By David Ignatius,
“Revenge, at first though sweet, Bitter ere long back on itself recoils.” The wisdom of that couplet from John Milton’s “Paradise Lost” extends in many directions. But let’s consider the context of the Arab Spring and its transition from dictatorship to democracy.
Revolutions can go off the rails for many reasons. But history shows that one of the most dangerous (if also understandable) mistakes is the desire to settle scores with the deposed regime. That toxic whiff of revenge has been in the air lately in Egypt, and it poses a danger for the Tahrir Revolution and the other movements that emulate it.
The New York Times reported last week that Egypt’s transitional military council intends to try deposed President Hosni Mubarak for conspiring to kill unarmed protesters. Conviction could mean the death penalty. The new regime also plans to prosecute Mubarak and his two sons, along with a wave of business cronies, on charges of corruption.
This prosecutorial zeal has frightened conservative Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia, which has warned that it won’t provide economic assistance to Egypt if Mubarak is humiliated. But the greater danger is that Egyptian and international investors will steer clear of the country if they think doing business there might expose them to legal risks.
Sen. John Kerry had it right when he told a gathering of the trustees of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars last week that a vengeful legal assault on Mubarak would be an “enormous mistake.” The biggest cost, Kerry said, is that it would undermine the economic strategy of innovation, investment and entrepreneurship that was the overlooked centerpiece of President Obama’s big speech on the Middle East.
What’s needed in Egypt and the other Arab countries that have suffered from dictatorship is a sense that the rule of law will prevail, with safeguards against vindictive prosecution. This protective legal framework is as important as democracy itself, which as Alexander Hamilton and other American founders warned more than 200 years ago can be bent to become the tyrannical will of the mob.
On my visits to Egypt since the Tahrir Revolution, I have been struck by the growing polarization between Christians and Muslims and the vindictiveness against Mubarak’s family and friends. It’s nice to see Egyptians lining up at newspaper kiosks (to buy real newspapers, as opposed to canned official lies), but my Cairo friends say that too many headlines carry the implicit message, “Off with their heads!”
There’s a difference between accountability for the crimes of the past, which is healthy, and a spirit of vengeance, which is not. South Africa sought that balance with its Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which denounced apartheid but also tried to reassure whites that they had a future in a multiracial democracy. Rwanda has struggled to craft a similar process that reconciles Hutus who perpetrated the 1994 genocide with the Tutsi victims (who now run the country).
Neither the South African nor the Rwandan efforts have been entirely successful. But both established a legal process of justice that had reconciliation as its explicit goal, which checked the impulse for vengeance.
Failure to develop such a framework can have disastrous consequences. The French Revolution of 1789 was inflamed by the Committee of Public Safety and its practice of national purification by guillotine; the Iranian revolution of 1979 was manipulated by zealots who, from the first months, began purging those they judged insufficiently devoted to Ayatollah Khomeini.
Finding a post-revolutionary path to reconciliation is especially important in the Middle East, whose nations are mosaics of different religions, tribes and clans. Unless an inclusive spirit of “truth and reconciliation” can be nurtured, these countries will fracture into pre-modern loyalties, as happened in post-Hussein Iraq.
This transition process is especially volatile in Syria, where a blood feud between the ruling Alawite minority and the Sunni majority has been building since the 1970s. Exacerbating this religious fracture is the regional tension between Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia.
For an example of how the blood feuds of the past can poison the present, one need look no further than the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Both sides are so embedded in their narratives that they can’t write the common document of a peace treaty. They could use a little truth and reconciliation, too.
As the Arab Spring rolls forward, the new revolutionaries must build pathways to a stable and tolerant future, even as they take proper account of the past. Otherwise, as the movie title had it, “there will be blood.”
davidignatius@washpost.com
© The Washington Post Co
Showing posts with label Middle East. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Middle East. Show all posts
Monday, June 6, 2011
NATO and the Arab Spring
By ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN
Published: May 31, 2011
BRUSSELS — The dramatic developments across North Africa and the Middle East remind me of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. From Tunis to Cairo to Benghazi, people overcame fear to embrace freedom. Some governments in the region have taken important steps to meet the rightful demands of their citizens. Others realized their time was up and moved aside. But I was appalled to see that in some countries, and especially in Libya, the call for freedom and dignity has been met with state violence.
NATO’s reaction to the crisis in Libya has been quick and resolute. In March, acting under the authority of an historic United Nations Security Council Resolution, the alliance took overall command of military operations to protect the Libyan people against Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s outrageous attacks. Working together with partners, including from the region, we have made significant progress in degrading Qaddafi’s ability to attack civilians and to lay siege to cities.
Some people have asked why NATO acted in Libya but not elsewhere, in particular in Syria. My answer is clear. We took action in Libya because we have a strong mandate from the Security Council and solid support from countries in the region. That is a unique combination which we have not seen elsewhere.
Three months ago, nobody would have predicted a NATO operation in North Africa. But NATO allies have long understood that our security is closely tied to that of our southern neighbors. That is why it also makes perfect sense to consider how we can help North Africa and the Middle East become a region that is free, democratic, and stable.
First, we will sustain our efforts to fulfill the United Nations mandate to protect the Libyan people. We will continue operations until all attacks and threats of attack against civilians have ended; until the regime has verifiably withdrawn its forces and mercenaries back to their bases; and until full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access is guaranteed to all the people in Libya in need of assistance.
However, there is no solely military solution to this conflict. The only lasting solution will be a political one that responds to the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people. NATO allies and partners will keep up the pressure to pave the way for such a solution. As the Contact Group and the recent G-8 summit made clear, the question is not if Qaddafi will go, but when.
Second, President Obama has already announced a far-reaching policy to support democratic reform and economic development in North Africa and the Middle East. The European Union could also have a major role to play. NATO, too, can make a unique contribution. Many allies went through demanding reforms after their own revolutions over 20 years ago and have a wealth of experience to share. Modern defense and security institutions which are fully accountable to democratically elected authorities will be a vital reform priority for Libya and many other countries in the region.
Finally, the Arab Spring has shown the importance of intensifying our political dialogue. NATO already has two partnership frameworks that bring together the 28 allies with many countries of the region: our Mediterranean Dialogue with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, and our Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. They form an excellent basis to discuss common security concerns, develop common responses, and build lasting trust between our nations. We are open and stand ready to include other countries. A democratic Libya, if it were interested, would be a most welcome new partner.
As an alliance of democracies, we believe that fundamental values are the true foundation for stability. That is why I am convinced that lasting stability, security and prosperity across North Africa and the Middle East can only be possible once all the people of the region enjoy the fundamental values that we all cherish: freedom, democracy and human rights.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen is the secretary general of NATO.
Published: May 31, 2011
BRUSSELS — The dramatic developments across North Africa and the Middle East remind me of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. From Tunis to Cairo to Benghazi, people overcame fear to embrace freedom. Some governments in the region have taken important steps to meet the rightful demands of their citizens. Others realized their time was up and moved aside. But I was appalled to see that in some countries, and especially in Libya, the call for freedom and dignity has been met with state violence.
NATO’s reaction to the crisis in Libya has been quick and resolute. In March, acting under the authority of an historic United Nations Security Council Resolution, the alliance took overall command of military operations to protect the Libyan people against Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s outrageous attacks. Working together with partners, including from the region, we have made significant progress in degrading Qaddafi’s ability to attack civilians and to lay siege to cities.
Some people have asked why NATO acted in Libya but not elsewhere, in particular in Syria. My answer is clear. We took action in Libya because we have a strong mandate from the Security Council and solid support from countries in the region. That is a unique combination which we have not seen elsewhere.
Three months ago, nobody would have predicted a NATO operation in North Africa. But NATO allies have long understood that our security is closely tied to that of our southern neighbors. That is why it also makes perfect sense to consider how we can help North Africa and the Middle East become a region that is free, democratic, and stable.
First, we will sustain our efforts to fulfill the United Nations mandate to protect the Libyan people. We will continue operations until all attacks and threats of attack against civilians have ended; until the regime has verifiably withdrawn its forces and mercenaries back to their bases; and until full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access is guaranteed to all the people in Libya in need of assistance.
However, there is no solely military solution to this conflict. The only lasting solution will be a political one that responds to the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people. NATO allies and partners will keep up the pressure to pave the way for such a solution. As the Contact Group and the recent G-8 summit made clear, the question is not if Qaddafi will go, but when.
Second, President Obama has already announced a far-reaching policy to support democratic reform and economic development in North Africa and the Middle East. The European Union could also have a major role to play. NATO, too, can make a unique contribution. Many allies went through demanding reforms after their own revolutions over 20 years ago and have a wealth of experience to share. Modern defense and security institutions which are fully accountable to democratically elected authorities will be a vital reform priority for Libya and many other countries in the region.
Finally, the Arab Spring has shown the importance of intensifying our political dialogue. NATO already has two partnership frameworks that bring together the 28 allies with many countries of the region: our Mediterranean Dialogue with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, and our Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. They form an excellent basis to discuss common security concerns, develop common responses, and build lasting trust between our nations. We are open and stand ready to include other countries. A democratic Libya, if it were interested, would be a most welcome new partner.
As an alliance of democracies, we believe that fundamental values are the true foundation for stability. That is why I am convinced that lasting stability, security and prosperity across North Africa and the Middle East can only be possible once all the people of the region enjoy the fundamental values that we all cherish: freedom, democracy and human rights.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen is the secretary general of NATO.
G8 ‘Marshall Plan’ for Arab Spring Nations Falls Short
Posted on 05/28/2011 by Juan
The 8 wealthiest industrial countries, meeting at the G-8, urged that the world give Egypt, Tunisia and liberated Libya (‘emerging democracies in the Arab world’) some $40 billion in aid. The sum will make headlines but there is less to it than meets the eye.
The G8 is only ponying up $10 billion itself, and that is only in the form of relatively vague promises of a sort that have often not been completely followed through on in the past. It is urging that the Gulf oil states to give $10 billion, though some of them, like Saudi Arabia, were not actually very happy about Hosni Mubarak being overthrown and it is not clear that they will want to help grassroots democratization succeed. That $10 bn. may or may not come through, and if it did it might have strings attached that would actually be undemocratic. Saudi Arabia is very afraid of the outbreak of press freedom in Egypt, which could end its stranglehold over Arabophone journalism and open its authoritarian system to critique. What price would it extract from Cairo for its billions in aid?
Then the G8 is urging that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank provide another $20 bn., but that aid is likely to be in the form of loans.
But Egypt alone is carrying $80 billion in debt, and its debt servicing costs have risen because its credit rating has been downgraded in the wake of the political crisis.
Tunisia is even worse off, with 1/8 of Egypt’s population but a debt of $50 billion racked up by the Zine El Abidine kleptocracy. Before the crisis, Tunisia had been looking to borrow nearly $3 billion this year just to pay the interest on the old debt and cover budget shortfalls (caused by the ruling class stealing the country blind).
So the G8′s idea of getting these countries further in debt, and making vague promises on direct aid, isn’t probably actually very helpful.
There is, moreover, a contrast to be made here in what the wealthy countries seem to most value when it comes to their financial dealings with places like Egypt. In 1990-1991, Egypt was $50 billion in debt, and then its government joined in the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein’s forces occupying Kuwait. After the Gulf War, $25 billion of the debt was forgiven, i.e., half, which uplifted the Egyptian economy in the early to mid 1990s. Pakistan also got very heavy debt forgiveness after 2001 for turning on the Taliban and allying with the United States and NATO.
If joining a war is worth half a country’s debt, then moving from a military dictatorship to trying to become a democratic country should be worth just as much. That would mean Egypt alone should be getting $40 bn. in debt forgiveness. After all, the debt was incurred by a military dictatorship that did not consult the people, and which was in the hip pocket of the Western Powers. Why should poor Egyptians in Ismailiya and Asyut be held hostage for repayment?
And, the $25 bn. in debt forgiveness for Egypt of the early 1990s was a sure thing, not vague promises and ‘calls’ on other countries and institutions of the sort that just came out of the G8.
It is also true that in the 1990s, US debt was relatively small and that Bill Clinton even had a budget surplus late in his term, whereas G.W. Bush and his Republican majority doubled the national debt and created long term structural deficit with his tax cuts and wars. (Obama’s deficits have been one-off and won’t affect things going forward.). But all that is not the fault of the Tunisian and Egyptian people, though it underlines how much Bush weakened America.
Egypt’s transition to democracy is going to be rocky enough without the albatross of Hosni Mubarak’s debts hanging around its neck. The world community needs to be far more generous and pro-active if Egyptians are going to feel rewarded rather than punished for their remarkable achievement in moving toward popular sovereignty and a rule of law. The same holds true for Tunisia. But Egypt is a fourth of the Arab world and an opinion leader, and its success really would resonate widely in the Arab world and Africa.
The G8 gesture was good as a confidence-building measure, but it is piddling in relationship to the real needs and is short-sighted in its picayune dimensions. It also signals that war-fighting is more valued than democracy-making.
One good thing about the likely victory of the Free Libya forces is that that country’s oil wealth ($26 bn a year) could be used in part to support the new democracies in its neighborhood, while Qaddafi would have tried to undermine them.
The 8 wealthiest industrial countries, meeting at the G-8, urged that the world give Egypt, Tunisia and liberated Libya (‘emerging democracies in the Arab world’) some $40 billion in aid. The sum will make headlines but there is less to it than meets the eye.
The G8 is only ponying up $10 billion itself, and that is only in the form of relatively vague promises of a sort that have often not been completely followed through on in the past. It is urging that the Gulf oil states to give $10 billion, though some of them, like Saudi Arabia, were not actually very happy about Hosni Mubarak being overthrown and it is not clear that they will want to help grassroots democratization succeed. That $10 bn. may or may not come through, and if it did it might have strings attached that would actually be undemocratic. Saudi Arabia is very afraid of the outbreak of press freedom in Egypt, which could end its stranglehold over Arabophone journalism and open its authoritarian system to critique. What price would it extract from Cairo for its billions in aid?
Then the G8 is urging that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank provide another $20 bn., but that aid is likely to be in the form of loans.
But Egypt alone is carrying $80 billion in debt, and its debt servicing costs have risen because its credit rating has been downgraded in the wake of the political crisis.
Tunisia is even worse off, with 1/8 of Egypt’s population but a debt of $50 billion racked up by the Zine El Abidine kleptocracy. Before the crisis, Tunisia had been looking to borrow nearly $3 billion this year just to pay the interest on the old debt and cover budget shortfalls (caused by the ruling class stealing the country blind).
So the G8′s idea of getting these countries further in debt, and making vague promises on direct aid, isn’t probably actually very helpful.
There is, moreover, a contrast to be made here in what the wealthy countries seem to most value when it comes to their financial dealings with places like Egypt. In 1990-1991, Egypt was $50 billion in debt, and then its government joined in the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein’s forces occupying Kuwait. After the Gulf War, $25 billion of the debt was forgiven, i.e., half, which uplifted the Egyptian economy in the early to mid 1990s. Pakistan also got very heavy debt forgiveness after 2001 for turning on the Taliban and allying with the United States and NATO.
If joining a war is worth half a country’s debt, then moving from a military dictatorship to trying to become a democratic country should be worth just as much. That would mean Egypt alone should be getting $40 bn. in debt forgiveness. After all, the debt was incurred by a military dictatorship that did not consult the people, and which was in the hip pocket of the Western Powers. Why should poor Egyptians in Ismailiya and Asyut be held hostage for repayment?
And, the $25 bn. in debt forgiveness for Egypt of the early 1990s was a sure thing, not vague promises and ‘calls’ on other countries and institutions of the sort that just came out of the G8.
It is also true that in the 1990s, US debt was relatively small and that Bill Clinton even had a budget surplus late in his term, whereas G.W. Bush and his Republican majority doubled the national debt and created long term structural deficit with his tax cuts and wars. (Obama’s deficits have been one-off and won’t affect things going forward.). But all that is not the fault of the Tunisian and Egyptian people, though it underlines how much Bush weakened America.
Egypt’s transition to democracy is going to be rocky enough without the albatross of Hosni Mubarak’s debts hanging around its neck. The world community needs to be far more generous and pro-active if Egyptians are going to feel rewarded rather than punished for their remarkable achievement in moving toward popular sovereignty and a rule of law. The same holds true for Tunisia. But Egypt is a fourth of the Arab world and an opinion leader, and its success really would resonate widely in the Arab world and Africa.
The G8 gesture was good as a confidence-building measure, but it is piddling in relationship to the real needs and is short-sighted in its picayune dimensions. It also signals that war-fighting is more valued than democracy-making.
One good thing about the likely victory of the Free Libya forces is that that country’s oil wealth ($26 bn a year) could be used in part to support the new democracies in its neighborhood, while Qaddafi would have tried to undermine them.
Sunday, May 29, 2011
Saudi Bid to Curb Iran Worries U.S.
NYtimes
MAY 27, 2011
By MATTHEW ROSENBERG, JAY SOLOMON and MARGARET COKER
Saudi Arabia is rallying Muslim nations across the Middle East and Asia to join an informal Arab alliance against Iran, in a move some U.S. officials worry could draw other troubled nations into the sectarian tensions gripping the Arab world.
Saudi officials have approached Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Central Asian states to lend diplomatic support—and potentially military assistance in some cases—to help stifle a majority Shiite revolt in Sunni-led Bahrain, a conflict that has become a symbol of Arab defiance against Iran.
Saudi Arabia's efforts, though against a common enemy, signal increasing friction with the Obama administration. Its invitation to Pakistan in particular could complicate U.S. security goals in South Asia. The push also complicates U.S. efforts to guide popular uprisings in the Middle East toward a peaceful and democratic conclusion.
The chief of the Saudi National Security Council, Prince Bandar bin Sultan al Saud, asked Pakistan's powerful generals in March to lend support for the operation in Bahrain, according to Pakistani, U.S. and Saudi officials briefed on the meetings.
Associated Press
Bahraini soldiers with a portrait of Bahrain's King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa on an armored personnel carrier at a checkpoint in Manama.
Prince Bandar—who was the Saudi ambassador to Washington for more than two decades—told the Pakistani generals that the U.S. shouldn't be counted on to restore stability across the Middle East or protect Pakistan's interests in South Asia, these officials say.
U.S. officials working with Saudi Arabia acknowledged in recent days Riyadh's frustration with Washington's policies but believe the relationship can be stabilized. "They are not happy with us, and are really nervous about Iran," said an American official. "But I don't think they are going to go too far."
Saudi officials said their campaign was broad. "There are many elements of this initiative," said a Saudi official. "All the major Muslim states are willing to commit to this issue if need be and asked by Saudi leadership."
The official said any potential Pakistani troops could be integrated into the 4,000-man force of mostly Saudi soldiers that deployed to Bahrain in March to defend the ruling Khalifa family against the popular domestic uprising against its rule. But Saudi officials said the current force is adequate, and no formal request for troops has yet been made.
The military intervention was invited by Bahrain's Sunni monarchy, which accused Iran of driving the protest movement. Tehran denied the charge, while volubly defending the rights of the protesters and demanding a withdrawal of the foreign troops.
Security forces from other Gulf Cooperation Council members joined Saudi troops in stifling the revolt, in what Saudi Arabia said was a message to Iran not to meddle in other nations' affairs. The GCC includes Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Saudi Arabia has sought to expand the GCC to include Jordan and Morocco.
The U.S. opposed the violent crackdown. American officials have objected to the use of force by Arab regimes against protesters, and say they fear violence could drive Bahrain's Shiite protesters into the arms of Iran, a Shiite theocracy that has long vied with the Saudis for influence in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East.
Saudi diplomats said that after the GCC force entered Bahrain in March, Riyadh dispatched senior officials to Europe and Asia to explain the operation and try to galvanize support. Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal traveled to Europe while Prince Bandar traveled to Asia.
Prince Bandar's stops included India, China, Pakistan and Malaysia. Prince Bandar, who has no spokesman, couldn't be reached for comment.
Malaysia, which is also Sunni-dominated, said this month it was willing to send troops to Bahrain, during a visit to Riyadh by Prime Minister Najib Razak. "Malaysia fully backs all sovereign decisions taken by Saudi Arabia and GCC states to safeguard the stability and security of the region in these trying times," Mr. Najib said in a statement.
Bahraini officials said Thursday that they desire diplomatic support but don't need military assistance at this stage, and haven't made requests to either Pakistan or Malaysia.
A civilian Pakistani official said its military was weighing what it could do to help the Saudis. A senior Pakistani military officer said Pakistan has no immediate plans to send soldiers for "operational purposes."
The officer said a Pakistani battalion has been in Bahrain since before the unrest began to help train Bahraini forces, but hasn't taken part in the crackdown. Bahrain's police force includes a substantial contingent of Pakistani recruits.
Military ties between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia go back decades. Pakistan receives hundreds of millions of dollars a year in Saudi aid, much of it in the form of subsidized oil.
The Saudi overture in Pakistan is a sign of how diplomatic friction in two distinct regions—the Middle East on one hand and Afghanistan and Pakistan on the other—could make it harder for the U.S. to pursue its goals of ending the conflict in Afghanistan, stabilizing nuclear-armed Pakistan, limiting Iran's power and keeping a lid on violent turmoil in the Mideast.
Pakistani and U.S. relations were already souring in March before the U.S. raid in Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden, which Pakistan viewed as a violation of national sovereignty.
But Pakistan, like Saudi Arabia, relies heavily on the U.S. The U.S. is Saudi Arabia's closest strategic partner. Last year Riyadh and Washington announced a planned $60 billion arms sale, the largest in U.S. history.
The U.S. provides Saudi Arabia and other allies in the region with an air and naval shield against possible attacks by Iran, with military bases in Qatar, Bahrain and the U.A.E.
Still, U.S.-Saudi relations have soured over the past decade. Saudi Arabia was opposed to the toppling of Iraq's Saddam Hussein because of his role as a bulwark against Iranian power. And Riyadh has been skeptical of the Obama administration's efforts to engage Iran diplomatically, among other disagreements.
Related
Saudi Protesters Step Back—for Now
Nations Seek to Make Tunisia Model for Democracy in Region
Riyadh upset officials in Washington in another nominal proxy fight with Iran, in late 2009, when Saudi forces entered Yemen to clear rebels from their shared border. Yemen accused Iran of aiding the insurgents; Tehran denied the charge. The U.S. says it has seen no evidence of Iranian involvement in the uprising.
Saudis blame the U.S. in large part for abetting the push to topple Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. The Saudis saw him as the last strong Sunni hedge against Iranian influence and fear Egypt's new government will be too friendly with Tehran.
A senior Saudi official said relations with Washington are strong, and denied that Prince Bandar had spoken ill of the U.S.
The Saudis and Iranians have cobbled together loosely allied camps across the Mideast. Iran holds sway in Syria, and with the militant Arab groups Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, parties opposed to the West and deeply hostile to Israel.
The Saudi sphere, which is more pro-Western, includes the Sunni Muslim-led Gulf monarchies, Egypt, Morocco and the other main Palestinian faction, Fatah.
Write to Matthew Rosenberg at matthew.rosenberg@wsj.com, Jay Solomon at jay.solomon@wsj.com and Margaret Coker at margaret.coker@wsj.com
MAY 27, 2011
By MATTHEW ROSENBERG, JAY SOLOMON and MARGARET COKER
Saudi Arabia is rallying Muslim nations across the Middle East and Asia to join an informal Arab alliance against Iran, in a move some U.S. officials worry could draw other troubled nations into the sectarian tensions gripping the Arab world.
Saudi officials have approached Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Central Asian states to lend diplomatic support—and potentially military assistance in some cases—to help stifle a majority Shiite revolt in Sunni-led Bahrain, a conflict that has become a symbol of Arab defiance against Iran.
Saudi Arabia's efforts, though against a common enemy, signal increasing friction with the Obama administration. Its invitation to Pakistan in particular could complicate U.S. security goals in South Asia. The push also complicates U.S. efforts to guide popular uprisings in the Middle East toward a peaceful and democratic conclusion.
The chief of the Saudi National Security Council, Prince Bandar bin Sultan al Saud, asked Pakistan's powerful generals in March to lend support for the operation in Bahrain, according to Pakistani, U.S. and Saudi officials briefed on the meetings.
Associated Press
Bahraini soldiers with a portrait of Bahrain's King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa on an armored personnel carrier at a checkpoint in Manama.
Prince Bandar—who was the Saudi ambassador to Washington for more than two decades—told the Pakistani generals that the U.S. shouldn't be counted on to restore stability across the Middle East or protect Pakistan's interests in South Asia, these officials say.
U.S. officials working with Saudi Arabia acknowledged in recent days Riyadh's frustration with Washington's policies but believe the relationship can be stabilized. "They are not happy with us, and are really nervous about Iran," said an American official. "But I don't think they are going to go too far."
Saudi officials said their campaign was broad. "There are many elements of this initiative," said a Saudi official. "All the major Muslim states are willing to commit to this issue if need be and asked by Saudi leadership."
The official said any potential Pakistani troops could be integrated into the 4,000-man force of mostly Saudi soldiers that deployed to Bahrain in March to defend the ruling Khalifa family against the popular domestic uprising against its rule. But Saudi officials said the current force is adequate, and no formal request for troops has yet been made.
The military intervention was invited by Bahrain's Sunni monarchy, which accused Iran of driving the protest movement. Tehran denied the charge, while volubly defending the rights of the protesters and demanding a withdrawal of the foreign troops.
Security forces from other Gulf Cooperation Council members joined Saudi troops in stifling the revolt, in what Saudi Arabia said was a message to Iran not to meddle in other nations' affairs. The GCC includes Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Saudi Arabia has sought to expand the GCC to include Jordan and Morocco.
The U.S. opposed the violent crackdown. American officials have objected to the use of force by Arab regimes against protesters, and say they fear violence could drive Bahrain's Shiite protesters into the arms of Iran, a Shiite theocracy that has long vied with the Saudis for influence in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East.
Saudi diplomats said that after the GCC force entered Bahrain in March, Riyadh dispatched senior officials to Europe and Asia to explain the operation and try to galvanize support. Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal traveled to Europe while Prince Bandar traveled to Asia.
Prince Bandar's stops included India, China, Pakistan and Malaysia. Prince Bandar, who has no spokesman, couldn't be reached for comment.
Malaysia, which is also Sunni-dominated, said this month it was willing to send troops to Bahrain, during a visit to Riyadh by Prime Minister Najib Razak. "Malaysia fully backs all sovereign decisions taken by Saudi Arabia and GCC states to safeguard the stability and security of the region in these trying times," Mr. Najib said in a statement.
Bahraini officials said Thursday that they desire diplomatic support but don't need military assistance at this stage, and haven't made requests to either Pakistan or Malaysia.
A civilian Pakistani official said its military was weighing what it could do to help the Saudis. A senior Pakistani military officer said Pakistan has no immediate plans to send soldiers for "operational purposes."
The officer said a Pakistani battalion has been in Bahrain since before the unrest began to help train Bahraini forces, but hasn't taken part in the crackdown. Bahrain's police force includes a substantial contingent of Pakistani recruits.
Military ties between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia go back decades. Pakistan receives hundreds of millions of dollars a year in Saudi aid, much of it in the form of subsidized oil.
The Saudi overture in Pakistan is a sign of how diplomatic friction in two distinct regions—the Middle East on one hand and Afghanistan and Pakistan on the other—could make it harder for the U.S. to pursue its goals of ending the conflict in Afghanistan, stabilizing nuclear-armed Pakistan, limiting Iran's power and keeping a lid on violent turmoil in the Mideast.
Pakistani and U.S. relations were already souring in March before the U.S. raid in Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden, which Pakistan viewed as a violation of national sovereignty.
But Pakistan, like Saudi Arabia, relies heavily on the U.S. The U.S. is Saudi Arabia's closest strategic partner. Last year Riyadh and Washington announced a planned $60 billion arms sale, the largest in U.S. history.
The U.S. provides Saudi Arabia and other allies in the region with an air and naval shield against possible attacks by Iran, with military bases in Qatar, Bahrain and the U.A.E.
Still, U.S.-Saudi relations have soured over the past decade. Saudi Arabia was opposed to the toppling of Iraq's Saddam Hussein because of his role as a bulwark against Iranian power. And Riyadh has been skeptical of the Obama administration's efforts to engage Iran diplomatically, among other disagreements.
Related
Saudi Protesters Step Back—for Now
Nations Seek to Make Tunisia Model for Democracy in Region
Riyadh upset officials in Washington in another nominal proxy fight with Iran, in late 2009, when Saudi forces entered Yemen to clear rebels from their shared border. Yemen accused Iran of aiding the insurgents; Tehran denied the charge. The U.S. says it has seen no evidence of Iranian involvement in the uprising.
Saudis blame the U.S. in large part for abetting the push to topple Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. The Saudis saw him as the last strong Sunni hedge against Iranian influence and fear Egypt's new government will be too friendly with Tehran.
A senior Saudi official said relations with Washington are strong, and denied that Prince Bandar had spoken ill of the U.S.
The Saudis and Iranians have cobbled together loosely allied camps across the Mideast. Iran holds sway in Syria, and with the militant Arab groups Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, parties opposed to the West and deeply hostile to Israel.
The Saudi sphere, which is more pro-Western, includes the Sunni Muslim-led Gulf monarchies, Egypt, Morocco and the other main Palestinian faction, Fatah.
Write to Matthew Rosenberg at matthew.rosenberg@wsj.com, Jay Solomon at jay.solomon@wsj.com and Margaret Coker at margaret.coker@wsj.com
Saudi Arabia Scrambles to Limit Region’s Upheaval
NYtimes
May 27, 2011
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR
RIYADH, Saudi Arabia — Saudi Arabia is flexing its financial and diplomatic might across the Middle East in a wide-ranging bid to contain the tide of change, shield other monarchies from popular discontent and avert the overthrow of any more leaders struggling to calm turbulent nations.
From Egypt, where the Saudis dispensed $4 billion in aid last week to shore up the ruling military council, to Yemen, where it is trying to ease out the president, to the kingdoms of Jordan and Morocco, which it has invited to join a union of Persian Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia is scrambling to forestall more radical change and block Iran’s influence.
The kingdom is aggressively emphasizing the relative stability of monarchies, part of an effort to avert any drastic shift from the authoritarian model, which would generate uncomfortable questions about the pace of political and social change at home.
Saudi Arabia’s proposal to include Jordan and Morocco in the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council — which authorized the Saudis to send in troops to quell a largely Shiite Muslim rebellion in the Sunni Muslim monarchy of Bahrain — is intended to create a kind of “Club of Kings.” The idea is to signal to Shiite Iran that the Sunni Arab monarchs will defend their interests, analysts said.
“We’re sending a message that monarchies are not where this is happening,” Prince Waleed bin Talal al-Saud, a businessman and high-profile member of the habitually reticent royal family, told the editorial board of The New York Times last week, referring to the unrest. “We are not trying to get our way by force, but to safeguard our interests.”
The range of the Saudi intervention is extraordinary as the unrest pushes Riyadh’s hand to forge what some commentators, in Egypt and elsewhere, brand a “counterrevolution.” Some Saudi and foreign analysts find the term too sweeping for the steps the Saudis have actually taken, though they appear unparalleled in the region and beyond as the kingdom reaches out to ally with non-Arab Muslim states as well.
“I am sure that the Saudis do not like this revolutionary wave — they were really scared,” said Khalid Dakhil, a Saudi political analyst and columnist. “But they are realistic here.”
In Egypt, where the revolution has already toppled a close Saudi ally in Hosni Mubarak, the Saudis are dispensing aid and mending ties in part to help head off a good showing by the Muslim Brotherhood in the coming parliamentary elections. The Saudis worry that an empowered Muslim Brotherhood could damage Saudi legitimacy by presenting a model of Islamic law different from the Wahhabi tradition of an absolute monarch.
“If another model of Shariah says that you have to resist, this will create a deep difficulty,” said Abdulaziz Algasim, a Saudi lawyer.
Saudi officials are also concerned that Egypt’s foreign policy is shifting, with its outreach to the Islamist group Hamas and plans to restore ties with Iran. The Saudi monarch, King Abdullah, also retains a personal interest in protecting Mr. Mubarak, analysts believe.
The Arab Spring began to unravel an alliance of so-called moderate Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which were willing to work closely with the United States and promote peace with Israel. American support for the Arab uprisings also strained relations, prompting Saudi Arabia to split from Washington on some issues while questioning its longstanding reliance on the United States to protect its interests.
The strained Saudi posture toward Washington was outlined in a recent opinion article by Nawaf Obaid, a Saudi analyst, in The Washington Post that suggested Riyadh was ready to go it alone because the United States had become an “unreliable partner.”
But that seems at least partly a display of Saudi pique, since the oil-for-military aid arrangement that has defined relations between the two for the past six decades is unlikely to be replaced soon. Saudi Arabia is negotiating to buy $60 billion in advanced American weapons, and President Obama, in his speech last week demanding that Middle Eastern autocrats bow to popular demands for democracy, noticeably did not mention Saudi Arabia. The Saudi ambassador, Adel al-Jubeir, sat prominently in the front row.
Saudi Arabia is taking each uprising in turn, without relying on a single blueprint. In Bahrain, it resorted to force, sending troops to crush a rebellion by Shiites because it feared the creation of a hostile government — a kind of Shiite Cuba — only about 20 miles from some of its main oil fields, one sympathetic to Iran, if not allied with it. It has deployed diplomacy in other uprisings, and remained on the fence in still others. It is also spending money, pledging $20 billion to help stabilize Bahrain and Oman, which has also faced protests.
In Yemen, Saudi Arabia joined the coalition seeking to ease out President Ali Abdullah Saleh because it thinks the opposition might prove a more reliable, less unruly southern neighbor. But Arab diplomats noted that even the smallest Saudi gestures provided Mr. Saleh with excuses to stay, since he interpreted them as support. This month, for example, the Saudis sent in tanker trucks to help abate a gasoline shortage.
On Syria, an initial statement of support by King Abdullah for President Bashar al-Assad has been followed by silence, along with occasional calls at Friday Prayer for God to support the protesters. That silence reflects a deep ambivalence, analysts said. The ruling Saudi family personally dislikes Mr. Assad — resenting his close ties with Iran and seeing Syria’s hand in the assassination of a former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, a Saudi ally. But they fear his overthrow will unleash sectarian violence without guaranteeing that Iranian influence will be diminished.
In Libya, after helping push through an Arab League request for international intervention, Saudi Arabia sat out and left its neighbors, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, to join the military coalition supporting the rebels. It has so far kept its distance publicly from Tunisia as well, although it gave refuge to its ousted president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali.
There are also suspicions that the kingdom is secretly providing money to extremist groups to hold back changes. Saudi officials deny that, although they concede private money may flow.
In 1952, after toppling the Egyptian king, Gamal Abdel Nasser worked to destabilize all monarchs, inspiring a regicide in Iraq and eventually the overthrow of King Idris of Libya. Saudi Arabia was locked in confrontation with Egypt throughout the 1960s, and it is determined not to relive that period.
“We are back to the 1950s and early 1960s, when the Saudis led the opposition to the revolutions at that time, the revolutions of Arabism,” said Mohammad F. al-Qahtani, a political activist in Riyadh.
May 27, 2011
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR
RIYADH, Saudi Arabia — Saudi Arabia is flexing its financial and diplomatic might across the Middle East in a wide-ranging bid to contain the tide of change, shield other monarchies from popular discontent and avert the overthrow of any more leaders struggling to calm turbulent nations.
From Egypt, where the Saudis dispensed $4 billion in aid last week to shore up the ruling military council, to Yemen, where it is trying to ease out the president, to the kingdoms of Jordan and Morocco, which it has invited to join a union of Persian Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia is scrambling to forestall more radical change and block Iran’s influence.
The kingdom is aggressively emphasizing the relative stability of monarchies, part of an effort to avert any drastic shift from the authoritarian model, which would generate uncomfortable questions about the pace of political and social change at home.
Saudi Arabia’s proposal to include Jordan and Morocco in the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council — which authorized the Saudis to send in troops to quell a largely Shiite Muslim rebellion in the Sunni Muslim monarchy of Bahrain — is intended to create a kind of “Club of Kings.” The idea is to signal to Shiite Iran that the Sunni Arab monarchs will defend their interests, analysts said.
“We’re sending a message that monarchies are not where this is happening,” Prince Waleed bin Talal al-Saud, a businessman and high-profile member of the habitually reticent royal family, told the editorial board of The New York Times last week, referring to the unrest. “We are not trying to get our way by force, but to safeguard our interests.”
The range of the Saudi intervention is extraordinary as the unrest pushes Riyadh’s hand to forge what some commentators, in Egypt and elsewhere, brand a “counterrevolution.” Some Saudi and foreign analysts find the term too sweeping for the steps the Saudis have actually taken, though they appear unparalleled in the region and beyond as the kingdom reaches out to ally with non-Arab Muslim states as well.
“I am sure that the Saudis do not like this revolutionary wave — they were really scared,” said Khalid Dakhil, a Saudi political analyst and columnist. “But they are realistic here.”
In Egypt, where the revolution has already toppled a close Saudi ally in Hosni Mubarak, the Saudis are dispensing aid and mending ties in part to help head off a good showing by the Muslim Brotherhood in the coming parliamentary elections. The Saudis worry that an empowered Muslim Brotherhood could damage Saudi legitimacy by presenting a model of Islamic law different from the Wahhabi tradition of an absolute monarch.
“If another model of Shariah says that you have to resist, this will create a deep difficulty,” said Abdulaziz Algasim, a Saudi lawyer.
Saudi officials are also concerned that Egypt’s foreign policy is shifting, with its outreach to the Islamist group Hamas and plans to restore ties with Iran. The Saudi monarch, King Abdullah, also retains a personal interest in protecting Mr. Mubarak, analysts believe.
The Arab Spring began to unravel an alliance of so-called moderate Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which were willing to work closely with the United States and promote peace with Israel. American support for the Arab uprisings also strained relations, prompting Saudi Arabia to split from Washington on some issues while questioning its longstanding reliance on the United States to protect its interests.
The strained Saudi posture toward Washington was outlined in a recent opinion article by Nawaf Obaid, a Saudi analyst, in The Washington Post that suggested Riyadh was ready to go it alone because the United States had become an “unreliable partner.”
But that seems at least partly a display of Saudi pique, since the oil-for-military aid arrangement that has defined relations between the two for the past six decades is unlikely to be replaced soon. Saudi Arabia is negotiating to buy $60 billion in advanced American weapons, and President Obama, in his speech last week demanding that Middle Eastern autocrats bow to popular demands for democracy, noticeably did not mention Saudi Arabia. The Saudi ambassador, Adel al-Jubeir, sat prominently in the front row.
Saudi Arabia is taking each uprising in turn, without relying on a single blueprint. In Bahrain, it resorted to force, sending troops to crush a rebellion by Shiites because it feared the creation of a hostile government — a kind of Shiite Cuba — only about 20 miles from some of its main oil fields, one sympathetic to Iran, if not allied with it. It has deployed diplomacy in other uprisings, and remained on the fence in still others. It is also spending money, pledging $20 billion to help stabilize Bahrain and Oman, which has also faced protests.
In Yemen, Saudi Arabia joined the coalition seeking to ease out President Ali Abdullah Saleh because it thinks the opposition might prove a more reliable, less unruly southern neighbor. But Arab diplomats noted that even the smallest Saudi gestures provided Mr. Saleh with excuses to stay, since he interpreted them as support. This month, for example, the Saudis sent in tanker trucks to help abate a gasoline shortage.
On Syria, an initial statement of support by King Abdullah for President Bashar al-Assad has been followed by silence, along with occasional calls at Friday Prayer for God to support the protesters. That silence reflects a deep ambivalence, analysts said. The ruling Saudi family personally dislikes Mr. Assad — resenting his close ties with Iran and seeing Syria’s hand in the assassination of a former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, a Saudi ally. But they fear his overthrow will unleash sectarian violence without guaranteeing that Iranian influence will be diminished.
In Libya, after helping push through an Arab League request for international intervention, Saudi Arabia sat out and left its neighbors, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, to join the military coalition supporting the rebels. It has so far kept its distance publicly from Tunisia as well, although it gave refuge to its ousted president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali.
There are also suspicions that the kingdom is secretly providing money to extremist groups to hold back changes. Saudi officials deny that, although they concede private money may flow.
In 1952, after toppling the Egyptian king, Gamal Abdel Nasser worked to destabilize all monarchs, inspiring a regicide in Iraq and eventually the overthrow of King Idris of Libya. Saudi Arabia was locked in confrontation with Egypt throughout the 1960s, and it is determined not to relive that period.
“We are back to the 1950s and early 1960s, when the Saudis led the opposition to the revolutions at that time, the revolutions of Arabism,” said Mohammad F. al-Qahtani, a political activist in Riyadh.
Sunday, May 15, 2011
on George Mitchel resignation
Post-Mitchell, the air of resignation on Israel-Palestine might linger
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/13/george_mitchell_resignation
U.S. Shift to Mideast Crisis Management
http://www.cfr.org/israel/us-shift-mideast-crisis-management/p24974
The Resignation of George Mitchell
http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2011/05/13/the-resignation-of-george-mitchell/
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/13/george_mitchell_resignation
U.S. Shift to Mideast Crisis Management
http://www.cfr.org/israel/us-shift-mideast-crisis-management/p24974
The Resignation of George Mitchell
http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2011/05/13/the-resignation-of-george-mitchell/
Friday, April 29, 2011
Senator John Kerry on U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East
With revolutionary change sweeping through the Middle East and North Africa and violence erupting in Libya, U.S. policy toward the region is quickly evolving. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry discussed the challenges for the United States and his policy recommendations. Carnegie's Marwan Muasher moderated.
Challenges and Opportunities
Kerry described the cascade of democratic uprisings across the Middle East as “one of the most momentous developments of our time.” The overthrow of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt has paved the way for the establishment of more transparent and accountable governments, and the United States has a crucial role to play in facilitating these democratic transitions, Kerry said.
- Investing in democracy: Political reforms not only serve the interests of protesters who are demanding transparent and accountable governments, but they will also preempt potential threats to U.S. national security, Kerry said. Extremism cannot flourish in open political systems where citizens enjoy economic prosperity. The United States has a strong national interest in supporting the development of emerging democracies in the Middle East through aid and other assistance programs. Although the current congressional climate may be unfavorable to foreign aid appropriations, Kerry cautioned, “We can either pay now or pay later with increased threats to our own national security.”
- Lessons from Berlin: Kerry pointed to the breakup of the Soviet Union as a historical case study that can guide American engagement with a post-revolutionary Middle East. Just as Tunisians and Egyptians are celebrating the dismantling of repressive regimes, citizens of the former Soviet bloc countries “welcomed the destruction of stultifying autocracies” with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Kerry said. Recognizing the opportunity to support nascent democracies, U.S. policy makers wisely supported an infusion of economic aid and development assistance to Eastern European countries. According to Kerry, American assistance was a pivotal factor in catalyzing successful democratic transitions in former communist states.
- Supporting free market reforms: Kerry argued that the United States must take advantage of the opportunity to support liberal economic reforms across the Middle East. Citing the lack of economic opportunities for the region’s swelling youth population, Kerry said he is working with Senators Joe Lieberman and John McCain on new legislation to fuel sustainable economic development through innovation and entrepreneurship.
- Irreversible change: Although Kerry acknowledged that emerging democracies in the Arab world face uncertain futures, he was certain that “the old order of the Middle East cannot be restored.” After years of repression and economic hardship, citizens have fundamentally overhauled the authoritarian status quo by “tearing down the walls of state-sponsored fear and bureaucratic indifference,” he asserted.
- A blow to extremism: The uprisings of recent weeks have proved that dramatic political change is not only possible, but can be achieved peacefully. Kerry said the success of largely peaceful popular protests has undermined the legitimacy of extremist groups seeking to advance their political agendas through violence and terrorism. “The people of Egypt liberated themselves in eighteen days without a single IED or suicide bomb,” Kerry said.
- Restoring American credibility in the region: How U.S. policy makers respond to unrest in the Middle East will shape Arab public opinion toward the United States for decades to come, Kerry said. Citing the example of Libya—where Moammar Qaddafi’s embattled regime is violently suppressing the rebel movement with “grotesque brutality”—Kerry said a failure to intervene on behalf of the Libyan people will lead regional observers to question Washington’s commitment to human rights and democratic principles.
- Immediate action needed in Libya: With Libya on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe, Kerry stressed that “the international community cannot watch from the sidelines as a quest for democracy is met with raw violence.” Kerry endorsed recommendations by the Arab League and the United Nations to impose a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace and said that U.S. and international leaders should consider “whatever is necessary” to prevent further escalation of violence.
More Changes on the Horizon
Although substantial political changes have already been achieved in Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries undergoing popular uprisings, Kerry said he expects these transformations to continue for the foreseeable future. “To keep the mandate of their people and meet the challenges of modernity, leaders of the region have no choice but to embark on paths of reform,” Kerry said.
- Libya: Although Qaddafi’s violent crackdown has momentarily dampened the momentum of the rebel movement, Kerry was confident that “the will of the Libyan people will ultimately prevail.”
- Bahrain: The United States has important strategic interests in Bahrain, where the Navy’s Fifth Fleet has been based since 1991. Following recent clashes between state security forces and anti-government protesters, Kerry urged both sides to refrain from violence and seek a negotiated solution to the current political crisis through an inclusive national dialogue. Referring to the Gulf Cooperation Council’s decision to deploy troops into Bahrain on March 14, Kerry called on the GCC countries to ensure that the intervention “does not lead to broader regional conflict.”
- Morocco: Kerry identified Morocco as one of the countries that has responded to the imperative for immediate reform, citing King Mohammed VI’s decision to conduct a popular referendum on proposed constitutional amendments.
- Jordan: According to Kerry, Jordanian King Abdullah II has “moved skillfully” to preempt popular unrest by promising to expand participation in the political process.
- Oman: In Oman, Sultan Qaboos recently directed the country’s partially elected consultative council to propose constitutional amendments, in a move that signaled his commitment to broader reforms, Kerry said.
- Israel: The cascade of reforms that is currently transforming the Middle East will have important implications for Israel’s security, Kerry said. Noting the removal of pro-Western governments in Lebanon and Egypt, Kerry predicted that countries which have historically enjoyed strong ties with Israel “may change their postures.” Referring to the stalled negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian leaders, Kerry stressed that continued progress toward achieving a lasting peace is the only way to guarantee Israel’s security and the stability of the region as a whole. Highlighting the urgency of resuscitating the stalled peace process, Kerry said, “To the extent Israelis found the security situation acceptable prior to the outbreak of unrest, the status quo with its neighbors is now unsustainable.”
event transcript
Kerry's remarks
Sources on Middle East
Twisting Assad's Arm
U.S. diplomats are always complaining they have no leverage over Syria. They're wrong.
As Bahrain stifles protest movement, U.S.’s muted objections draw criticism
NATO Showing Strain Over Approach to Libya
Perspectives on the Crisis in Libya
| Author: | Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations |
|---|
Sources on Middle East
Azerbaijan: US Military Ties with Baku are Stagnating - Experts
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63360
Unwelcome Surprises in Libya
Declaring our intervention in the Maghreb a failure
http://reason.com/archives/2011/04/25/unwelcome-surprises-in-libya/print
CIA’s Panetta Held Secret Talks on Syria in Ankara, Sabah Says
President of Yemen Offers to Leave, With Conditions
Yemen’s president agrees to resign in tentative deal
Guantanamo Bay: Why Obama hasn’t fulfilled his promise to close the facility
U.S. secretly backed Syrian opposition groups, cables released by WikiLeaks show
The Folly of Protection
March 20, 2011
SNAPSHOT
Is Intervention Against Qaddafi’s Regime Legal and Legitimate?
Michael W. Doyle
MICHAEL W. DOYLE is Harold Brown Professor of International Affairs, Law, and Political Science at Columbia University and Chair of the United Nations Democracy Fund Advisory Board.In classic United Nations Security Council language, Resolution 1973, passed on March 17, 2011, authorized UN member states to “take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas” in Libya by establishing a no-fly zone and enforcing an arms embargo against Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime. The resolution gave teeth to the much-heralded “responsibility to protect” -- which, according to the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome, is the responsibility of the international community to “help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”
The UN General Assembly adopted the principle of the responsibility to protect -- or RtoP, its UN abbreviation -- in 2005 in a unanimous resolution advocated by nongovernmental organizations; UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the high-level panel he appointed in 2005 to investigate how the United Nations could pursue reform; and Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, co-chairs of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, whose 2001 report urging adoption of RtoP drove the campaign for the concept. The 2005 document articulating RtoP carefully deliniated grounds for action under the doctrine, limiting it to four situations suitable for intervention: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The Libyan intervention represents only the third time since 2005 that the Security Council has invoked RtoP to enforce the protection of civilians. The second case occurred just weeks ago, when the Security Council’s first resolution targeted Qaddafi’s crackdown against Libya’s rebellion by calling for financial sanctions and an arms embargo. Resolution 1973, however, marks the first Security Council approval of force in the name of RtoP.
In passing RtoP, the Security Council helped bridge the gap between so-called legitimate (ethically justifiable) and legal (legally authorized) intervention. The Kosovo Commission, a group of independent experts under the chairmanship of the South African justice Richard Goldstone, first identified this dichotomy in 1999 while investigating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s intervention in Kosovo. It deemed NATO’s actions “illegal but legitimate,” in the sense that the Western countries had performed a legitimate rescue of oppressed Kosovars likely to suffer ethnic cleansing under Slobodan Milošević’s leadership but had done so without the Security Council’s legal sanction (unavailable due to the threatened Russian and Chinese vetoes). To gain approval for their current intervention in Libya, however, Western nations secured a resolution that passed with ten votes in favor, no vetoes, and five abstentions from Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia.
By invoking RtoP for the intervention in Libya, the Security Council narrowed the divide between legitimacy and legality. Yet the ethical and legal justifications for both elements remain murky. Most significantly, a legitimate and lawful outcome to the operation is far from assured.
The true complexity of the UN action against Qaddafi’s regime can be understood only by investigating the UN Charter, which specifies that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” The only exception to this principle falls under Chapter VII of the charter, which authorizes the Security Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and act to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” Internal abuses by states -- including the slaughter of civilians -- do not automatically qualify as “international” threats under the charter.
Nonetheless, the Security Council has, in practice, claimed wide discretion to interpret events as “threats to the peace” that did not necessarily qualify as dangers to “international peace.” This phenomenon became particularly acute following the Cold War, when the Security Council further diluted the requirement of “international threat” by endorsing a wide range of other triggers for successful Chapter VII sanctions. It authorized arms embargoes, trade sanctions, no-fly zones, and even armed intervention against various acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, interference with the delivery of humanitarian supplies, violations of cease-fires, collapse of civil order, and coups against democratic governments and war crimes in Haiti, Cambodia, Iraq, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, and the former Republic of Yugoslavia.
RtoP, responding to the sense that these domestic harms warranted international response, solidified the Security Council’s claims to wider discretion. Yet it also restricted its ability to sanction intervention to the four situations listed in the RtoP document -- genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity -- and thus precluded, for example, intervention in cases of civil disorder and coups. Although the resolution authorizing force against Libya will certainly further entrench the principle of RtoP, it will not completely resolve the tension between RtoP -- in itself only a General Assembly recommendation -- and the UN Charter itself, which, according to the letter of the law, limits action to “international” threats. Equally significant, the Libyan resolution authorizes only a no-fly zone and the protection of civilians, not the ouster of Qaddafi that U.S. President Barack Obama has called for and which is most likely to resolve the crisis politically.
The no-fly zone itself faces questions of ethical legitimacy as well. An old tradition of ethical and practical lessons, dating at least as far back as the writings of the British philosopher John Stuart Mill in the middle of the nineteenth century, argues against armed intervention for the sake of protecting civilians and promoting human rights and democracy. For anyone committed to human dignity, this tradition claims, democracy and human rights must derive from self-government, not laws and regulations imposed by foreigners, however well meaning. And imposing democracy from the outside tends to fail. Democracy is not only government for the people; it is also government of and by the people. Unless citizens view themselves as a collective body and are prepared to pay taxes, defend their borders, and abide by majority rule, democracy is unsustainable. These attributes are more often achieved by long national struggles and wars of liberation than foreign intervention.
Thus, when foreigners seek to liberate a country whose people have been unable to liberate themselves, they often fall into one or more of three traps. First, the leadership that replaces the former regime finds that it cannot rule because it has not been able to mobilize the support to win on its own, and, as in Iraq, civil strife follows the liberating invasion. The new leadership finds itself in the second trap when it can only remain in power thanks to ongoing foreign support. As a result, it renders the country a client state rather than a free nation. The third trap occurs when the leadership learns that it can only govern as the previous dictator did -- by force. The liberating invaders are thus responsible not only for the monetary and human costs of the invasion but for having produced a civil war, a colony, or one more tyranny with a new ideological label attached.
Foreign states must sometimes override or disregard these traps. The national security interests of a given country may require intervention, or the casualties being suffered or likely to result from a domestic conflict are so large as to demand a humanitarian rescue (such as in Rwanda in 1994). Such humanitarian rescue offers the best justification for the current intervention in Libya. Yet legitimate armed interventions must be proportional, in the sense that they will actually cost fewer lives than they save. The no-fly zone is saving the rebels and their civilian supporters at the moment, but their current preservation may simply set the stage for a prolonged and costly civil war.
Military action should also not be undertaken unless it is likely to be successful. Success with regard to the Libyan intervention has yet to be defined. Qaddafi probably would have been able to conquer the rebel capital Benghazi with his air force, artillery, and armor, but the commencement of allied intervention will destroy the air force and protect the civilian population from large-scale ground attacks. However, it does not appear that the rebels can conquer the country even if Qaddafi’s air force is neutralized unless they are aided by international arms or forces on the ground -- assistance not authorized by Resolution 1973.
The current intervention in Libya, then, seems to wed legality with ethical legitimacy. But it strains against the letter of the UN Charter law on intervention and will remain ethically problematic unless it can help resolve the crisis without further substantial loss of life. This uncertainty will pose intricate problems for policymakers and negotiators in the weeks and months ahead. If Qaddafi retains power while the rebels maintain their own territory, will partition provide a workable solution? If Qaddafi and the rebels cannot achieve any political agreement, can the international community continue its involvement while the two sides battle it out with small arms? Or will the interveners brush aside the restrictions of the Security Council resolution and topple Qaddafi -- and thereby discredit the legal authorization of RtoP? Regardless, the intervention in Libya is sure to shape how RtoP is applied in the future.
Michael W. Doyle
MICHAEL W. DOYLE is Harold Brown Professor of International Affairs, Law, and Political Science at Columbia University and Chair of the United Nations Democracy Fund Advisory Board.In classic United Nations Security Council language, Resolution 1973, passed on March 17, 2011, authorized UN member states to “take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas” in Libya by establishing a no-fly zone and enforcing an arms embargo against Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime. The resolution gave teeth to the much-heralded “responsibility to protect” -- which, according to the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome, is the responsibility of the international community to “help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”
The UN General Assembly adopted the principle of the responsibility to protect -- or RtoP, its UN abbreviation -- in 2005 in a unanimous resolution advocated by nongovernmental organizations; UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the high-level panel he appointed in 2005 to investigate how the United Nations could pursue reform; and Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, co-chairs of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, whose 2001 report urging adoption of RtoP drove the campaign for the concept. The 2005 document articulating RtoP carefully deliniated grounds for action under the doctrine, limiting it to four situations suitable for intervention: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The Libyan intervention represents only the third time since 2005 that the Security Council has invoked RtoP to enforce the protection of civilians. The second case occurred just weeks ago, when the Security Council’s first resolution targeted Qaddafi’s crackdown against Libya’s rebellion by calling for financial sanctions and an arms embargo. Resolution 1973, however, marks the first Security Council approval of force in the name of RtoP.
In passing RtoP, the Security Council helped bridge the gap between so-called legitimate (ethically justifiable) and legal (legally authorized) intervention. The Kosovo Commission, a group of independent experts under the chairmanship of the South African justice Richard Goldstone, first identified this dichotomy in 1999 while investigating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s intervention in Kosovo. It deemed NATO’s actions “illegal but legitimate,” in the sense that the Western countries had performed a legitimate rescue of oppressed Kosovars likely to suffer ethnic cleansing under Slobodan Milošević’s leadership but had done so without the Security Council’s legal sanction (unavailable due to the threatened Russian and Chinese vetoes). To gain approval for their current intervention in Libya, however, Western nations secured a resolution that passed with ten votes in favor, no vetoes, and five abstentions from Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia.
By invoking RtoP for the intervention in Libya, the Security Council narrowed the divide between legitimacy and legality. Yet the ethical and legal justifications for both elements remain murky. Most significantly, a legitimate and lawful outcome to the operation is far from assured.
The true complexity of the UN action against Qaddafi’s regime can be understood only by investigating the UN Charter, which specifies that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” The only exception to this principle falls under Chapter VII of the charter, which authorizes the Security Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and act to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” Internal abuses by states -- including the slaughter of civilians -- do not automatically qualify as “international” threats under the charter.
Nonetheless, the Security Council has, in practice, claimed wide discretion to interpret events as “threats to the peace” that did not necessarily qualify as dangers to “international peace.” This phenomenon became particularly acute following the Cold War, when the Security Council further diluted the requirement of “international threat” by endorsing a wide range of other triggers for successful Chapter VII sanctions. It authorized arms embargoes, trade sanctions, no-fly zones, and even armed intervention against various acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, interference with the delivery of humanitarian supplies, violations of cease-fires, collapse of civil order, and coups against democratic governments and war crimes in Haiti, Cambodia, Iraq, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, and the former Republic of Yugoslavia.
RtoP, responding to the sense that these domestic harms warranted international response, solidified the Security Council’s claims to wider discretion. Yet it also restricted its ability to sanction intervention to the four situations listed in the RtoP document -- genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity -- and thus precluded, for example, intervention in cases of civil disorder and coups. Although the resolution authorizing force against Libya will certainly further entrench the principle of RtoP, it will not completely resolve the tension between RtoP -- in itself only a General Assembly recommendation -- and the UN Charter itself, which, according to the letter of the law, limits action to “international” threats. Equally significant, the Libyan resolution authorizes only a no-fly zone and the protection of civilians, not the ouster of Qaddafi that U.S. President Barack Obama has called for and which is most likely to resolve the crisis politically.
The no-fly zone itself faces questions of ethical legitimacy as well. An old tradition of ethical and practical lessons, dating at least as far back as the writings of the British philosopher John Stuart Mill in the middle of the nineteenth century, argues against armed intervention for the sake of protecting civilians and promoting human rights and democracy. For anyone committed to human dignity, this tradition claims, democracy and human rights must derive from self-government, not laws and regulations imposed by foreigners, however well meaning. And imposing democracy from the outside tends to fail. Democracy is not only government for the people; it is also government of and by the people. Unless citizens view themselves as a collective body and are prepared to pay taxes, defend their borders, and abide by majority rule, democracy is unsustainable. These attributes are more often achieved by long national struggles and wars of liberation than foreign intervention.
Thus, when foreigners seek to liberate a country whose people have been unable to liberate themselves, they often fall into one or more of three traps. First, the leadership that replaces the former regime finds that it cannot rule because it has not been able to mobilize the support to win on its own, and, as in Iraq, civil strife follows the liberating invasion. The new leadership finds itself in the second trap when it can only remain in power thanks to ongoing foreign support. As a result, it renders the country a client state rather than a free nation. The third trap occurs when the leadership learns that it can only govern as the previous dictator did -- by force. The liberating invaders are thus responsible not only for the monetary and human costs of the invasion but for having produced a civil war, a colony, or one more tyranny with a new ideological label attached.
Foreign states must sometimes override or disregard these traps. The national security interests of a given country may require intervention, or the casualties being suffered or likely to result from a domestic conflict are so large as to demand a humanitarian rescue (such as in Rwanda in 1994). Such humanitarian rescue offers the best justification for the current intervention in Libya. Yet legitimate armed interventions must be proportional, in the sense that they will actually cost fewer lives than they save. The no-fly zone is saving the rebels and their civilian supporters at the moment, but their current preservation may simply set the stage for a prolonged and costly civil war.
Military action should also not be undertaken unless it is likely to be successful. Success with regard to the Libyan intervention has yet to be defined. Qaddafi probably would have been able to conquer the rebel capital Benghazi with his air force, artillery, and armor, but the commencement of allied intervention will destroy the air force and protect the civilian population from large-scale ground attacks. However, it does not appear that the rebels can conquer the country even if Qaddafi’s air force is neutralized unless they are aided by international arms or forces on the ground -- assistance not authorized by Resolution 1973.
The current intervention in Libya, then, seems to wed legality with ethical legitimacy. But it strains against the letter of the UN Charter law on intervention and will remain ethically problematic unless it can help resolve the crisis without further substantial loss of life. This uncertainty will pose intricate problems for policymakers and negotiators in the weeks and months ahead. If Qaddafi retains power while the rebels maintain their own territory, will partition provide a workable solution? If Qaddafi and the rebels cannot achieve any political agreement, can the international community continue its involvement while the two sides battle it out with small arms? Or will the interveners brush aside the restrictions of the Security Council resolution and topple Qaddafi -- and thereby discredit the legal authorization of RtoP? Regardless, the intervention in Libya is sure to shape how RtoP is applied in the future.
Return to Article: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67666/michael-w-doyle/the-folly-of-protection
Published on Foreign Affairs (http://www.foreignaffairs.com)
The Arab Revolutions: An Israeli Perspective
PolicyWatch #1778
Israel has been watching the ongoing upheaval in the Arab world with steadily growing concern. While they hope to see a happy, democratic end to the popular eruptions of protest and discontent against dictatorial regimes, Israelis are bracing themselves for a series of less optimistic outcomes.
By Ehud Yaari
March 15, 2011Israel has been watching the ongoing upheaval in the Arab world with steadily growing concern. While they hope to see a happy, democratic end to the popular eruptions of protest and discontent against dictatorial regimes, Israelis are bracing themselves for a series of less optimistic outcomes.
A different Middle East is emerging, one that may be temporarily called "square-ocracy," or the transfer of power from governments to masses of demonstrators in the streets. Rulers are bowing to popular demands, fearing the fate of former Tunisian president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. But it is still unclear who will lead these countries in the long term, in which direction they will move, and what type of "freedom" will emerge. An extended period of uncertainty and instability may lie ahead, forcing Israel to cope with a highly volatile environment and reassess some of its longstanding assumptions about the nature of its relationships with some neighboring states.
To be sure, Israel was hardly mentioned during the huge, early demonstrations in Egypt and elsewhere. Over time, however, some anti-Israeli slogans began creeping into the protest movement's inventory. For example, tens of thousands cheered in Cairo's Tahrir Square when previously exiled Islamist leader Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi urged them to march on Jerusalem. Mubarak was portrayed as a Zionist agent with a Star of David smeared over his face. Calls for suspension of the bilateral peace treaty and expulsion of Israeli embassy staff were often heard during demonstrations in Amman. In Yemen, demonstrators shouted accusations that President Ali Abdullah Saleh was collaborating with Israel. In Libya, insurgents have often described Muammar Qadhafi as a Jew.
In short, a degree of anti-Israeli sentiment has slowly been mixed into the overwhelmingly domestic agendas of Arab protesters. Israel is clearly not at the top of these agendas, but it has become a part of the revolutionary discourse. Below is a short list of Israel's most pressing concerns about the ongoing unrest.
Egyptian Gas Sales and Treaty Review
The Supreme Military Council under Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi is making a quiet effort to reassure Israel that Cairo's policy toward it has not changed, and that Egypt still regards bilateral peace as a major strategic asset. At the same time, however, the army's high command seems reluctant to resume gas exports to Israel for fear of public reaction. At this point, the hesitancy is political in nature, not a function of technical difficulties. The council is particularly concerned about the current investigation into charges of corruption involved in the most recent contract governing Egyptian gas sales to Israel, which was orchestrated by Mubarak's close friend Hussein Salem, one of the first Egyptians to flee the country when the revolution gained momentum. The longer this suspension continues, the more difficulty Cairo will have announcing a resumption in sales. The latest word from the new government is that the gas supply will resume soon but prices will be renegotiated.
Whatever the results of the eventual presidential and parliamentary elections, the next government will likely seek a "review" of several elements in the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. For example, some Egyptian politicians have indicated a desire to link progress toward Palestinian statehood with continued implementation of the treaty. The Muslim Brotherhood has already called for resubmitting the treaty to a national referendum.
Indeed, with the official dissolution of the Mabahith, or State Security Investigations -- the Egyptian agency traditionally tasked with curtailing Ikhwan activities -- the Brotherhood is becoming bolder by the day. It will certainly use its clout to contest about a quarter of the seats in the parliament, as well as to influence the outcome of the presidential race. The organization's growing power, combined with policy statements by potential presidential candidates, seems to indicate that Egypt's next leaders will adopt a new policy toward Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In short, a less friendly and cooperative government in Cairo is almost a certainty.
Instability in the Sinai
The next Egyptian government will also likely focus on removing the peace treaty's "limitations over sovereignty," meaning the provisions requiring demilitarization of eastern Sinai. Israel has already permitted Egypt to deploy three battalions in the demilitarized areas, to protect Sharm al-Sheikh and the al-Arish-Rafah region bordering the Gaza Strip. Israel could also conceivably accept a limited revision of the Military Protocol to allow an Egyptian military presence close to the border in the hope of improving Cairo's hold over the Sinai.
Since the revolution, Egyptian authorities have effectively lost control over most of the peninsula and some of its Bedouin tribes. The army has vacated the positions it previously maintained in Central Sinai, instead concentrating on securing the northern coastal road and the road along the Gulf of Aqaba. As a result, the Sinai is fast turning into a wild frontier, a safe haven for local arms smugglers and migrating jihadist groups. Hamas is taking advantage of this situation by developing its network of allies among the armed tribes with the intention of mounting terrorist attacks against Israel via the peninsula. Iran and Hizballah are also redoubling their efforts to gain a solid foothold there.
These activities would only accelerate if Cairo changed its official policy toward the Hamas regime in Gaza. In early contacts between the Egyptian military and Hamas officials, a permanent reopening of the Rafah terminal was discussed not only for individual travel, but also as a trade corridor. This portfolio is now with Gen. Murad Muwafi, who replaced Omar Suleiman as head of General Intelligence. In his previous role as governor of North Sinai, Muwafi dealt with Hamas issues on a daily basis.
In light of these factors, Israel may soon face a major dilemma: how to foil terrorist attacks emanating from the Sinai (e.g., new attempts to lob missiles at Eilat) if Egypt proves unwilling or unable to do so. Preemptive Israeli operations across the border would certainly trigger a major crisis between the two countries.
The Palestinian Authority
According to various indicators, some Palestinian groups may view the storm of successful demonstrations throughout the Arab world as a model for unrest against Israel. Discussions are already quietly under way among different Palestinian groups concerning the structure and potential format of nonviolent marches by thousands of people toward Israel Defense Forces positions, West Bank settlements, Israeli security barriers, and, most important, Jerusalem. The Israeli army is already taking measures to prepare for these possibilities.
For its part, the Palestinian Authority has obtained information about plans to call for mass demonstrations in the West Bank urging an end to the Fatah-Hamas split. Hamas has already allowed a similar demonstration in Gaza. It is difficult to predict at this stage whether West Bank Palestinians would respond to such calls in large numbers. From Israel's point of view, other dangers may emerge in addition to the challenge of dealing with the demonstrations themselves. For example, pressure from the streets could spur Mahmoud Abbas to accept a "unity before reconciliation" deal that gives Hamas complete security control over Gaza, allows it to take part in a "national unity government," and enables it confront Fatah in West Bank elections. Such a deal would legitimize Hamas without securing any substantial concessions from the movement.
Jordan
Under constant pressure from petitions and potential demonstrations, King Abdullah has been promising to speed up reforms in the Hashemite Kingdom. Various opposition groups -- including the Muslim Brotherhood, Palestinian nationalists, and East Jordanian critics of the king's conduct -- are all voicing reservations regarding peace with Israel. Attentive to this mood, Abdullah has appointed some well-known anti-Israeli politicians to the new cabinet, formed by Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit. He also nominated a harsh critic of Israel, Khaled al-Karaki, to the all-important job of chief of the Royal Cabinet.
Clearly, then, Amman is heading toward a policy of cooling relations with Israel, though coordination on security and water issues continues. In fact, this may be the worst period in the short history of peace between the two states. Israeli officials are now worried that the king will accept Iranian overtures to improve relations and visit Tehran.
Conclusion
Severe tests lie ahead for Israel's relationships with its Arab peace partners. Much effort will be needed to protect the peace treaties from the growing assertiveness of the Muslim Brotherhood and other hostile factions. The United States can greatly facilitate this goal by making clear that it regards peace as the cornerstone of its regional policies, even as it supports transition to democracy in the Arab world. Otherwise the Middle East may enter an era of reform under reformers who view peace as a liability. Washington should put the word out that the process begun at Camp David is not finished, and that peace treaties are a benefit for new democracies.
Ehud Yaari is an Israel-based Lafer international fellow with The Washington Institute.
Sources on Middle East
The New Cold War
There has long been bad blood between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but popular protests across the Middle East now threaten to turn the rivalry into a tense and dangerous regional divide.
Iranian Winter Could Chill the Arab Spring
From nukes to terrorist proxies, Tehran's power grows—and Washington dithers.
Arming Libya's Rebels: A Debate in Doha
Kerry: Obama wasted 1 1/2 years on Mideast peace, may try again soon
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry (D-Mass.) said Tuesday that President Barack Obama frittered away the first half of his term on an ill-advised approach to seeking peace in the Middle East, but may "step out" within weeks with a new initiative to break the gridlock.
Speaking to a gathering in Washington of leaders from the Muslim world, Kerry said the administration's effort to set the table for broader talks by resolving the impasse over Jewish settlements in the West Bank was futile. However, he suggested that Obama may move soon to get the peace process going in order to head off a possible showdown at the United Nations in September.
"I was opposed to the prolonged effort on the settlements in a public way because I never thought it would work and, in fact, we have wasted a year and a half on something that for a number of reasons was not achievable," Kerry told the U.S.-Islamic World Forum, organized by the Brookings Institution's Saban Center. "I think it sort of put the cart ahead of the horse in a way here. The key is to get to the security and borders definition and if you can get the borders definition you’ve solved the problem of the settlements. But we can’t get that discussion right now."
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to visit Washington next month. Kerry said Netanyahu is likely to address the U.S. Congress and will have an opportunity to present a peace plan that could help defuse a confrontation at the United Nations in September over a proposed vote on the international organization formally recognizing Gaza and the West Bank as a Palestinian state.
"I suspect that it’s very possible that President Obama will even step out ahead of that and will possibly-- I say possibly--make his own contribution to where he thinks the process ought to go in the meantime. Conceivably, that can come together in a responsible effort that produces a transition here," Kerry said. "I think we can get to borders and the fundamental issues fairly quickly and its conceivable that between now and September we will do that."
CNN's Fareed Zakaria, who was moderating the panel discussion, responded with skepticism bordering on disbelief. "You’re predicting a burst of diplomatic activity and achievement in six months that has not happened in two years?” he asked.
“I’m going way out on a limb and predicting the possibility of it,” said Kerry, while hinting that his speculation was informed by some concrete knowledge about a renewed U.S. effort.. “But I think I’m giving you some relatively good vision of what might unfold here."
A White House spokesman declined to comment on Kerry's criticism or his tentative prediction of a new U.S. initiative. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is schedule to address the same conference Tuesday evening.
Kerry called the Palestinian effort to seek formal recognition at the United Nations a "mistake" on the part of Palestinian President Abbas that could backfire and have "dangerous" consequences in various countries in the region.
"I hope that a diplomatic initiative can in fact preclude unintended consequences but, believe me, everyone is well aware of those dangers of September and I think there will be a genuine effort to try to avoid things that you’re not initiating and controlling yourself," the senator said
Another panelist, Carter National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, said simply prodding Israel and the Palestinians to negotiate won't work because Israel feels too secure and the Palestinian leadership too weak.
"The problem will remain unresolved unless the United States steps forward," Brzezinski said. "I think it behooves the United states to step forward with a generalized framework of what the peace has to be."
If so inclined, you can view video of Kerry and Brezinski's comments after the jump. Pick it up around 1:04:45.
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