U.S. Strategy Toward Preserving the Egyptian Regime

STRATFOR
February 3, 2011

Wednesday was another Egypt day, but the most important development did not take place in the country. Instead, it was in Washington, where White House spokesman Robert Gibbs used some pretty tough language in demanding that Egypt immediately engage in the process of transition: “The time for a transition has come, and that time is now…now is not September…now means yesterday,” Gibbs said.



Gibbs’ comments clearly show that the United States wants Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to step down and without much delay. Washington sees this as a way to try to defuse the street agitation. The fear is that should the unrest continue, the situation may get out of hand and even the Egyptian military might not be able to handle the situation.



“…the United States is not worried about the end of the “Mubarakian era” and is in fact demanding that the embattled president depart sooner rather than later.”

The critical element in this process is the Egyptian military, which is expected to ensure that Mubarak’s fall does not lead to a collapse of the existing order. As things stand, it seems the opposition forces would be satisfied if Mubarak stepped down, after which they are prepared to negotiate with his successors. Of course, such an event would herald the next phase when all sorts of issues (interim administration, elections, new constitution, etc.) would have to be sorted out.



But the bottom line is that regime change would not take place. Any new ruling elite — if and when it took office — would be dependent upon the military, internal security forces, intelligence service, bureaucracy and business community to govern the country. After all, these are the basic instruments of governance that any political force would be dependent upon.



A key thing to note in the case of Egypt is that the public agitation is not led by any political force. Rather, civil society is behind the protest demonstrations. So, when Mubarak throws in the towel and the public goes back home, the political parties will be left with little leverage vis-a-vis the state.



That weakens the ability of the political forces to negotiate with the regime from a position of relative strength. This is not to say that the ruling National Democratic Party sans Mubarak would be able to continue with business as usual with the military’s backing. There will be compromises but nothing that would lead to a fundamental shift in the nature of the Egyptian polity.



The important thing to keep in mind at this point is that the political forces depend upon the military for any political change. It is this dependency that will likely allow the military to ensure continuity of policy. This would be the case, even if the country’s most organized political group, the Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood, were to come to power.



On their own, political forces do not wield much power and in Egypt, where the political forces do not own the streets, this is all the more the case. Thus, the move toward a more democratic polity is an evolutionary process and will likely take many years to transpire — assuming, of course, ceteris paribus — all things being equal. Until then, the guarantor of state stability is the country’s armed forces, which means that the order established by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952 will not undergo any major change anytime soon.



It is for this reason the United States is not worried about the end of the “Mubarakian era” and is in fact demanding that the embattled president depart sooner rather than later.