Indonesia and the U.S. Effort to Re-Engage Southeast Asia

STRATFOR
March 4, 2010 | 1149 GMT
SEVERAL OFFICERS OF INDONESIA’S ELITE Special Forces Command (Kopassus) are reportedly in Washington to discuss the resumption of military training for Indonesia’s special forces. U.S. training of Kopassus units was canceled in the late 1990s amid the chaotic end of the Suharto regime, and the push for independence by East Timor due to accusations of human rights abuses by the force. The U.S. Defense Department, State Department and President Barack Obama’s administration are currently working with Congress and the Indonesians to lift the training ban as part of a broader effort to re-engage Southeast Asia, particularly strategically located Indonesia.

A low-key but persistent initiative by the Obama administration has been the reparation and expansion of economic, political and military ties with Southeast Asia. Following the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia shifted from a simmering battleground between opposing international forces to an area of economic interest, with minimal strategic concern for the one remaining superpower. The 1997 Asian economic crisis interrupted the region’s dreams of gaining independent significance and influence, and with the reduction of economic importance — and the rise of other, more strategic issues — the United States paid little heed to Southeast Asia. Indonesia not only faced the withdrawal of U.S. interest, but also additional U.S. pressure that did nothing to halt the fall of former ally Suharto — or the loss of East Timor.

As Washington shifted its attention to the rise of international Islamic militancy, Indonesia mattered in those concerns only so far as it was prevented from becoming a haven for militants. And for this task, Washington looked to its Pacific ally Australia to take the lead. Canberra has long been concerned about Indonesia, its much more populous neighbor to the north, and the country that both shields Australia from the rest of Asia and could cut Australian supply lines should relations deteriorate. For Australia, Indonesia never lost its significance, but for the United States, Indonesia had fallen to a third-tier issue, at best — neither a crisis nor a necessary strategic partner.

“A low-key but persistent initiative by U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration has been the reparation and expansion of economic, political and military ties with Southeast Asia.”
But throughout the first decade of the 21st century, as Washington focused primarily on South and Southwest Asia, China undertook a re-examination of its own position and foreign policy. Shifts in China’s economic patterns, which make the country much more dependent upon trade flows to and from far-flung areas, prompted Beijing to begin expanding its own political and economic influence, starting in Southeast and Central Asia. In addition, to protect its longer maritime supply lines, Beijing began shifts in its naval acquisitions and doctrine, working to reshape its navy from one of coastal defense to one capable of overseas deployment and long distance missions.

This expansion of China’s sphere of interest, influence and activity has pushed up against two of the guiding U.S. strategic imperatives — ensuring that no single great power can arise in the Eurasian landmass, and ensuring domination of the seas to allow rapid access to distant locations while minimizing any foreign power’s ability to challenge the U.S. mainland. China is expanding its reach throughout Eurasia via land and beyond via the sea, and the Straight of Malacca, between Indonesia and Singapore, is a critical element for Beijing’s access to the Indian Ocean basin. China is far from becoming the dominant power in Eurasia, and has yet to fundamentally challenge U.S. control of the seas (though there have been occasional collisions between the two countries’ maritime assets). But Beijing is certainly showing an inclination in that direction, and Beijing’s ultimate capabilities aside, Washington has taken notice.

During U.S. President George W. Bush’s administration, the Defense Department began the process of trying to lift restrictions against military cooperation with Indonesia, both to enlist Jakarta’s help in anti-terrorism efforts, and because Indonesia lies astride some of the most important sea lanes in the world. Indonesia stretches from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, and can theoretically control the passage between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. The United States backed the takeover by Suharto in the 1960s due to fears that then-President Sukarno was flirting with international communism, thus putting strategic sea lanes at risk of communist control.

While Washington is not looking to facilitate another coup (as it did with the transition from Sukarno to Suharto), it does want to ensure that Indonesia does not fall into China’s rising sphere of influence. The United States also wants to prevent the Indonesian state from collapsing into chaos (as it nearly did with Suharto’s ouster), disrupting sea lanes and providing openings for hostile forces. One of the critical elements to address is the Indonesian military, which serves not only a role as national defender, but also as a critical element to ensure unity and stability across the vast archipelagic nation. Questions of human rights or Obama’s birth certificate aside, closer U.S. relations with Indonesia serve to shore up Washington’s strategic position in East Asia, and can serve as an element of constraint to China.

And this goes beyond the military — Indonesia is also home to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) secretariat, and Washington sees a close bilateral relationship with Jakarta as a critical component of a broader re-engagement with Southeast Asia. The United States has already reduced friction with ASEAN by lifting economic restrictions on Cambodia and Laos, and softening its position on Myanmar. Washington is also about to launch talks on the new Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreements, which would strengthen U.S. trade in Southeast Asia. In the near-term, Southeast Asia continues to rank low in U.S. activities, but a need to revive relations to deal with China and other East Asian uncertainties in the future has been recognized. And Indonesia has been identified as the centerpiece of this strategy.