Arms Control Association
Peter Crail
Iran is keeping open the option of developing nuclear weapons eventually, but it is not clear that Tehran will decide to do so, U.S. intelligence officials told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Feb. 16. The briefing, which was part of an annual intelligence community overview of threats to the United States, coincided with a long-delayed formal update of a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear program. Intelligence officials held briefings on the revised judgments with administration officials and members of Congress in February.
Unlike the 2007 NIE, in which the intelligence community prepared a public summary of “key judgments,” an unclassified summary of the updated assessment is not expected. Many of the key conclusions from the 2007 assessment were reiterated in a Feb. 16 written statement by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper to the Senate panel.
Clapper said that Iran is keeping open the option of developing nuclear weapons through the pursuit of various nuclear capabilities but that the intelligence community did not know if Iran eventually would decide to build nuclear weapons.
He also said that the advancement of Iran’s nuclear capabilities strengthened the intelligence community’s assessment that Tehran has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons eventually, “making the central issue the political will to do so.”
Moreover, Iran’s decision-making on the nuclear issue “is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran,” Clapper said.
Among Iran’s nuclear capabilities, Clapper specifically cited Iran’s advances in uranium enrichment. Uranium can be enriched to low levels commonly used in nuclear power reactors or to high levels for potential use in nuclear weapons. Clapper said that the intelligence community judges that Iran “is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium [HEU] for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so.”
The 2007 NIE said that Iran would be technically capable of producing HEU between 2010 and 2015, although it noted that the Department of State’s intelligence bureau judged that Iran was unlikely to do so before 2013 due to technical and programmatic hurdles.
One central judgment from the 2007 NIE that Clapper’s statement did not address was the intelligence community’s assessment of Iran’s nuclear warhead development and covert uranium-conversion and -enrichment activities. In 2007 the intelligence community judged “with high confidence” that Iran suspended such efforts in the fall of 2003 and concluded “with moderate confidence” that Iran maintained that halt through mid-2007. (See ACT, January/February 2008.)
Statements from senior intelligence officials over the past year have suggested that Iran has engaged in research on nuclear weapons designs at least since the 2007 NIE. “I think they continue to work on designs in that area,” CIA Director Leon Panetta told ABC’s This Week June 27.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has sought explanations from Iran regarding the agency’s “concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile,” according to a February 2010 IAEA report. (See ACT, March 2010.) Those concerns stem from intelligence information provided to the agency over the past several years, including digital documentation reportedly smuggled out of Iran. Tehran has rejected much of that information as forgeries and has not cooperated with the IAEA probe.
The public disclosure of a previously secret uranium-enrichment plant under construction near the city of Qom in September 2009 also raised questions about Iran’s renewed pursuit of covert enrichment facilities. U.S. intelligence officials said at that time that although the facility had been under construction since 2006, it was not until early 2009 that the intelligence community was able to determine that the site was a uranium-enrichment facility. (See ACT, October 2009.)
Although the new assessment is a more formal update of the previous intelligence judgment, policymakers have likely received revised intelligence assessments of Iran’s capabilities in various forms for some time. “I expect that numerous judgments have been flowing all along over the last couple of years from the intelligence agencies to the policymakers with regard to this topic,” Paul Pillar, former CIA national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia, said at a Nov. 22 briefing hosted by the Arms Control Association.
Negotiations Hit Roadblock
The updated intelligence assessment followed an inconclusive Jan. 21-22 meeting between the “P5+1”—the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Germany—and Iran on Iran’s nuclear program. The parties did not arrive at any substantive agreement during the two-day meet in Istanbul, nor did they agree to further talks.
In a Jan. 22 statement, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, who represents the P5+1, expressed disappointment with the outcome. “We had hoped to embark on a discussion of practical ways forward,” she said, noting that the six countries went to Istanbul “with specific practical proposals which would build trust.”
Those proposals included an updated version of a nuclear fuel swap arrangement first put forward by the United States in 2009 and additional transparency measures to improve IAEA monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program. (See ACT, November 2009.)
P5+1 diplomats said that the updated fuel swap offer entailed removing a larger amount of low-enriched uranium (LEU) from Iran than the 1,200 kilograms initially proposed. Iran has produced about an additional 1,400 kilograms of 4 percent LEU since the original offer. The new proposal also would remove Iran’s smaller reserves of 20 percent-enriched uranium and halt any further enrichment at that level, which Iran initiated in February 2010.
Diplomats also indicated that the transparency measures proposed were consistent with those sought by the IAEA.
Ashton said that rather than discussing these proposals, Tehran established two preconditions for any progress: recognition of Iran’s claimed right to enrich uranium and the lifting of international sanctions.
With regard to enrichment, she reiterated the P5+1’s recognition of Iran’s right to civil nuclear energy, stressing that it was Iran’s responsibility to demonstrate that such a program is exclusively peaceful.
The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, of which Iran is a member, recognizes a state’s “inalienable right” to a peaceful nuclear energy program as long as non-nuclear-weapon state members abide by their commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons. The treaty does not reference specific nuclear activities such as enrichment.
Ashton noted that the conditions for lifting international sanctions are specified in the UN resolutions and that “those do not exist today.” She indicated in particular that the removal of sanctions would accompany the re-establishment of international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities.
Although the P5+1 have rejected Iran’s preconditions, they stated their willingness to continue to engage in negotiations over the proposals they forwarded.
Iran also indicated that it was open to further talks. Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili told reporters Jan. 22, “We are still prepared for further negotiations with the P5+1, based on common issues.”
Jalili’s willingness to engage in further discussions appeared to contradict claims by other key Iranian officials that the Istanbul talks might present the final opportunity for negotiations. Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s envoy to the IAEA, told reporters in France Jan. 12 that “the Istanbul meeting might be the last chance for the West to return to talks,” because Iran would install its own fuel rods in the Tehran Research Reactor rather than import them as part of the proposed fuel swap.
However, Iran is not believed to be capable of safely producing fuel plates for the reactor in the near future. Former IAEA Deputy Director-General for Safeguards Olli Heinonen said during the Nov. 22 briefing that Iran still needed one to two years to manufacture the reactor fuel safely.
Showing posts with label NIE 2011. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NIE 2011. Show all posts
Tuesday, March 15, 2011
Saturday, February 19, 2011
U.S. report finds debate in Iran on building nuclear bomb
Washington Post
February 18, 2011; 6:15 PM
By Greg Miller and Joby Warrick
A comprehensive new U.S. intelligence report concludes that Iran has resumed research on key components for a nuclear weapon, but that the slow and scattered nature of the effort reflects renewed debate within the regime over whether to build a bomb, U.S. officials said.
The finding represents a significant, if subtle, shift from the main conclusion of a controversial 2007 estimate that Iran had halted its weaponization work.
In finding that Iran has again begun taking steps toward designing a nuclear warhead, the new estimate is likely to be seen as erasing doubt that the earlier document created about Iran's intent.
But the new report reaches no firm conclusions about when Iran might acquire the bomb. The classified estimate has already triggered debate among American officials over whether Iran's apparent hesitation is the result of U.S.-backed sanctions meant to derail any weapons program.
Overall, the National Intelligence Estimate concludes that Iran is conducting "early stage R&D work on aspects of the manufacturing process for a nuclear weapon," said a U.S. official familiar with the report. At the same time, the estimate describes "serious debate within the Iranian regime . . . on how to proceed."
Anticipation surrounding the new estimate has been intense, both because it addresses one of the central national security dilemmas confronting President Obama, but also because critics regarded the previous estimate as confusing, and blamed it for undermining then-President George W. Bush's efforts to ratchet up diplomatic pressure on Iran.
The report carries particular weight because it represents the consensus view of the entire U.S. intelligence community, rather than the assessments of a lone agency.
U.S. officials have said that, unlike the estimate of four years ago, the new one will remain classified and out of public view; they would describe it only on the condition of anonymity. A Wall Street Journal article described aspects of the estimate this week.
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper summarized key points in testimony before the Senate intelligence committee Wednesday, telling lawmakers that Iran's "technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons."
"Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so," Clapper said. Whether such a decision had been made, he said, remains unclear.
The new assessment does not entirely refute the 2007 report's most controversial finding, which held that Iran's leaders had halted nuclear weaponization research in 2003, even while pushing forward on uranium enrichment that is regarded as the most difficult step to building a bomb.
U.S. spy agencies remain convinced that Iranian officials ordered a temporary halt to certain military research projects aimed at mastering the complex engineering involved in building nuclear warheads. The stoppage was described in computer notes and files surreptitiously obtained by the United States.
At the time, Iran's massive enrichment plant near the city of Natanz had been exposed by an opposition group. The halt also coincided with the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
"The fact is, after 2003 the program went to ground," said a senior administration official who has reviewed the latest estimate. But even while that military-backed project remains shuttered, the official said the effort "became not a single program but multiple programs farmed out to universities and private companies. What research is being carried out, and to what end, is now much harder to pin down."
Many analysts believe that Iran intends to follow the same course as Japan and other states that are regarded as "virtual" nuclear powers - acquiring all the basic building blocks for nuclear weapons without actually building a bomb.
These analysts believe Iran would stop short of assembling and testing a bomb, a move that would subject the country to international condemnation and a possible military attack. Iran consistently denies having a nuclear weapons program.
Over the past year, U.S. intelligence officials have become increasingly convinced that Iran's progress toward building a bomb has suffered setbacks, giving the United States and other allies an additional cushion of two years or more before Tehran would be in position to test a device. Israel's former intelligence chief estimated last month that Iran could not have a bomb before 2015.
Delays to Iran's program have been attributed in part to elaborate attempts at sabotage, including the unleashing of a computer worm, called Stuxnet, that caused major equipment failures in centrifuge machines at Natanz. U.N. inspectors have concluded that hundreds of machines failed in the attack, but that Iran recovered remarkably quickly, wheeling in new machines to replace those that were lost.
Regardless of the research on developing a nuclear warhead, U.S. intelligence agencies believe Iran has continued to achieve steady progress in making low-enriched uranium (LEU), a key ingredient in fuel for commercial nuclear reactors. With further processing, LEU can be converted into the highly enriched uranium used in nuclear bombs.
The new estimate's description of intense disagreement within the regime over the nuclear program has been cited by some U.S. officials as evidence that economic sanctions have worked.
Sanctions are causing substantial pain for the government, said one U.S. official, and at a time when Tehran is facing new civilian unrest, some leaders fear the economic damage could get "even worse."
But others who have read the new report disagree. "Nothing" in the report suggests sanctions are working, said a senior congressional official. "I don't think . . . that you can conclude that [Iran] is open to influence by peaceful means."
Officials on both sides of the sanctions issue agree that Iran's leaders are probably influenced by concern over potential Israeli military strikes.
February 18, 2011; 6:15 PM
By Greg Miller and Joby Warrick
A comprehensive new U.S. intelligence report concludes that Iran has resumed research on key components for a nuclear weapon, but that the slow and scattered nature of the effort reflects renewed debate within the regime over whether to build a bomb, U.S. officials said.
The finding represents a significant, if subtle, shift from the main conclusion of a controversial 2007 estimate that Iran had halted its weaponization work.
In finding that Iran has again begun taking steps toward designing a nuclear warhead, the new estimate is likely to be seen as erasing doubt that the earlier document created about Iran's intent.
But the new report reaches no firm conclusions about when Iran might acquire the bomb. The classified estimate has already triggered debate among American officials over whether Iran's apparent hesitation is the result of U.S.-backed sanctions meant to derail any weapons program.
Overall, the National Intelligence Estimate concludes that Iran is conducting "early stage R&D work on aspects of the manufacturing process for a nuclear weapon," said a U.S. official familiar with the report. At the same time, the estimate describes "serious debate within the Iranian regime . . . on how to proceed."
Anticipation surrounding the new estimate has been intense, both because it addresses one of the central national security dilemmas confronting President Obama, but also because critics regarded the previous estimate as confusing, and blamed it for undermining then-President George W. Bush's efforts to ratchet up diplomatic pressure on Iran.
The report carries particular weight because it represents the consensus view of the entire U.S. intelligence community, rather than the assessments of a lone agency.
U.S. officials have said that, unlike the estimate of four years ago, the new one will remain classified and out of public view; they would describe it only on the condition of anonymity. A Wall Street Journal article described aspects of the estimate this week.
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper summarized key points in testimony before the Senate intelligence committee Wednesday, telling lawmakers that Iran's "technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons."
"Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so," Clapper said. Whether such a decision had been made, he said, remains unclear.
The new assessment does not entirely refute the 2007 report's most controversial finding, which held that Iran's leaders had halted nuclear weaponization research in 2003, even while pushing forward on uranium enrichment that is regarded as the most difficult step to building a bomb.
U.S. spy agencies remain convinced that Iranian officials ordered a temporary halt to certain military research projects aimed at mastering the complex engineering involved in building nuclear warheads. The stoppage was described in computer notes and files surreptitiously obtained by the United States.
At the time, Iran's massive enrichment plant near the city of Natanz had been exposed by an opposition group. The halt also coincided with the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
"The fact is, after 2003 the program went to ground," said a senior administration official who has reviewed the latest estimate. But even while that military-backed project remains shuttered, the official said the effort "became not a single program but multiple programs farmed out to universities and private companies. What research is being carried out, and to what end, is now much harder to pin down."
Many analysts believe that Iran intends to follow the same course as Japan and other states that are regarded as "virtual" nuclear powers - acquiring all the basic building blocks for nuclear weapons without actually building a bomb.
These analysts believe Iran would stop short of assembling and testing a bomb, a move that would subject the country to international condemnation and a possible military attack. Iran consistently denies having a nuclear weapons program.
Over the past year, U.S. intelligence officials have become increasingly convinced that Iran's progress toward building a bomb has suffered setbacks, giving the United States and other allies an additional cushion of two years or more before Tehran would be in position to test a device. Israel's former intelligence chief estimated last month that Iran could not have a bomb before 2015.
Delays to Iran's program have been attributed in part to elaborate attempts at sabotage, including the unleashing of a computer worm, called Stuxnet, that caused major equipment failures in centrifuge machines at Natanz. U.N. inspectors have concluded that hundreds of machines failed in the attack, but that Iran recovered remarkably quickly, wheeling in new machines to replace those that were lost.
Regardless of the research on developing a nuclear warhead, U.S. intelligence agencies believe Iran has continued to achieve steady progress in making low-enriched uranium (LEU), a key ingredient in fuel for commercial nuclear reactors. With further processing, LEU can be converted into the highly enriched uranium used in nuclear bombs.
The new estimate's description of intense disagreement within the regime over the nuclear program has been cited by some U.S. officials as evidence that economic sanctions have worked.
Sanctions are causing substantial pain for the government, said one U.S. official, and at a time when Tehran is facing new civilian unrest, some leaders fear the economic damage could get "even worse."
But others who have read the new report disagree. "Nothing" in the report suggests sanctions are working, said a senior congressional official. "I don't think . . . that you can conclude that [Iran] is open to influence by peaceful means."
Officials on both sides of the sanctions issue agree that Iran's leaders are probably influenced by concern over potential Israeli military strikes.
Thursday, February 17, 2011
AP sources: US sees Iran's leaders split on nukes
MATTHEW LEE
Feb 17, 2011
The Associated Press
WASHINGTON (AP) — U.S. intelligence agencies believe Iran's leaders are divided over the question of whether to use its nuclear program to develop atomic weapons and is immersed in a serious internal debate about how to proceed in the face of international sanctions, American officials said Wednesday.
"We continue to assess Iran is keeping the option open to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons should it choose to do so," National Intelligence Director James Clapper told Congress. "We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons."
Two officials told The Associated Press that the United States believes Iran's government is fragmented on the matter and beset by divisions. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the findings of a new classified assessment of Iran that Clapper told lawmakers on Wednesday had been completed recently.
The key finding of the new NIE — that Iran's leaders remain divided over whether to go forward with a bomb — was first reported by the Wall Street Journal on Wednesday.
The new National Intelligence Estimate replaces a 2007 version that controversially concluded Iran had abandoned attempts to develop nuclear weapons in 2003. That report was disputed by Israel and several European intelligence services.
Discussing the broad outlines of the findings, Clapper told the Senate Intelligence Committee that Iran remained a challenge and a potential threat despite the internal debate.
"We see a disturbing confluence of events: an Iran that is increasingly rigid, autocratic, dependent on coercion to maintain control and defiant toward the West, and an Iran that continues to advance its uranium enrichment capabilities along with what appears to be the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons if its leaders choose to do so," he said.
At the White House, when asked about the new intelligence estimate, national security spokesman Tommy Vietor said he would not comment on intelligence matters.
But Vietor said the administration's approach is driven "by the fact that Iran has failed to demonstrate clearly peaceful nuclear intentions."
"Iran has engaged in a constant pattern of deception on its nuclear program," Vietor said. "Iran has pursued its nuclear program in ways that only deepen the world's concerns, including by building a secret enrichment plant, enriching uranium to higher levels, and refusing to meet its international obligations."
In December, the top U.S. military officer said he believes Iran is trying to build a nuclear bomb, which he said poses a threat to its neighbors, and the United States is "very ready" to counter Iran should it make a move.
"From my perspective I see Iran continuing on this path to develop nuclear weapons, and I believe that that development and achieving that goal would be very destabilizing to the region," Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said then.
Iran denies it is seeking a nuclear weapon, and denies U.S. claims that it sponsors terrorists. Iran has wary relations with many of its neighbors, who are trading partners with the oil producer but distrust the theocratic government.
The United States fears that if Iran masters the technical challenge of building a bomb it could set off a nuclear arms race around the Persian Gulf area.
Mullen said in December that he supports the current strategy of applying economic and political sanctions on Iran to try to dissuade it from building a bomb, while engaging Iran in international negotiations over the scope of its nuclear program. Iran insists it is seeking nuclear energy.
Mullen repeated his view that a pre-emptive military strike on Iran's known nuclear facilities is a bad option that would set off "unintended consequences," but one the United States reserves the right to use. The Obama administration has said it will not allow Iran to become a nuclear weapons state but has never said exactly what it would do to prevent that.
Last April U.S. officials said Iran is pursuing an aggressive missile program, including intercontinental missiles it would need outside expertise to perfect.
Once Iran decided to build one bomb, it could amass enough highly enriched uranium to do so in as little as 12 months, Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in April. He added that Tehran still would need additional time to test the weapon and make it usable against an enemy.
New nuclear nations generally need three to five additional years to make a usable weapon, Cartwright said, but the time line could be shortened if Iran should pursue a warhead and a missile or other delivery system at the same time.
Opinions vary on how much damage a U.S. or Israeli military strike could do to Iran's nuclear program, which is intentionally opaque and spread among multiple facilities.
U.S. officials generally say that a strike on one or more known facilities would set the program back a few years but not stop it.
The United States also has acknowledged that once a nation has sufficient nuclear scientific and technological prowess, it could rebound from nearly any assault on the facilities used for bomb development.
Feb 17, 2011
The Associated Press
WASHINGTON (AP) — U.S. intelligence agencies believe Iran's leaders are divided over the question of whether to use its nuclear program to develop atomic weapons and is immersed in a serious internal debate about how to proceed in the face of international sanctions, American officials said Wednesday.
"We continue to assess Iran is keeping the option open to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons should it choose to do so," National Intelligence Director James Clapper told Congress. "We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons."
Two officials told The Associated Press that the United States believes Iran's government is fragmented on the matter and beset by divisions. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the findings of a new classified assessment of Iran that Clapper told lawmakers on Wednesday had been completed recently.
The key finding of the new NIE — that Iran's leaders remain divided over whether to go forward with a bomb — was first reported by the Wall Street Journal on Wednesday.
The new National Intelligence Estimate replaces a 2007 version that controversially concluded Iran had abandoned attempts to develop nuclear weapons in 2003. That report was disputed by Israel and several European intelligence services.
Discussing the broad outlines of the findings, Clapper told the Senate Intelligence Committee that Iran remained a challenge and a potential threat despite the internal debate.
"We see a disturbing confluence of events: an Iran that is increasingly rigid, autocratic, dependent on coercion to maintain control and defiant toward the West, and an Iran that continues to advance its uranium enrichment capabilities along with what appears to be the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons if its leaders choose to do so," he said.
At the White House, when asked about the new intelligence estimate, national security spokesman Tommy Vietor said he would not comment on intelligence matters.
But Vietor said the administration's approach is driven "by the fact that Iran has failed to demonstrate clearly peaceful nuclear intentions."
"Iran has engaged in a constant pattern of deception on its nuclear program," Vietor said. "Iran has pursued its nuclear program in ways that only deepen the world's concerns, including by building a secret enrichment plant, enriching uranium to higher levels, and refusing to meet its international obligations."
In December, the top U.S. military officer said he believes Iran is trying to build a nuclear bomb, which he said poses a threat to its neighbors, and the United States is "very ready" to counter Iran should it make a move.
"From my perspective I see Iran continuing on this path to develop nuclear weapons, and I believe that that development and achieving that goal would be very destabilizing to the region," Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said then.
Iran denies it is seeking a nuclear weapon, and denies U.S. claims that it sponsors terrorists. Iran has wary relations with many of its neighbors, who are trading partners with the oil producer but distrust the theocratic government.
The United States fears that if Iran masters the technical challenge of building a bomb it could set off a nuclear arms race around the Persian Gulf area.
Mullen said in December that he supports the current strategy of applying economic and political sanctions on Iran to try to dissuade it from building a bomb, while engaging Iran in international negotiations over the scope of its nuclear program. Iran insists it is seeking nuclear energy.
Mullen repeated his view that a pre-emptive military strike on Iran's known nuclear facilities is a bad option that would set off "unintended consequences," but one the United States reserves the right to use. The Obama administration has said it will not allow Iran to become a nuclear weapons state but has never said exactly what it would do to prevent that.
Last April U.S. officials said Iran is pursuing an aggressive missile program, including intercontinental missiles it would need outside expertise to perfect.
Once Iran decided to build one bomb, it could amass enough highly enriched uranium to do so in as little as 12 months, Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in April. He added that Tehran still would need additional time to test the weapon and make it usable against an enemy.
New nuclear nations generally need three to five additional years to make a usable weapon, Cartwright said, but the time line could be shortened if Iran should pursue a warhead and a missile or other delivery system at the same time.
Opinions vary on how much damage a U.S. or Israeli military strike could do to Iran's nuclear program, which is intentionally opaque and spread among multiple facilities.
U.S. officials generally say that a strike on one or more known facilities would set the program back a few years but not stop it.
The United States also has acknowledged that once a nation has sufficient nuclear scientific and technological prowess, it could rebound from nearly any assault on the facilities used for bomb development.
Exclusive: New National Intelligence Estimate on Iran complete
The Cable
feb. 15, 2011
The U.S. intelligence community has completed and is circulating a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear weapons program that walks back the conclusion of the 2007 NIE, which stated that Iran had halted work on its covert nuclear weapons program.
Intelligence officials briefed executive branch policymakers on the revised NIE last week. The document is being shared with members of Congress and their staff this week, an administration official and several Capitol Hill sources told The Cable. This is in advance of an early March meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors, where there may be another resolution on Iran's nuclear program, the official said.
The 2007 NIE was attacked in public due to its conclusion: "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." The new estimate might not directly contradict that judgment, Hill sources report, but could say that while the intelligence community has not determined that Iran has made the strategic decision to build a nuclear weapon, it is working on the components of such a device.
Several sources said they are being told there will be no declassified version of the new NIE, and that only those cleared to read the full 2007 NIE (pdf) will be able to see the new version.
"It does exist," House Intelligence Committee chairman Mike Rogers (R-MI) said in an interview with The Cable. Rogers said the administration was right to take its time to revise the 2007 NIE before releasing the updated version. "Intelligence is a fluid thing, sometimes you get great stuff and sometimes you don't get great stuff to make good conclusions. I think they were prudent in what they've done."
House Foreign Affairs ranking Democrat Howard Berman (D-CA) told The Cable he had heard the new NIE would walk back the controversial conclusions of the 2007 version, but that he hadn't read it yet. Regardless, he said, the 2007 Iran NIE was now obsolete and discredited.
"Nobody had been paying attention to the older NIE. A few people on the outside focused on it because they didn't want us to go down the sanctions route but neither the administration nor the Congress paid it much attention," Berman said. "I thought the NIE estimate then was a faulty one because it focused on some aspects of weaponization -- even as Iran was continuing to enrich."
Revelations that Iran had a secret uranium enrichment facility at Qom, which occurred after the release of the 2007 NIE, were further proof that the Iranian regime was pursing nuclear weapons, Berman said. Regardless, the Obama administration has disregarded the 2007 Iran NIE, he said.
"For a year and a half the administration has been convinced that Iran has been pursuing a nuclear weapon. That's what they whole sanctions push is based on," Berman said. "There can be no serious doubt that Iran wants to have a nuclear weapons capability."
Sen. Mark Kirk (R-IL), a former intelligence officer for the U.S. Navy, told The Cable, "The 2007 NIE was a mistake," and this document appears to be more realistic. He urged the intelligence community to take a less technical and more comprehensive look at the Iranian leadership's actions when making such judgments.
"My hope is that the current leaders of the intelligence community look not just at technical details and also comment regularly on Iran's leaders," Kirk said. "In Intelligence 101 we are taught to measure both capability and intent politically, and the intent here on the part of the Iranian regime is pretty clear."
Several lawmakers refused to discuss the new NIE because it was classified or because they hadn't read it yet. Senate Armed Services Committee ranking Republican John McCain (R-AZ) told The Cable he had been briefed on the new NIE, but declined to comment on its contents. Senate Intelligence Committee chairwoman Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) told The Cable she hadn't yet seen the new NIE but planned to review it soon.
Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI), who supported the conclusions in the 2007 NIE, contended that the old estimate was misconstrued as an attempt by its authors to head off an attack against Iran by the Bush administration.
"I think it was interpreted incorrectly," Levin told The Cable.
The NIE is compiled by the National Intelligence Council, but rollout and classification decisions are ultimately made by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.
feb. 15, 2011
The U.S. intelligence community has completed and is circulating a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear weapons program that walks back the conclusion of the 2007 NIE, which stated that Iran had halted work on its covert nuclear weapons program.
Intelligence officials briefed executive branch policymakers on the revised NIE last week. The document is being shared with members of Congress and their staff this week, an administration official and several Capitol Hill sources told The Cable. This is in advance of an early March meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors, where there may be another resolution on Iran's nuclear program, the official said.
The 2007 NIE was attacked in public due to its conclusion: "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." The new estimate might not directly contradict that judgment, Hill sources report, but could say that while the intelligence community has not determined that Iran has made the strategic decision to build a nuclear weapon, it is working on the components of such a device.
Several sources said they are being told there will be no declassified version of the new NIE, and that only those cleared to read the full 2007 NIE (pdf) will be able to see the new version.
"It does exist," House Intelligence Committee chairman Mike Rogers (R-MI) said in an interview with The Cable. Rogers said the administration was right to take its time to revise the 2007 NIE before releasing the updated version. "Intelligence is a fluid thing, sometimes you get great stuff and sometimes you don't get great stuff to make good conclusions. I think they were prudent in what they've done."
House Foreign Affairs ranking Democrat Howard Berman (D-CA) told The Cable he had heard the new NIE would walk back the controversial conclusions of the 2007 version, but that he hadn't read it yet. Regardless, he said, the 2007 Iran NIE was now obsolete and discredited.
"Nobody had been paying attention to the older NIE. A few people on the outside focused on it because they didn't want us to go down the sanctions route but neither the administration nor the Congress paid it much attention," Berman said. "I thought the NIE estimate then was a faulty one because it focused on some aspects of weaponization -- even as Iran was continuing to enrich."
Revelations that Iran had a secret uranium enrichment facility at Qom, which occurred after the release of the 2007 NIE, were further proof that the Iranian regime was pursing nuclear weapons, Berman said. Regardless, the Obama administration has disregarded the 2007 Iran NIE, he said.
"For a year and a half the administration has been convinced that Iran has been pursuing a nuclear weapon. That's what they whole sanctions push is based on," Berman said. "There can be no serious doubt that Iran wants to have a nuclear weapons capability."
Sen. Mark Kirk (R-IL), a former intelligence officer for the U.S. Navy, told The Cable, "The 2007 NIE was a mistake," and this document appears to be more realistic. He urged the intelligence community to take a less technical and more comprehensive look at the Iranian leadership's actions when making such judgments.
"My hope is that the current leaders of the intelligence community look not just at technical details and also comment regularly on Iran's leaders," Kirk said. "In Intelligence 101 we are taught to measure both capability and intent politically, and the intent here on the part of the Iranian regime is pretty clear."
Several lawmakers refused to discuss the new NIE because it was classified or because they hadn't read it yet. Senate Armed Services Committee ranking Republican John McCain (R-AZ) told The Cable he had been briefed on the new NIE, but declined to comment on its contents. Senate Intelligence Committee chairwoman Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) told The Cable she hadn't yet seen the new NIE but planned to review it soon.
Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI), who supported the conclusions in the 2007 NIE, contended that the old estimate was misconstrued as an attempt by its authors to head off an attack against Iran by the Bush administration.
"I think it was interpreted incorrectly," Levin told The Cable.
The NIE is compiled by the National Intelligence Council, but rollout and classification decisions are ultimately made by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.
U.S. Spies: Iran Split on Nuclear Program
WSJ
WASHINGTON—A new classified U.S. intelligence assessment concludes that Iran's leaders are locked in an increasingly heated debate over whether to move further toward developing nuclear weapons, saying the bite of international sanctions may be sowing discord.
The new national intelligence estimate, or NIE, says Tehran likely has resumed work on nuclear-weapons research in addition to expanding its program to enrich uranium—updating a contested 2007 estimate that concluded the arms program had all but halted in 2003.
But it doesn't conclude that Iran has relaunched a full-blown program to try to build bombs. According to the assessment, Iran's debate over whether to do so suggests international sanctions may be causing divisions in Tehran, U.S. officials said.
The new assessment, which was shared this week with key congressional committees, comes as protesters in Tehran ramp up pressure on Iran's leaders, amid a wave of popular revolts sweeping the Mideast. Tehran took steps Wednesday to stifle passions inflamed by the killings of two students during protests.
Adding to tensions, Israel Wednesday said the deployment of an Iranian warship to Syria via the Suez Canal was a "provocation" by Iran that Israel couldn't ignore.
The NIE's findings suggest that, in the U.S. view, at least some Iranian leaders are worried that economic turmoil fueled in part by international sanctions could spur opposition to the regime—though officials acknowledge it is impossible for outsiders to determine the precise effect of sanctions on decision-making in Tehran.
Iran's government has also taken steps to stifle any possible unrest in response to its own economic measures, after Tehran significantly cut subsidies for fuel, electricity and basic food items in late December.
An NIE is considered the consensus view of all the various U.S. intelligence agencies, and, as a result, carries more weight than an analysis coming from any one part of the intelligence community.
The new assessment is the first full, new analysis by the intelligence community since the 2007 estimate, which concluded that Iran had halted its nuclear-weapon design and weaponization work, as well as its covert uranium enrichment-related activities. Those findings were disputed by some European spy agencies. Iran denies it is trying to develop nuclear weapons.
U.S. officials say at least some of those 2007 assertions have been revised in the new NIE. But the new assessment stops short of rejecting the earlier findings.
"The bottom line is that the intelligence community has concluded that there's an intense debate inside the Iranian regime on the question of whether or not to move toward a nuclear bomb," a U.S. official said. "There's a strong sense that a number of Iranian regime officials know that the sanctions are having a serious effect."
Such conclusions are likely to stiffen the resolve of Obama administration officials to tighten sanctions further. The White House declined to comment on the new intelligence assessment.
U.S. officials pointed to Iran's violent crackdown on protests this week as a sign the regime is concerned about its vulnerability after the fall of longtime leaders in Tunisia and Egypt.
President Barack Obama has voiced support for the rights of protest leaders in Iran, whom the regime has threatened with execution. The State Department has been tweeting messages expressing support for the rights of Iranians to hold protests.
The new intelligence findings also reflect a growing consensus among the U.S. and its allies that Tehran's suspected effort to obtain a warhead has been significantly slowed by the combination of sanctions and problems at its nuclear facilities.
Senior Israeli officials said last month that Tehran may be at least four years away from being able to produce a nuclear weapon because of technological difficulties, a notably longer timeline than Israelis had used previously. Soon after, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Washington believed Iran's nuclear program faced mounting "technical" problems.
In a separate threat assessment presented to the Senate Intelligence Committee Wednesday, the director of national intelligence, James Clapper, said the U.S. believes Iran should be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon "in the next few years," provided Tehran makes the decision to do so.
Officials in the U.S., Europe and Asia credit, in part, an international campaign that they say has restricted Iran's ability to procure the raw materials needed to build an atomic bomb.
Officials say Iran has had difficulty acquiring carbon fiber and a particular high-strength steel, two critical components for making machinery used in producing enriched uranium.
Iran's nuclear program also appears to have been slowed by problems in the computer system used to run its enrichment equipment, officials said.
Officials say Tehran is encountering problems deploying advanced centrifuge machines that could drastically accelerate the production of highly enriched uranium, which is needed for a nuclear bomb.
Experts attribute equipment failures among such machines at Iran's main uranium-enrichment plant to a computer worm known as Stuxnet. Iran has acknowledged the computer attacks. Experts speculate that Stuxnet was developed by Israel or the U.S., or both, though neither government has confirmed any role.
A report issued on Wednesday by David Albright, an expert on Iran's nuclear program who heads the Institute for Science and International Security, said it is increasingly accepted that a successful Stuxnet attack in late 2009 or early 2010 destroyed about 1,000 Iranian centrifuges out of about 9,000 at the site.
"The effect of this attack was significant," Mr. Albright said in the report. "It rattled the Iranians, who were unlikely to know what caused the breakage, delayed the expected expansion of the plant, and further consumed a limited supply of centrifuges to replace those destroyed."
Mr. Clapper, in testimony to Congress, said the intelligence community believes Iran is "keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons."
FEBRUARY 17, 2011
By ADAM ENTOUS WASHINGTON—A new classified U.S. intelligence assessment concludes that Iran's leaders are locked in an increasingly heated debate over whether to move further toward developing nuclear weapons, saying the bite of international sanctions may be sowing discord.
The new national intelligence estimate, or NIE, says Tehran likely has resumed work on nuclear-weapons research in addition to expanding its program to enrich uranium—updating a contested 2007 estimate that concluded the arms program had all but halted in 2003.
But it doesn't conclude that Iran has relaunched a full-blown program to try to build bombs. According to the assessment, Iran's debate over whether to do so suggests international sanctions may be causing divisions in Tehran, U.S. officials said.
The new assessment, which was shared this week with key congressional committees, comes as protesters in Tehran ramp up pressure on Iran's leaders, amid a wave of popular revolts sweeping the Mideast. Tehran took steps Wednesday to stifle passions inflamed by the killings of two students during protests.
Adding to tensions, Israel Wednesday said the deployment of an Iranian warship to Syria via the Suez Canal was a "provocation" by Iran that Israel couldn't ignore.
The NIE's findings suggest that, in the U.S. view, at least some Iranian leaders are worried that economic turmoil fueled in part by international sanctions could spur opposition to the regime—though officials acknowledge it is impossible for outsiders to determine the precise effect of sanctions on decision-making in Tehran.
Iran's government has also taken steps to stifle any possible unrest in response to its own economic measures, after Tehran significantly cut subsidies for fuel, electricity and basic food items in late December.
An NIE is considered the consensus view of all the various U.S. intelligence agencies, and, as a result, carries more weight than an analysis coming from any one part of the intelligence community.
The new assessment is the first full, new analysis by the intelligence community since the 2007 estimate, which concluded that Iran had halted its nuclear-weapon design and weaponization work, as well as its covert uranium enrichment-related activities. Those findings were disputed by some European spy agencies. Iran denies it is trying to develop nuclear weapons.
U.S. officials say at least some of those 2007 assertions have been revised in the new NIE. But the new assessment stops short of rejecting the earlier findings.
"The bottom line is that the intelligence community has concluded that there's an intense debate inside the Iranian regime on the question of whether or not to move toward a nuclear bomb," a U.S. official said. "There's a strong sense that a number of Iranian regime officials know that the sanctions are having a serious effect."
Such conclusions are likely to stiffen the resolve of Obama administration officials to tighten sanctions further. The White House declined to comment on the new intelligence assessment.
U.S. officials pointed to Iran's violent crackdown on protests this week as a sign the regime is concerned about its vulnerability after the fall of longtime leaders in Tunisia and Egypt.
President Barack Obama has voiced support for the rights of protest leaders in Iran, whom the regime has threatened with execution. The State Department has been tweeting messages expressing support for the rights of Iranians to hold protests.
The new intelligence findings also reflect a growing consensus among the U.S. and its allies that Tehran's suspected effort to obtain a warhead has been significantly slowed by the combination of sanctions and problems at its nuclear facilities.
Senior Israeli officials said last month that Tehran may be at least four years away from being able to produce a nuclear weapon because of technological difficulties, a notably longer timeline than Israelis had used previously. Soon after, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Washington believed Iran's nuclear program faced mounting "technical" problems.
In a separate threat assessment presented to the Senate Intelligence Committee Wednesday, the director of national intelligence, James Clapper, said the U.S. believes Iran should be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon "in the next few years," provided Tehran makes the decision to do so.
Officials in the U.S., Europe and Asia credit, in part, an international campaign that they say has restricted Iran's ability to procure the raw materials needed to build an atomic bomb.
Officials say Iran has had difficulty acquiring carbon fiber and a particular high-strength steel, two critical components for making machinery used in producing enriched uranium.
Iran's nuclear program also appears to have been slowed by problems in the computer system used to run its enrichment equipment, officials said.
Officials say Tehran is encountering problems deploying advanced centrifuge machines that could drastically accelerate the production of highly enriched uranium, which is needed for a nuclear bomb.
Experts attribute equipment failures among such machines at Iran's main uranium-enrichment plant to a computer worm known as Stuxnet. Iran has acknowledged the computer attacks. Experts speculate that Stuxnet was developed by Israel or the U.S., or both, though neither government has confirmed any role.
A report issued on Wednesday by David Albright, an expert on Iran's nuclear program who heads the Institute for Science and International Security, said it is increasingly accepted that a successful Stuxnet attack in late 2009 or early 2010 destroyed about 1,000 Iranian centrifuges out of about 9,000 at the site.
"The effect of this attack was significant," Mr. Albright said in the report. "It rattled the Iranians, who were unlikely to know what caused the breakage, delayed the expected expansion of the plant, and further consumed a limited supply of centrifuges to replace those destroyed."
Mr. Clapper, in testimony to Congress, said the intelligence community believes Iran is "keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons."
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