Washington’s World: Themes for 2011

Predictions have a predictable record of coming unstuck. We do, however, believe that it is sensible to identify a limited number of broad themes of probable salience. In that spirit, we offer 11 items for 2011 and extend to our readers our best wishes for the year.

1. President Obama’s attention will center on domestic priorities. Foreign policy issues will have to force their way onto his agenda, either by their intrinsic importance to US interests or as the result of an emergency. It is unlikely that the US government will reach for goals beyond those currently in play.

2. With Congress divided and ideological passions prominent, the ability of the US governance system to deliver timely decisions on the pressing issues of the day will be severely tested. Maneuvering for the 2012 elections will shape much of the debate.

3. US economic performance will steadily improve, but some sectors of the economy, notably housing, will continue to be fragile. Federal debt ratios will remain obstinately high. Obama's re-election prospects will depend on his perceived success in job recovery.

4. Emerging funding constraints will significantly limit the Pentagon's ability to achieve its goals abroad. Any new spending will focus on enhancing US capabilities in Asia.

5. The US will maintain its rhetorical commitment to human rights. This will complicate

relations with Russia, China and allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

6. The search for a viable US policy with regard to China, steering between partnership and hostility, will be the dominant foreign policy theme. The US will encourage its partners in India, Japan, South Korea and the whole Pacific Rim to play more countervailing roles. The implications for global financial matters will be significant.

7. The Iranian quest for nuclear weaponry will come to a head in 2011 with Israel championing a more aggressive policy and finding increasing support in Congress.  The Administration will maneuver to avoid military action.

8. The Administration will attempt to maintain the fragile status quo on the Korean Peninsular. The US will do everything it can to steer clear of a confrontation.  

9. The Middle East peace process will lose priority for the Administration during 2011.

10. In Afghanistan, the US mission will point to growing numbers of trained Afghan security forces as the precursor to initiating a drawdown.  Strategic success against the Taliban will remain elusive.

11.  The Administration's efforts against al-Qaeda will see increased activity in the Yemen and the Horn of Africa as well as stepped up efforts to root out the "homegrown" threat.  These actions will offer a mixed record of achievement.

U.S. efforts fail to convince Pakistan's top general to target Taliban

By Karin Brulliard and Karen DeYoung
Washington Post
Friday, December 31, 2010


ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN - Countless U.S. officials in recent years have lectured and listened to Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, the man many view as the most powerful in Pakistan. They have drunk tea and played golf with him, feted him and flown with him in helicopters.
But they have yet to persuade him to undertake what the Obama administration's recent strategy review concluded is a key to success in the Afghan war - the elimination of havens inside Pakistan where the Taliban plots and stages attacks on coalition troops in Afghanistan.
Kayani, who as Pakistan's army chief has more direct say over the country's security strategy than its president or prime minister, has resisted personal appeals from President Obama, U.S. military commanders and senior diplomats. Recent U.S. intelligence estimates have concluded that he is unlikely to change his mind anytime soon. Despite the entreaties, officials say, Kayani doesn't trust U.S. motivations and is hedging his bets in case the American strategy for Afghanistan fails.
In many ways, Kayani is the personification of the vexing problem posed by Pakistan. Like the influential military establishment he represents, he views Afghanistan on a timeline stretching far beyond the U.S. withdrawal, which is slated to begin this summer. While the Obama administration sees the insurgents as an enemy force to be defeated as quickly and directly as possible, Pakistan has long regarded them as useful proxies in protecting its western flank from inroads by India, its historical adversary.
"Kayani wants to talk about the end state in South Asia," said one of several Obama administration officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity about the sensitive relationship. U.S. generals, the official said, "want to talk about the next drone attacks."
The administration has praised Kayani for operations in 2009 and 2010 against domestic militants in the Swat Valley and in South Waziristan, and has dramatically increased its military and economic assistance to Pakistan. But it has grown frustrated that the general has not launched a ground assault against Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda sanctuaries in North Waziristan.
Kayani has promised action when he has enough troops available, although he has given no indication of when that might be. Most of Pakistan's half-million-man army remains facing east, toward India.
In recent months, Kayani has sometimes become defiant. When U.S.-Pakistani tensions spiked in September, after two Pakistani soldiers were killed by an Afghanistan-based American helicopter gunship pursuing insurgents on the wrong side of the border, he personally ordered the closure of the main frontier crossing for U.S. military supplies into Afghanistan, according to U.S. and Pakistani officials.
In October, administration officials choreographed a White House meeting for Kayani at which Obama could directly deliver his message of urgency. The army chief heard him out, then provided a 13-page document updating Pakistan's strategic perspective and noting the gap between short-term U.S. concerns and Pakistan's long-term interests, according to U.S. officials.
Kayani reportedly was infuriated by the recent WikiLeaks release of U.S. diplomatic cables, some of which depicted him as far chummier with the Americans and more deeply involved in Pakistani politics than his carefully crafted domestic persona would suggest. In one cable, sent to Washington by the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad last year, he was quoted as discussing with U.S. officials a possible removal of Pakistan's president and his preferred replacement.
On the eve of the cable's publication in November, the normally aloof and soft-spoken general ranted for hours on the subject of irreconcilable U.S.-Pakistan differences in a session with a group of Pakistani journalists.
The two countries' "frames of reference" regarding regional security "can never be the same," he said, according to news accounts. Calling Pakistan America's "most bullied ally," Kayani said that the "real aim of U.S. strategy is to de-nuclearize Pakistan."
The general's suspicions
Kayani was a star student at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., in 1988, writing his master's thesis on "Strengths and Weaknesses of the Afghan Resistance Movement." He was among the last Pakistanis to graduate from the college before the United States cut off military assistance to Islamabad in 1990 in response to Pakistan's suspected nuclear weapons program. Eight years later, both Pakistan and India conducted tests of nuclear devices. The estrangement lasted until President George W. Bush lifted the sanctions in 2001, less than two weeks after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
Kayani is far from alone in the Pakistani military in suspecting that the United States will abandon Pakistan once it has achieved its goals in Afghanistan, and that its goal remains to leave Pakistan defenseless against nuclear-armed India.
Kayani "is one of the most anti-India chiefs Pakistan has ever had," one U.S. official said.
The son of a noncommissioned army officer, Kayani was commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1971. He was chief of military operations during the 2001-2002 Pakistan-India crisis. As head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency from 2004 to 2007, he served as a point man for back-channel talks with India initiated by then-President Pervez Musharraf. When Musharraf resigned in 2008, the talks abruptly ended.
The Pakistani military has long been involved in politics, but few believe that the general seeks to lead the nation. "He has stated from the beginning that he has no desire to involve the military in running the country," said Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. But that does not mean Kayani would stand by "if there was a failure of civilian institutions," Nawaz said. "The army would step in."
Kayani remains an enigmatic figure, chiefly known in Pakistan for his passion for golf and chain-smoking. According to Jehangir Karamat, a retired general who once held Kayani's job, he is an avid reader and a fan of Lebanese American poet Khalil Gibran.
'Mind-boggling'
Even some Pakistanis see Kayani's India-centric view as dated, self-serving and potentially disastrous as the insurgents the country has harbored increasingly turn on Pakistan itself.
"Nine years into the Afghanistan war, we're fighting various strands of militancy, and we still have an army chief who considers India the major threat," said Cyril Almeida, an editor and columnist at the English-language newspaper Dawn. "That's mind-boggling."
Kayani has cultivated the approval of a strongly anti-American public that opinion polls indicate now holds the military in far higher esteem than it does the weak civilian government of President Asif Ali Zardari. Pakistani officials say the need for public support is a key reason for rebuffing U.S. pleas for an offensive in North Waziristan. In addition to necessitating the transfer of troops from the Indian border, Pakistani military and intelligence officials say such a campaign would incite domestic terrorism and uproot local communities. Residents who left their homes during the South Waziristan offensive more than a year ago have only recently been allowed to begin returning to their villages.
Several U.S. officials described Kayani as straightforward in his explanations of why the time is not right for an offensive in North Waziristan: a combination of too few available troops and too little public support.
The real power broker
Pakistani democracy activists fault the United States for professing to support Pakistan's civilian government while at the same time bolstering Kayani with frequent high-level visits and giving him a prominent role in strategic talks with Islamabad.
Obama administration officials said in response that while they voice support for Pakistan's weak civilian government at every opportunity, the reality is that the army chief is the one who can produce results.
"We have this policy objective, so who do we talk to?" one official said. "It's increasingly clear that we have to talk to Kayani."
Most of the talking is done by Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In more than 30 face-to-face meetings with Kayani, including 21 visits to Pakistan since late 2007, Mullen has sought to reverse what both sides call a "trust deficit" between the two militaries.
But the patience of other U.S. officials has worn thin. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the commander of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan, has adopted a much tougher attitude toward Kayani than his predecessor, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, had, according to several U.S. officials.
For his part, Kayani complains that he is "always asking Petraeus what is the strategic objective" in Afghanistan, according to a friend, retired air marshal Shahzad Chaudhry.
As the Obama administration struggles to assess the fruits of its investment in Pakistan, some officials said the United States now accepts that pleas and military assistance will not change Kayani's thinking. Mullen and Richard C. Holbrooke, who served as the administration's special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan until his death last month, thought that "getting Kayani to trust us enough" to be honest constituted progress, one official said.
But what Kayani has honestly told them, the official said, is: "I don't trust you."