May 30, 2011
By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK
CAIRO — The headline screamed from a venerable liberal newspaper: Coptic Christians had abducted a young Muslim and tattooed her with a cross. “Copts kidnap Raghada!”
“They tied me up with ropes, beat me with shoes, shaved my hair,” Raghada Salem Abdel Fattah, 19, declared, “and forced me to read Christian psalms!”
Like many similar stories proliferating here since the revolution, Ms. Abdel Fattah’s kidnapping could not be confirmed. But for members of Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority, the sensational headline — from a respected publisher, no less — served to validate their fear that the Egyptian revolution had made their country less tolerant and more dangerous for religious minorities. The Arab Spring initially appeared to open a welcoming door to the dwindling number of Christian Arabs who, after years of feeling marginalized, eagerly joined the call for democracy and rule of law. But now many Christians here say they fear that the fall of the police state has allowed long-simmering tensions to explode, potentially threatening the character of Egypt, and the region.
“Will Christians have equal rights and full citizenship or not?” asked Sarkis Naoum, a Christian commentator in Beirut, Lebanon. A surge of sectarian violence in Cairo — 24 dead, more than 200 wounded and three churches in flames since President Hosni Mubarak’s downfall — has turned Christian-Muslim tensions into one of the gravest threats to the revolution’s stability. But it is also a pivotal test of Egypt’s tolerance, pluralism and the rule of law. The revolution has empowered the majority but also opened new questions about the protection of minority rights like freedom of religion or expression as Islamist groups step forward to lay out their agendas and test their political might.
Around the region, Christians are also closely watching events in Syria, where as in Egypt Christians and other minorities received the protection of a secular dictator, Bashar al-Assad, now facing his own popular uprising.
“The Copts are the crucial test case,” said Heba Morayef, a researcher with Human Rights Watch here, adding that facing off against “societal pressures” may in some ways be ever harder than criticizing a dictator. “It is the next big battle.”
But so far, there is little encouragement in the debate over how to address the sectarian strife. Instead of searching for common ground, all sides are pointing fingers of blame while almost no one is addressing the underlying reasons for the strife, including a legal framework that treats Muslims and Christians differently.
Christians, who make up about 10 percent of the 80 million Egyptians, say the revolution has plunged them into uncharted territory. Suppressed or marginalized for six decades here, Islamists entering politics have rushed to defend an article of the Egyptian Constitution that declares Egypt a Muslim country that derives its laws from Islam. Christians and liberals say privately they abhor the provision, which was first added as a populist gesture by President Anwar el-Sadat. But the article is so popular among Muslims — and the meaning so vague — that even many liberals and Christians entering politics are reluctant to speak out against it, asking at most for slight modifications.
“Our position is that it should stay, but a clause should be added so that in personal issues non-Muslims are subject to the rules of their own religion,” said Naguib Sawiris, a secular-minded Christian tycoon who has started his own liberal party.
He would prefer to remove religion from the laws entirely the way Western separation of church and state does, he said, but that idea could not prevail in Egypt. “Islam doesn’t separate them,” he said.
The most common sparks for sectarian violence, however, come from Egyptian laws dating from the end of the colonial era. One imposes stricter regulations on building churches than on mosques. Christians often look to get around the restrictions by constructing “community centers” with altars and steeples — sometimes provoking Muslim accusations of deceit and Christian charges of discrimination.
The other statute is one the church supports, although not all its parishioners agree: it enforces the Coptic Church’s near-total ban on divorce, even while Egyptian laws on Muslim divorce have grown increasingly liberal.
Often, Christians who want to divorce convert to Islam — and try, after the divorce, to convert back. The law has spawned many rumors of sectarian “kidnappings” to abet or prevent such a conversion for some Coptic women. The rumors ignite most outbreaks of Muslim-Christian violence, including at least three riots since the revolution, and many other controversies. In Ms. Abdel Fattah’s case, the Cairo police said the account was fabricated, while Ms. Abdel Fattah’s mother said her daughter was too traumatized to speak to reporters.
But despite widespread recognition of the law’s role as a catalyst of sectarian violence, the idea that civic law should enforce religious morals is so deeply embedded here that almost no one is proposing to alter the rule.
“It is explosive,” said Hossam Bahgat, founder of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, one of the few groups that advocate changing the law to at least allow the choice of a civil, nonreligious marriage.
When Copts held a weeklong sit-in to demand equal legal treatment, many who attended nonetheless insisted on the preservation of separate, binding laws on Christian marriages. “So no one will be able to get around the religion,” said Yusef George, a 30-year-old businessman. A spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest Islamist group, said it, too, supported the rule.
Some blame their own church for depending too much on Mr. Mubarak. In a pattern common to Syria, Iraq and elsewhere, Coptic leaders cultivated the patronage of Egypt’s secular dictator, with Coptic Pope Shenouda III trading political support for favors and protection. As in Iraq, with the leader deposed, the Christians felt exposed.
“Coptic rights were reserved to be discussed between Mubarak and the pope,” said Mona Makram Ebeid, a Coptic scholar and former lawmaker who suspended her membership in the liberal Wafd party because its newspaper published the headline about Ms. Abdel Fattah, “and the Copts were left out of it completely.”
Church leaders, in turn, blame Islamic fundamentalists they say the revolution has emboldened. “They don’t want any Copts present in Egypt,” said Father Armia Adly, a spokesman for the church.
The Muslim Brotherhood, meanwhile, has named a Christian as deputy leader of its new political party. “We are calling for a civil state,” said Essam el-Erian, a prominent leader of the Brotherhood, adding that the group hoped to promote laws derived from the elements of Islamic law common to other great religions, like “freedom of worship and faith, equality between people, and human rights and human dignity.”
Still, many liberals argue the sectarian conflicts prove Egypt should establish a permanent “bill of rights” to protect religious and personal freedoms before holding elections that could give power to an Islamist majority. It would “remove the sense of angst that exists today in Egypt,” said a spokeswoman for Mohamed ElBaradei, a liberal presidential contender.
Showing posts with label egypt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label egypt. Show all posts
Monday, June 6, 2011
Friday, April 29, 2011
Poll: Egyptians have unfavorable view of U.S., are divided on fundamentalists
Washington Post
By Michael Birnbaum, Monday, April 25, 9:31 PM
CAIRO — Egyptians are deeply skeptical about the United States and its role in their country, but they are also divided in their attitudes about Islamic fundamentalists, according a poll released Monday by the Pew Global Attitudes Project.Most Egyptians distrust the United States and want to renegotiate their peace treaty with Israel, the poll found. But only 31 percent say they sympathize with fundamentalists, while 30 percent say they sympathize with those who disagree with fundamentalists. An additional 26 percent said they had mixed views.
The poll is the first comprehensive look at attitudes of Egyptians since protests forced President Hosni Mubarak to end his 30-year reign in February. The numbers reveal a society that overwhelmingly agrees that Mubarak was bad for the country but is divided about what the future should look like.
Although 75 percent were positive about the Muslim Brotherhood, which was officially banned under Mubarak and is now the strongest political organization in the country, almost as many — 70 percent — felt positively about the youth-based April 6 movement that was mostly secular and was one of the key organizers of the protests.
The poll found that 39 percent of Egyptians believe the U.S. response to the upheaval in Egypt was negative, almost double the 22 percent who said it was positive. But many Egyptians — 35 percent — said that the U.S. impact on what happened in Egypt was neither positive nor negative, suggesting that, to them, the United States might not have had much to do with the situation either way.
The United States initially struggled to adopt the right tone toward the protests, at times sending conflicting messages about how quickly Mubarak, its longtime ally, needed to step down, while consistently saying that the decision was in the hands of Egyptians.
Egyptian attitudes toward the United States more generally stayed about the same between 2010 and 2011 — with just 20 percent holding a favorable opinion of the United States this year, an increase of three percentage points from 2010, and 79 percent holding an unfavorable opinion, a decrease of three percentage points.
More Egyptians — 64 percent — said they had low or no confidence in President Obama in 2011 than they did last year, up five percentage points.
And 54 percent want to annul the peace treaty with Israel, compared with 36 percent who want to maintain it.
In a sign of the enduring respect Egyptians have for their military, as well as their gratitude that generals ultimately sided with protesters over Mubarak, those polled were overwhelmingly unified in their support for the head of the transitional military council running the country, Mohammed Hussein Tantawi.
Ninety percent held positive views of him, and 88 percent had positive views of the military in general. They were almost as unified in their opposition to Mubarak. Only 13 percent held favorable views of him; 86 percent held unfavorable views.
A majority of the country wants Egypt’s laws to strictly follow the Koran — 62 percent — and even among those who disagree with Islamic fundamentalists, the number only drops to 47 percent.
The April 6 youth organizers have struggled to determine how best to translate their successes into influence in the political future of the country. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, benefits from a preexisting political organization in a country that has few of them. New political parties seem to be announced every week, and the likely outcomes of the September parliamentary and November presidential elections are unclear.
That might be why only 41 percent of those surveyed felt that free and fair elections were very likely, as compared with 59 percent who thought they were only somewhat likely or unlikely. Support for individual political parties is very divided, and highest number of those surveyed — 21 percent — said they didn’t know which party should lead the next government.
Of the current presidential candidates, Amr Moussa, the secretary general of the Arab League and a former foreign minister under Mubarak, is the favorite, commanding an 89 percent favorable rating. Ayman Nour, an opposition politician, was second among the candidates named, with 70 percent viewing him favorably. Mohamed ElBaradei, the former leader of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who is a well-known face in the West but is regarded as an outsider by many in Egypt, had a 57 percent favorable rating.
The pollsters conducted face-to-face interviews with 1,000 Egyptians across the country over a period of two weeks at the end of March and beginning of April, and the survey has a margin of error of four percentage points.
Tuesday, March 15, 2011
Beyond Cairo: Prospects for change in the Middle East
February 16, 2011
This article was first published in The Hill on February 16, 2011. After weeks of excitement and surprise, it is time to try to make meaning out of the momentous events in Tunisia and Egypt.
Are we on the brink of a democratic tsunami across the region? Or will we discover that Tunisia and Egypt were special cases, and street violence in Yemen, Jordan, Iran and elsewhere will not lead to similar outcomes? What is the right balance between seeing each country's unique history and characteristics, while identifying structural similarities and ways in which would-be democrats and dissidents in one place are inspired by other cases?
Let's acknowledge that there are multiple factors driving events in the region. Bumper sticker interpretations - it's all angry young men in search of jobs and dignity, or it's a grand opportunity for non-democratic Islamist forces to exploit, or the military and vested interests will still prevail over the protesters - are to be avoided. Even if they contain a germ of truth, the complicated political, economic and cultural factors at play in the region defy simple slogans. To understand what these two cases might tell us about future trends in the region, we'll be better served by examining relevant lessons from the past and assessing the conditions that drove political change in Egypt and Tunisia.
First, it is not yet clear whether either of the two great revolts of 2010/2011 are revolutions, or even transitions to democracy. The protesters of Tunis and Tahrir Square are not in power; their roles in shaping future governments are not yet determined. These revolts, as in Egypt in 1952, Iraq in 1958, or Syria in 1963, could still be squelched by military leaders who initially said the right things about political participation, but gradually consolidated their own power and established authoritarian regimes.
Iran's revolution in 1978 saw a different but no less disturbing pattern, where the revolutionary fever of intellectuals and secular liberals facilitated the rise of more dogmatic forces that eventually seized control of the Islamic Republic. Transitions are rarely linear or predictable, and they often end not in democracy but in some new form of non-democratic politics. The regional influence of Egypt and Tunisia among Arab publics will be heavily dependent on whether they move smoothly and quickly in democratic directions.
Second, while events in Egypt and Tunisia clearly grew out of a potent combination of socio-economic pressures and political grievances, what these factors imply about the fate of other Arab regimes is highly uncertain. Both Tunisia and Egypt are considered middle-income countries. Both have a sizeable middle class. Both have benefitted from recent periods of economic growth. In both cases, however, improvements in economic performance went hand-in-hand with increased inequality, corruption, and growing anger at governments seen as more concerned with their own survival--and with installing family members in positions of power--than the needs of their citizens. In both cases, high levels of youth unemployment fueled a corrosive sense of alienation among Internet savvy college graduates. These sentiments were reinforced everyday by the humiliations citizens experienced at the hands of omnipresent security agencies.
In Egypt and Tunisia, these conditions were sufficient to transform youth protests into mass movements that overturned entrenched authoritarian regimes. Should we anticipate similar outcomes in other Arab countries, many of which have socio-economic and political profiles similar to Tunisia and Egypt? Are the protests we've seen in Jordan, Yemen and Algeria harbingers of regime collapse in those cases, as well? While such outcomes cannot be entirely ruled out, a deeper look at the conditions that contributed to success in Egypt and Tunisia suggest that we are not on the cusp of a region-wide wave of regime transition.
In recent demonstrations in Algeria, for instance, protesters were outnumbered by security forces that quickly suppressed calls for change. In Yemen, protests have largely failed to achieve significant scale. In Jordan, protests have tended to focus on economic grievances, and have remained relatively small. In Syria, a "day of rage" planned on Facebook for February 5 fizzled entirely: more Syrians demonstrated in Brussels than in Damascus. These countries share many of the same socio-economic and political grievances that sparked mass movements in Egypt and Tunisia. Why have similar movements not emerged in these cases?
What these examples make clear is that political grievances and socio-economic pressures cannot, on their own, explain the success of mass movements in Tunisia and Egypt. What was also needed to translate discontent into popular mobilization was a set of "enabling conditions." As it turns out, however, these conditions are not widely distributed in the Arab world. And in their absence, it will be difficult for discontent to serve as the basis for large-scale collective action.
Two enabling conditions stand out from the Tunisian and Egyptian experiences. First, both Egypt and Tunisia are relatively homogenous societies. Egypt is affected by sectarian tensions between the large Muslim majority and a small Coptic minority, but that pales in comparison to sectarian, tribal or communitarian cleavages that exist in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan and Bahrain.
In homogenous societies, it becomes possible for a critical mass of citizens to develop a shared commitment to an alternative political future. Where groups in society are focused on what divides them, and fear that democracy might bring their enemies to power, such a shared vision is very hard to achieve.
Second, both Egypt and Tunisia possessed militaries that presented themselves as defenders of the nation, not as protectors of the regime. Although Egypt's regime had been run by former officers since 1952 and senior officers have long dominated positions of power, the military was, nonetheless, able to separate its responsibilities as a national institution from its political commitment to the survival of Hosni Mubarak. The same cannot be said of other militaries in the region.
In Algeria, the survival of the military and the regime are virtually inseparable, and the regime has often demonstrated its willingness to resort to violence to preserve its hold on power. In Syria, the military is dominated by carefully selected regime loyalists and there, too, the regime has never shied away from using armed force against its own citizens. In Yemen, a militarized authoritarian regime sits on top of a highly fragmented society, and is already deeply enmeshed in two insurgencies, one led by Houthi rebels in the North, the other by increasingly militant secessionist movements in the South. In Jordan, the divide between Palestinian-Jordanians and East Bankers who dominate in the military--an army which battled Palestinian forces in 1970--is a similar constraint on the possibility of the military "defecting" from the ruling coalition.
Given the absence of the enabling conditions in these countries that contributed to the successful mobilization of mass movements in Egypt and Tunisia, we should not expect the presence of social and economic grievances alone to generate the kind of popular uprisings we've seen in Cairo and Tunis. Moreover, the Arab world's remaining authoritarian rulers have not stood idly by while neighboring regimes toppled. Every single one has taken some kind of measures to mitigate economic grievances and address immediate targets of political anger. Yemen's president has promised to step down at the end of his current term. The King of Jordan dissolved his government. In Bahrain and Kuwait, oil resources are being lavished on citizens to offset immediate economic pressures. Even in Syria the regime has made some cosmetic changes, expanding access to social media.
Change in these remaining autocracies is not impossible, but our analysis suggests that until deep social barriers to collective action are overcome, until it becomes possible to forge a shared collective sense of an alternative political future, and until militaries in these countries can be distanced from the regimes to which they remain loyal, further cases of authoritarian breakdown in the Arab world will remain out of reach.
http://www.stimson.org/summaries/beyond-cairo-prospects-for-change-in-the-middle-east/
New Egypt foreign minister likely to be tougher on Israel
By Liz Sly and Muhammed Mansour
Washington Post
Sunday, March 6, 2011;
CAIRO - Egypt on Sunday got its second new government in less than six weeks, including a new foreign minister who is expected to take a tougher line with Israel than the government of the ousted president Hosni Mubarak did.
The newly appointed prime minister, Essam Sharaf, announced his new cabinet as tensions soared between pro-democracy protesters and the army in downtown Cairo, with troops firing live ammunition and civilians armed with knives and sticks dispersing demonstrators who wanted to storm a key security building.
Sharaf was named Thursday as part of an effort by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military council now in charge of Egypt, to appease the country's still restive democracy activists and their demands for a clean sweep of Mubarak-era faces. The previous cabinet was named by Mubarak in late January in a desperate attempt to defuse the mass uprising calling for his resignation.
In one of the most significant shifts, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Egypt's foreign minister since 2004, was replaced by Nabil Elaraby, a career diplomat who won plaudits from demonstrators for joining the crowds in Cairo's Tahrir Square shortly before Mubarak resigned. He was subsequently appointed to the council of "wise men" named by the demonstrators to help steer the country's path to democracy.
As a member of the team that negotiated the Camp David peace treaty with Israel in 1978, he can be expected to abide by all of Egypt's existing commitments to Israel, analysts and former colleagues said. But he is renowned for having voiced reservations about some of the treaty's clauses to then-President Anwar Sadat, and "will not be willing to accept Israeli excesses in the occupied territories," said Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid, a professor of political science at Cairo University.
"Public opinion in Egypt is in favor of a less soft approach to Israel and I think he shares this feeling," he added. "It will be very difficult for him to make the kind of concessions Hosni Mubarak made to Israel," such as during the 2009 Gaza war, when Egypt closed its border with Gaza.
Elaraby is also likely to be more open to establishing diplomatic relations with Iran, improving Egypt's frosty relationship with Syria and opening dialogue with Lebanon's Hezbollah movement, Sayyid said, suggesting that the new Egypt may not be as reliable an ally of the United States as Mubarak's Egypt was.
Among the other new faces in the cabinet is Mansour El-Eissawy, who will head the crucial and sensitive interior ministry, the current focus of the wrath of the protest movement.
In comments quoted by the state news agency, he promised to "shrink the role of the state security apparatus, so that it is only focused on fighting terrorism."
But the protest movement is calling for the complete dismantling of the feared State Security Investigations agency, which is responsible for domestic political surveillance as well as counterterrorism and stands accused of most of the torture commonplace during the Mubarak era. Several of the agency's offices around the country have been overrun in the past two days after rumors that agents were destroying documents that could be used in evidence against government officials.
Soldiers had stood by on Saturday when a large crowd surged into the State Security headquarters in Cairo's Nasr City suburb, seizing documents and handing most, but not all of them, over to prosecutors.
Yet when protesters gathered Sunday outside the agency's office in downtown Cairo with the aim of retrieving documents, army troops opened fire over their heads. At the same time, groups of what witnesses called "thugs" appeared and attacked the demonstrators with sticks and knives in one of the worst episodes of violence since Mubarak's ouster.
Mistrust of military
It was also the first time since the early days of the revolt that armed gangs have confronted activists. Some of those present speculated that the "thugs" were civilians from the area, a stronghold of Mubarak's National Democratic Party, indicating building frustrations on the part of some citizens with the disruptions being caused by the ongoing protest movement.
"We need to give the new government a chance," said Mahmoud Salem, a blogger and activist who was present at the disturbance, but left when the armed civilians appeared. "Some people are bitter and angry and it could lead to hostility later. Ordinary people want things to move on."
Late Sunday, the army allowed 22 activists to enter the Cairo building to inspect the contents. But many in the crowd said the move did not assuage their concerns that the military is still seeking to preserve the old order, despite its recent gestures.
Washington Post
Sunday, March 6, 2011;
CAIRO - Egypt on Sunday got its second new government in less than six weeks, including a new foreign minister who is expected to take a tougher line with Israel than the government of the ousted president Hosni Mubarak did.
The newly appointed prime minister, Essam Sharaf, announced his new cabinet as tensions soared between pro-democracy protesters and the army in downtown Cairo, with troops firing live ammunition and civilians armed with knives and sticks dispersing demonstrators who wanted to storm a key security building.
Sharaf was named Thursday as part of an effort by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military council now in charge of Egypt, to appease the country's still restive democracy activists and their demands for a clean sweep of Mubarak-era faces. The previous cabinet was named by Mubarak in late January in a desperate attempt to defuse the mass uprising calling for his resignation.
In one of the most significant shifts, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Egypt's foreign minister since 2004, was replaced by Nabil Elaraby, a career diplomat who won plaudits from demonstrators for joining the crowds in Cairo's Tahrir Square shortly before Mubarak resigned. He was subsequently appointed to the council of "wise men" named by the demonstrators to help steer the country's path to democracy.
As a member of the team that negotiated the Camp David peace treaty with Israel in 1978, he can be expected to abide by all of Egypt's existing commitments to Israel, analysts and former colleagues said. But he is renowned for having voiced reservations about some of the treaty's clauses to then-President Anwar Sadat, and "will not be willing to accept Israeli excesses in the occupied territories," said Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid, a professor of political science at Cairo University.
"Public opinion in Egypt is in favor of a less soft approach to Israel and I think he shares this feeling," he added. "It will be very difficult for him to make the kind of concessions Hosni Mubarak made to Israel," such as during the 2009 Gaza war, when Egypt closed its border with Gaza.
Elaraby is also likely to be more open to establishing diplomatic relations with Iran, improving Egypt's frosty relationship with Syria and opening dialogue with Lebanon's Hezbollah movement, Sayyid said, suggesting that the new Egypt may not be as reliable an ally of the United States as Mubarak's Egypt was.
Among the other new faces in the cabinet is Mansour El-Eissawy, who will head the crucial and sensitive interior ministry, the current focus of the wrath of the protest movement.
In comments quoted by the state news agency, he promised to "shrink the role of the state security apparatus, so that it is only focused on fighting terrorism."
But the protest movement is calling for the complete dismantling of the feared State Security Investigations agency, which is responsible for domestic political surveillance as well as counterterrorism and stands accused of most of the torture commonplace during the Mubarak era. Several of the agency's offices around the country have been overrun in the past two days after rumors that agents were destroying documents that could be used in evidence against government officials.
Soldiers had stood by on Saturday when a large crowd surged into the State Security headquarters in Cairo's Nasr City suburb, seizing documents and handing most, but not all of them, over to prosecutors.
Yet when protesters gathered Sunday outside the agency's office in downtown Cairo with the aim of retrieving documents, army troops opened fire over their heads. At the same time, groups of what witnesses called "thugs" appeared and attacked the demonstrators with sticks and knives in one of the worst episodes of violence since Mubarak's ouster.
Mistrust of military
It was also the first time since the early days of the revolt that armed gangs have confronted activists. Some of those present speculated that the "thugs" were civilians from the area, a stronghold of Mubarak's National Democratic Party, indicating building frustrations on the part of some citizens with the disruptions being caused by the ongoing protest movement.
"We need to give the new government a chance," said Mahmoud Salem, a blogger and activist who was present at the disturbance, but left when the armed civilians appeared. "Some people are bitter and angry and it could lead to hostility later. Ordinary people want things to move on."
Late Sunday, the army allowed 22 activists to enter the Cairo building to inspect the contents. But many in the crowd said the move did not assuage their concerns that the military is still seeking to preserve the old order, despite its recent gestures.
Egypt key to future of Mideast revolts
miamiherald.com
By Trudy Rubin
The Internet and the airwaves are clogged with contradictory predictions of what the Mideast upheavals will mean to the region — and to us.
I have conservative readers calling me an idiot for not understanding that the Egyptian revolution is a huge victory for the Islamists, even as Sen. Joe Lieberman, I-Conn., extols the hope for secular democracy in Cairo alongside his buddy, Arizona Republican Sen. John McCain.
Some pundits insist the Mideast revolts are a victory for al Qaeda, or Iran, while others say the revolts undercut both. So, after 11 days in Cairo, I guess I should take a stab at prognostication.
Here goes: In the foreseeable, I don’t think these upheavals will present a clear-cut victory for either democracy or Islam, as each shaken country will be dealing with very different internal circumstances. But the overall trend — including the impact on America’s Mideast policy — will be set by what develops in Egypt.
And in Egypt, there’s a decent chance that a more democratic government could emerge — including Islamists, but in a minority role.
A more-democratic Egypt is crucial. In the other countries undergoing upheavals, the odds for a transition to stable democracy are far, far slimmer.
If Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi falls, he will leave a huge territory bereft of institutions and rent by tribal conflicts. In Yemen, the fall of Ali Abdullah Saleh could usher in tribal wars and a greater sway by radical clerics. This could pose a worrying threat to Saudi Arabia next door.
Tunisia may muddle through, although its economy is reeling. Bahrain may find some compromise solution — but its protests, based on grievances by the emirate’s Shiite majority against Sunni rulers, can easily be manipulated by Shiite Iran.
So, the outcome of Egypt’s revolution is crucial, and not just because of its size and its historic role as leader of the Arab world. If the Egyptian youth revolt leads to a non-Islamist democracy — even one with flaws — it would provide a counterpoint to the claim that “Islam is the answer.”
A democratic Egypt would challenge the Iranian narrative that clerical rule is the future. It would help stabilize a post-Gadhafi Libya and a weak Tunisian democracy. It would provide a Sunni ally for Lebanese democrats who are trying to hold out against the pressures of Hezbollah.
Of course, a democratic Egypt would not be as unquestioning an ally — or as quiescent a peace partner to Israel — as was Hosni Mubarak. Public pressure would force it to push much harder for a Palestinian state. But, based on many interviews in Cairo, I don’t believe the peace treaty with Israel would be breached. Egyptians don’t want war, and the Egyptian military would still have a key say in foreign affairs.
This brings us to the question of whether an Egyptian democracy can emerge.
The argument against this possibility assumes that the Muslim Brotherhood will hijack the revolution. Yet the organizers of the demonstrations — and the vast bulk of the crowds — have not been Islamists. This revolution sought an end to corruption, and a representative government.
That said, the outcome of the revolution is far from certain.
The army has called for parliamentary elections in June. This fails to allow enough time for the groups that made the revolution to organize new political parties and mobilize the 80 percent of the public that usually doesn’t vote.
Such an early ballot will benefit the Brotherhood — which is already organized — as well as the former governing party, which will no doubt return under a new name. Many of the young rebels believe the military wants to recreate the previous political scenario whereby there were only two political alternatives: the ruling elite and the scary Islamists. This makes the elite look preferable.
This would be a tragic error. Egypt is ripe for democratic change that could help steady a region in dizzying transition. Those who have the Egyptian military’s ear — including its benefactors in Washington — should be sending this message loud and clear.
I have conservative readers calling me an idiot for not understanding that the Egyptian revolution is a huge victory for the Islamists, even as Sen. Joe Lieberman, I-Conn., extols the hope for secular democracy in Cairo alongside his buddy, Arizona Republican Sen. John McCain.
Some pundits insist the Mideast revolts are a victory for al Qaeda, or Iran, while others say the revolts undercut both. So, after 11 days in Cairo, I guess I should take a stab at prognostication.
Here goes: In the foreseeable, I don’t think these upheavals will present a clear-cut victory for either democracy or Islam, as each shaken country will be dealing with very different internal circumstances. But the overall trend — including the impact on America’s Mideast policy — will be set by what develops in Egypt.
And in Egypt, there’s a decent chance that a more democratic government could emerge — including Islamists, but in a minority role.
A more-democratic Egypt is crucial. In the other countries undergoing upheavals, the odds for a transition to stable democracy are far, far slimmer.
If Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi falls, he will leave a huge territory bereft of institutions and rent by tribal conflicts. In Yemen, the fall of Ali Abdullah Saleh could usher in tribal wars and a greater sway by radical clerics. This could pose a worrying threat to Saudi Arabia next door.
Tunisia may muddle through, although its economy is reeling. Bahrain may find some compromise solution — but its protests, based on grievances by the emirate’s Shiite majority against Sunni rulers, can easily be manipulated by Shiite Iran.
So, the outcome of Egypt’s revolution is crucial, and not just because of its size and its historic role as leader of the Arab world. If the Egyptian youth revolt leads to a non-Islamist democracy — even one with flaws — it would provide a counterpoint to the claim that “Islam is the answer.”
A democratic Egypt would challenge the Iranian narrative that clerical rule is the future. It would help stabilize a post-Gadhafi Libya and a weak Tunisian democracy. It would provide a Sunni ally for Lebanese democrats who are trying to hold out against the pressures of Hezbollah.
Of course, a democratic Egypt would not be as unquestioning an ally — or as quiescent a peace partner to Israel — as was Hosni Mubarak. Public pressure would force it to push much harder for a Palestinian state. But, based on many interviews in Cairo, I don’t believe the peace treaty with Israel would be breached. Egyptians don’t want war, and the Egyptian military would still have a key say in foreign affairs.
This brings us to the question of whether an Egyptian democracy can emerge.
The argument against this possibility assumes that the Muslim Brotherhood will hijack the revolution. Yet the organizers of the demonstrations — and the vast bulk of the crowds — have not been Islamists. This revolution sought an end to corruption, and a representative government.
That said, the outcome of the revolution is far from certain.
The army has called for parliamentary elections in June. This fails to allow enough time for the groups that made the revolution to organize new political parties and mobilize the 80 percent of the public that usually doesn’t vote.
Such an early ballot will benefit the Brotherhood — which is already organized — as well as the former governing party, which will no doubt return under a new name. Many of the young rebels believe the military wants to recreate the previous political scenario whereby there were only two political alternatives: the ruling elite and the scary Islamists. This makes the elite look preferable.
This would be a tragic error. Egypt is ripe for democratic change that could help steady a region in dizzying transition. Those who have the Egyptian military’s ear — including its benefactors in Washington — should be sending this message loud and clear.
Five myths about the Muslim Brotherhood
Washington Post
By Lorenzo Vidino
Friday, March 4, 2011;
Even before Hosni Mubarak gave in to the throngs in Tahrir Square and stepped down as Egypt's president on Feb. 11, officials in Western capitals were debating what role the Muslim Brotherhood would play in a new Egypt and a changing Middle East. Yet much of what we know - or think we know - about the group's ambitions, beliefs and history is clouded by misperceptions.
1. The Muslim Brotherhood is a global organization.
Founded in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood saw its ideas quickly spread throughout the Arab world and beyond. Today, groups in more than 80 countries trace their ideologies to the Brotherhood, but these entities do not form a cohesive unit. Globally, the Brotherhood is more a school of thought than an official organization of card-carrying members.
Attempts to create a more formal global structure have failed, and the movement instead has taken on various forms. Where it is tolerated, as in Jordan, it functions as a political party; where persecuted, as in Syria, it survives underground; and in the Palestinian territories, it took a peculiar turn and became Hamas.
Though they interact through a network of personal, financial and ideological ties, Brotherhood entities operate independently, and each pursues its goals as it deems appropriate. What binds them is a deep belief in Islam as a way of life that, in the long term, they hope to turn into a political system, using different methods in different places.
2. The Brotherhood will dominate the new Egypt.
With most political forces in Egypt today discredited or disorganized, many assume that the Brotherhood's well-oiled political machine will play a major role in the country's future.
This is not far-fetched, yet there are reasons to believe that the group will hardly dominate post-Mubarak Egypt. When I interviewed members of the Brotherhood's Shura Council in 2009, they estimated that about 60 percent of Egyptians supported the group - seeing it as the only viable opposition to Mubarak - but that only 20 percent or so would support it in a hypothetical free election. And even that might have been optimistic: A poll of Egyptians by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy after Mubarak's fall found that only 15 percent of respondents approved of the Brotherhood, while the group's leaders received barely 1 percent in a presidential straw vote.
Over the past decade, aging hard-liners and a second generation of 50-somethings have wrestled for leadership of the Brotherhood. Then there are the younger cadres, which took part in the protest movement against Mubarak and deplored their leaders' late participation in it. How these divisions develop will determine the role of the Brotherhood in Egyptian politics.
3. The Brotherhood seeks to impose a draconian version of sharia law.
All Brotherhood factions will now push to increase the influence of sharia - Islamic law - in Egypt. However, the generational battle will determine what vision of sharia they will pursue.
The old guard's motto is still "the Koran is our constitution." The second generation speaks of human rights and compares itself to Europe's Christian Democrats - embracing democracy but keeping a religious identity. The third generation, especially in urban areas, seems to endorse this approach, even if skeptics contend that younger militants are simply offering a moderate facade to the West.
So far, the old guard is prevailing. The Brotherhood's first major political platform, released in 2007, paid lip service to democracy and stated that women and non-Muslims could not occupy top government posts, and gave a body of unelected sharia experts veto power over new laws. How long this old guard remains in control will shape the group's positions on sharia's most debated aspects, from women's rights to religious freedoms.
4. The Muslim Brotherhood has close ties to al-Qaeda.
Historically, yes. But recently, those ties have frayed.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Brotherhood was brutally repressed by the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Understanding that violence against Nasser was a losing proposition, most of the group opted for nonviolent opposition, seeking to Islamize society through grass-roots education and mainstream politics.
But a smaller wing, led by theologian Sayyid Qutb, opted for violence. This faction argued that Islamization from below was too slow and would be impeded by local and foreign powers. For generations, Qutb's idea of religiously justified violence has inspired jihadists worldwide. Several al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheik Mohammed, were influenced by the Brotherhood early in life, only to grow disillusioned with the organization later on.
While the Brotherhood has not completely rejected violence - supporting its use in Iraq, the Palestinian territories, Afghanistan and other places where it believes Muslims are under attack - the two groups have recently clashed over tactics and theology. Al-Qaeda's No. 2, Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, even wrote a book attacking the group for replacing bullets with ballots.
5. Washington can't work with the Brotherhood.
U.S. and Brotherhood officials have taken tough public stances against each other recently. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called the Brotherhood a "nefarious element" in Egyptian politics, while Brotherhood leader Mohammed Badi said America is "heading toward its demise."
But posturing aside, there may be room for engagement with the Brotherhood's more moderate players. It has happened before: Since early in the Eisenhower administration, parts of the U.S. government have reached out to the group, seeing its religious message as a potential bulwark against communism. It wasn't a true partnership, but during the Cold War, Washington and the Brothers occasionally put distrust aside to establish limited cooperation.
The White House took criticism last month when it said it would be open to a role for the Brotherhood in Egyptian politics, if it rejected violence and accepted democratic goals. But even after Sept. 11, 2001, some elements within the CIA and the State Department toyed with the idea of working with the Brotherhood against al-Qaeda, convinced that only radicals could defeat other radicals.
Even if Washington and the Brotherhood find ways to live with each other, big foreign-policy breakthroughs are unlikely. Wielding more power in Egypt could make the Brotherhood more pragmatic, but opposition to U.S. policy in the region is the cornerstone of its agenda - and that probably won't change.
By Lorenzo Vidino
Friday, March 4, 2011;
Even before Hosni Mubarak gave in to the throngs in Tahrir Square and stepped down as Egypt's president on Feb. 11, officials in Western capitals were debating what role the Muslim Brotherhood would play in a new Egypt and a changing Middle East. Yet much of what we know - or think we know - about the group's ambitions, beliefs and history is clouded by misperceptions.
1. The Muslim Brotherhood is a global organization.
Founded in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood saw its ideas quickly spread throughout the Arab world and beyond. Today, groups in more than 80 countries trace their ideologies to the Brotherhood, but these entities do not form a cohesive unit. Globally, the Brotherhood is more a school of thought than an official organization of card-carrying members.
Attempts to create a more formal global structure have failed, and the movement instead has taken on various forms. Where it is tolerated, as in Jordan, it functions as a political party; where persecuted, as in Syria, it survives underground; and in the Palestinian territories, it took a peculiar turn and became Hamas.
Though they interact through a network of personal, financial and ideological ties, Brotherhood entities operate independently, and each pursues its goals as it deems appropriate. What binds them is a deep belief in Islam as a way of life that, in the long term, they hope to turn into a political system, using different methods in different places.
2. The Brotherhood will dominate the new Egypt.
With most political forces in Egypt today discredited or disorganized, many assume that the Brotherhood's well-oiled political machine will play a major role in the country's future.
This is not far-fetched, yet there are reasons to believe that the group will hardly dominate post-Mubarak Egypt. When I interviewed members of the Brotherhood's Shura Council in 2009, they estimated that about 60 percent of Egyptians supported the group - seeing it as the only viable opposition to Mubarak - but that only 20 percent or so would support it in a hypothetical free election. And even that might have been optimistic: A poll of Egyptians by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy after Mubarak's fall found that only 15 percent of respondents approved of the Brotherhood, while the group's leaders received barely 1 percent in a presidential straw vote.
Over the past decade, aging hard-liners and a second generation of 50-somethings have wrestled for leadership of the Brotherhood. Then there are the younger cadres, which took part in the protest movement against Mubarak and deplored their leaders' late participation in it. How these divisions develop will determine the role of the Brotherhood in Egyptian politics.
3. The Brotherhood seeks to impose a draconian version of sharia law.
All Brotherhood factions will now push to increase the influence of sharia - Islamic law - in Egypt. However, the generational battle will determine what vision of sharia they will pursue.
The old guard's motto is still "the Koran is our constitution." The second generation speaks of human rights and compares itself to Europe's Christian Democrats - embracing democracy but keeping a religious identity. The third generation, especially in urban areas, seems to endorse this approach, even if skeptics contend that younger militants are simply offering a moderate facade to the West.
So far, the old guard is prevailing. The Brotherhood's first major political platform, released in 2007, paid lip service to democracy and stated that women and non-Muslims could not occupy top government posts, and gave a body of unelected sharia experts veto power over new laws. How long this old guard remains in control will shape the group's positions on sharia's most debated aspects, from women's rights to religious freedoms.
4. The Muslim Brotherhood has close ties to al-Qaeda.
Historically, yes. But recently, those ties have frayed.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Brotherhood was brutally repressed by the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Understanding that violence against Nasser was a losing proposition, most of the group opted for nonviolent opposition, seeking to Islamize society through grass-roots education and mainstream politics.
But a smaller wing, led by theologian Sayyid Qutb, opted for violence. This faction argued that Islamization from below was too slow and would be impeded by local and foreign powers. For generations, Qutb's idea of religiously justified violence has inspired jihadists worldwide. Several al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheik Mohammed, were influenced by the Brotherhood early in life, only to grow disillusioned with the organization later on.
While the Brotherhood has not completely rejected violence - supporting its use in Iraq, the Palestinian territories, Afghanistan and other places where it believes Muslims are under attack - the two groups have recently clashed over tactics and theology. Al-Qaeda's No. 2, Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, even wrote a book attacking the group for replacing bullets with ballots.
5. Washington can't work with the Brotherhood.
U.S. and Brotherhood officials have taken tough public stances against each other recently. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called the Brotherhood a "nefarious element" in Egyptian politics, while Brotherhood leader Mohammed Badi said America is "heading toward its demise."
But posturing aside, there may be room for engagement with the Brotherhood's more moderate players. It has happened before: Since early in the Eisenhower administration, parts of the U.S. government have reached out to the group, seeing its religious message as a potential bulwark against communism. It wasn't a true partnership, but during the Cold War, Washington and the Brothers occasionally put distrust aside to establish limited cooperation.
The White House took criticism last month when it said it would be open to a role for the Brotherhood in Egyptian politics, if it rejected violence and accepted democratic goals. But even after Sept. 11, 2001, some elements within the CIA and the State Department toyed with the idea of working with the Brotherhood against al-Qaeda, convinced that only radicals could defeat other radicals.
Even if Washington and the Brotherhood find ways to live with each other, big foreign-policy breakthroughs are unlikely. Wielding more power in Egypt could make the Brotherhood more pragmatic, but opposition to U.S. policy in the region is the cornerstone of its agenda - and that probably won't change.
Monday, March 7, 2011
Why Egypt has to be the U.S. priority in the Middle East
Washington Post
By Robert Kagan and Michele Dunne
Monday, March 7, 2011;
With the horrific carnage in Libya, the flames of revolution burning in Yemen and Bahrain, and protests for political change in Jordan and Morocco, there's a danger that the United States and Europe may lose sight of what still has to be our highest priority in the region: helping the people of Egypt complete their transition to democracy and a new chance at prosperity.
Why is Egypt so important? Because it is the heart of the Arab world. It was the birthplace of pan-Arabism under Gamal Nasser, the linchpin of Middle East peace under Anwar Sadat. With more than 80 million people - as many as Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria combined - it has a large and vigorous civil society, feisty, independent media, a broad array of political forces, and a well-respected judiciary. If Egypt can make the transition to democracy, it will lead the way to a new era for the Arab world. If Cairo falls back to dictatorship of one variety or another, it is unlikely the rest of the region will move on without it. The Arab Spring will live or die in Egypt.
The Obama administration is right to be wary of wielding a too-heavy hand. Egyptians are proud and capable and don't want a made-in-America democracy. We particularly need to avoid trying to dictate what kinds of groups can take part in Egypt's democratic process.
But there are important kinds of help that we can provide - above all, economic assistance. As in Eastern Europe, the first wave of enthusiasm for democracy will give way to questions about how well this form of government can deliver the goods.
What Egyptians most want from us is smart, targeted and timely assistance. Actions that could be taken immediately include:
l Debt forgiveness: Egypt owes billions of dollars to the United States and Europe. This debt should be forgiven or at least substantially reduced.
l Free trade: The Bush administration came close to beginning free-trade negotiations with Egypt in 2005 but backed away because of Hosni Mubarak's repression of political rivals. Once there is an elected Egyptian government that respects citizens' rights, the United States should offer such negotiations as an incentive for that government to adopt a free-market economic philosophy. In the meantime, Washington can offer a preferential trade agreement, which Congress could pass immediately.
l Rethink the U.S. assistance package. The administration has requested for the next fiscal year the same aid as before Mubarak's fall. Although it makes sense to give at least as much to a democratizing Egypt as we did to an authoritarian one, this is not the time for policy on auto-pilot. The administration should discuss with Egypt's political leaders shifting the balance toward more economic and less military aid. The military ought to be happy to show the Egyptian people it is willing to give them a bigger share of American aid.
l Private investment. Sens. John McCain and Joseph Lieberman recently returned from Egypt with a clear message: The Egyptians need and want foreign companies to come and invest in their country. The senators have proposed sending a delegation of high-tech executives to Egypt and Tunisia. The administration ought to help make this happen.
l Appoint a special Middle East transition czar. To oversee all these efforts, the administration is going to need a high-powered individual at the White House, someone with the domestic and international clout to pull together the efforts of the Pentagon, State Department, Treasury and Commerce, as well as the private sector and foreign aid. The U.S. government is not currently equipped to manage this process.
The United States also needs to show consistent support, publicly and privately, for protesters' ongoing pro-democracy demands. They are asking to slow down the breakneck pace Egypt's military leadership has set for elections and want to reform internal security services to ensure that torture and intimidation cease. Egypt can and should hold presidential elections this fall - there is a danger in waiting too long to let the Egyptian people choose their own leaders. But parliamentary elections should wait until a more open and balanced political playing field has been created. Throughout the process, the United States and Europe need to provide appropriate technical and financial assistance.
Whether the Arab Spring succeeds or fails is ultimately up to the peoples of the region. But that is no excuse for the United States and other democratic nations not to help in every way we can. The Egyptian people harbor justified resentment that the United States backed the repressive and often-brutal Mubarak regime for so long; they question our commitment to helping them enjoy the same freedoms that we do. The United States should make sure that we aid the transition now underway so that there is no room for doubt. History will not be kind if we blow this opportunity.
By Robert Kagan and Michele Dunne
Monday, March 7, 2011;
With the horrific carnage in Libya, the flames of revolution burning in Yemen and Bahrain, and protests for political change in Jordan and Morocco, there's a danger that the United States and Europe may lose sight of what still has to be our highest priority in the region: helping the people of Egypt complete their transition to democracy and a new chance at prosperity.
Why is Egypt so important? Because it is the heart of the Arab world. It was the birthplace of pan-Arabism under Gamal Nasser, the linchpin of Middle East peace under Anwar Sadat. With more than 80 million people - as many as Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria combined - it has a large and vigorous civil society, feisty, independent media, a broad array of political forces, and a well-respected judiciary. If Egypt can make the transition to democracy, it will lead the way to a new era for the Arab world. If Cairo falls back to dictatorship of one variety or another, it is unlikely the rest of the region will move on without it. The Arab Spring will live or die in Egypt.
The Obama administration is right to be wary of wielding a too-heavy hand. Egyptians are proud and capable and don't want a made-in-America democracy. We particularly need to avoid trying to dictate what kinds of groups can take part in Egypt's democratic process.
But there are important kinds of help that we can provide - above all, economic assistance. As in Eastern Europe, the first wave of enthusiasm for democracy will give way to questions about how well this form of government can deliver the goods.
What Egyptians most want from us is smart, targeted and timely assistance. Actions that could be taken immediately include:
l Debt forgiveness: Egypt owes billions of dollars to the United States and Europe. This debt should be forgiven or at least substantially reduced.
l Free trade: The Bush administration came close to beginning free-trade negotiations with Egypt in 2005 but backed away because of Hosni Mubarak's repression of political rivals. Once there is an elected Egyptian government that respects citizens' rights, the United States should offer such negotiations as an incentive for that government to adopt a free-market economic philosophy. In the meantime, Washington can offer a preferential trade agreement, which Congress could pass immediately.
l Rethink the U.S. assistance package. The administration has requested for the next fiscal year the same aid as before Mubarak's fall. Although it makes sense to give at least as much to a democratizing Egypt as we did to an authoritarian one, this is not the time for policy on auto-pilot. The administration should discuss with Egypt's political leaders shifting the balance toward more economic and less military aid. The military ought to be happy to show the Egyptian people it is willing to give them a bigger share of American aid.
l Private investment. Sens. John McCain and Joseph Lieberman recently returned from Egypt with a clear message: The Egyptians need and want foreign companies to come and invest in their country. The senators have proposed sending a delegation of high-tech executives to Egypt and Tunisia. The administration ought to help make this happen.
l Appoint a special Middle East transition czar. To oversee all these efforts, the administration is going to need a high-powered individual at the White House, someone with the domestic and international clout to pull together the efforts of the Pentagon, State Department, Treasury and Commerce, as well as the private sector and foreign aid. The U.S. government is not currently equipped to manage this process.
The United States also needs to show consistent support, publicly and privately, for protesters' ongoing pro-democracy demands. They are asking to slow down the breakneck pace Egypt's military leadership has set for elections and want to reform internal security services to ensure that torture and intimidation cease. Egypt can and should hold presidential elections this fall - there is a danger in waiting too long to let the Egyptian people choose their own leaders. But parliamentary elections should wait until a more open and balanced political playing field has been created. Throughout the process, the United States and Europe need to provide appropriate technical and financial assistance.
Whether the Arab Spring succeeds or fails is ultimately up to the peoples of the region. But that is no excuse for the United States and other democratic nations not to help in every way we can. The Egyptian people harbor justified resentment that the United States backed the repressive and often-brutal Mubarak regime for so long; they question our commitment to helping them enjoy the same freedoms that we do. The United States should make sure that we aid the transition now underway so that there is no room for doubt. History will not be kind if we blow this opportunity.
Saturday, February 26, 2011
U.S. Trying to Pick Winners in New Mideast
By MARK LANDLER and HELENE COOPER
WASHINGTON — As the Obama administration grapples with a cascade of uprisings in the Middle East, it has come to a stark recognition: the region’s monarchs are likely to survive; its presidents are more likely to fall.In the rapidly changing map that stretches from Morocco to Iran, two presidents have already tumbled: Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia. Administration officials said they believe that Yemen’s authoritarian president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, is in an increasingly tenuous position.
Yet in Bahrain, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa has so far managed to weather a surge of unrest, winning American support, even though his security forces were brutal in their crackdown of protesters. Officials believe that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia is also unlikely to be dethroned, while the emirs of the Persian Gulf have so far escaped unrest. Even in Jordan, where serious protests erupted, King Abdullah II has maneuvered deftly to stay in power, though he still has to contend with a restive Palestinian population.
This pattern of kings holding on to power is influencing the administration’s response to the crisis: the United States has sent out senior diplomats in recent days to offer the monarchs reassurance and advice — even those who lead the most stifling governments. But it is keeping its distance from autocratic presidents as they fight to hold power.
By all accounts, that is more a calculation of American interests than anything else.
“What the monarchies have going for them are royal families that allow them to stand above the fray, to a certain extent,” said Kenneth M. Pollack, the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. “It allows them to sack the government without sacking themselves.”
Many of the monarchs have run governments every bit as repressive as the presidents’. And the American calculation of who is likely to hang on to power has as much to do with the religious, demographic and economic makeups of the countries as with the nature of the governments.
Arab presidents pretend to be democratically chosen, even though most of their elections are rigged. Their veneer of legitimacy vanishes when pent-up grievances in their societies explode. Most of the presidents oversee more populous countries, without the oil wealth of the gulf monarchies, which would enable them to placate their populations with tax cuts and pay raises, like the kings of Saudi Arabia and Jordan have done recently.
The Americans acknowledge that they have no choice but to support countries like Saudi Arabia, and that all of the situations could change rapidly.
A case in point is Libya, where Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi — neither a king nor a president — has been brought to the verge of collapse with dizzying speed.
On Thursday, the administration failed again to evacuate diplomats and other American citizens from Libya. A ferry chartered by the United States government remained tied up at a pier in the capital, Tripoli, unable to sail to Malta because of heavy seas in the Mediterranean.
The 285 passengers are safe, according to the State Department spokesman, Philip J. Crowley, but they cannot leave the ship, which he said is guarded by Libyan security forces. A hotel across the street from the pier has been the site of gun battles between rebels and loyalists of Colonel Qaddafi, witnesses said.
The stalled evacuation has led the Obama administration to temper its condemnations of Colonel Qaddafi’s government, because officials worry that the Libyan government could take Americans hostage. But Mr. Crowley said Thursday that the United States would support a European proposal to expel Libya from the United Nations Human Rights Council, when it meets in Geneva on Monday.
Unlike in the case of Egypt, where President Obama spoke by phone with Mr. Mubarak several times during the crisis there, neither he nor any other American official has spoken with Colonel Qaddafi since the violence erupted. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was unable to reach the foreign minister, Moussa Koussa, Mr. Crowley said, citing a technical glitch.
The under secretary of state for political affairs, William J. Burns, did speak twice with Mr. Koussa, he said, and conveyed the administration’s “concern” that Libya continue to cooperate with the evacuation.
The spotty American communication with Libya contrasts with the regular phone calls Mr. Obama and Mrs. Clinton have held with Arab monarchs. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia pressed Mr. Obama in at least two conversations to back Mr. Mubarak. Since his ouster, an administration official said, Saudi officials have expressed some misgivings about their support for the former Egyptian leader.
So far, the kings appear to be hanging on.
The administration is sanguine that the Saudi royal family will survive any upheaval, though some acknowledge that they misread the prospects for change in Egypt. Earlier this week, King Abdullah, returning home from three months of medical treatment abroad, announced a $10 billion increase in welfare spending to help young people marry, buy homes and open businesses.
The administration has urged Saudi Arabia not to impede King Hamad’s attempt to undertake reforms in Bahrain, an island connected to Saudi Arabia by a causeway and dependent on the Saudis for political and economic support. Saudi Arabia is rattled by the prospect of Bahrain’s Shiite Muslim majority’s gaining more political power, at the expense of its Sunni rulers, in part because Saudi Arabia has a substantial Shiite population in its east.
American officials have sought to keep the focus on what they insist have been concessions made by Bahrain, where the Navy’s Fifth Fleet is stationed, as a sign that the protests can prod the king, and the crown prince who will head the dialogue with the protesters, in the right direction.
Similarly, in Jordan, King Abdullah, who faces a tricky situation because of his majority Palestinian population, has signaled a willingness to cede some power to an elected government or parliament. American officials and independent experts say that they think that could allow him to hang on to power. The administration’s clear hope is that all these kingdoms will eventually be constitutional monarchies.
“That approach to Jordan or Bahrain is the right approach; these are countries that have moved in the right direction, but not enough,” said Elliott Abrams, a Middle East adviser in the Bush administration who has been a frequent critic of the Obama administration. “Constitutional monarchy is a form of democracy.”
There has been far less unrest in other Persian Gulf states, like the United Arab Emirates, Qatar or Kuwait — in part, experts say, because they are essentially regal welfare states, where citizens pay no taxes and are looked after by the government. In the United Arab Emirates, for example, when one citizen marries another citizen, the government helps to pay for the wedding and even to buy a home.
Even so, an administration official noted, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed, recently toured less prosperous parts of the United Arab Emirates to hold town-hall-style meetings — at least a nod to democratic rule.
“The truly wealthy societies like Qatar, the U.A.E. and Kuwait have greater advantages,” said Ted Kattouf, a former United States ambassador to Syria. In many ways, he added, “the monarchies have more legitimacy than the republics.”
In Yemen, a lack of legitimacy is plaguing President Saleh and the prospect of instability there poses national security problems for the United States, which has had the government’s support for counterterrorism operations. Protesters are demanding his resignation even after he pledged not to seek re-election. The administration is pushing Mr. Saleh — a crafty authoritarian who has manipulated factions in his country to cling to power for 30 years — to revive a stalled effort at constitutional reform, though an official expressed pessimism about the likelihood of progress.
“The republics — and hence, the presidents — are the most vulnerable because they’re supposed to be democracies but ultimately are not,” said an Arab diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “They pretend people have a voice, but this voice doesn’t exist. With the monarchy, no one’s pretending there’s a democracy.”
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Interview Hillary Rodham Clinton February 14, 2011 Aljazeera
February 14, 2011
QUESTION: Madam Secretary, first of all, thank you for talking to Al Jazeera at the State Department. As you know, the Egyptian army, the supreme council of the armed forces in Egypt, have announced certain steps following the success of the revolution, as many Egyptians call it. And yet there is still some skepticism among many Egyptians that these measures are not enough. Where do you stand on that?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think that where we stand is with the Egyptian people. We want to be a good partner and friend as they make this transition. Three weeks ago, no one would have guessed that so much could have happened that would have been so responsive to the needs and aspirations that we heard coming from Tahrir Square. And now, like so many kinds of movements for change, the hard work of actually putting into place the steps that are necessary must be pursued, and it needs to be pursued as expeditiously as possible with as broad and inclusive a group of Egyptians involved. But we’re just at the beginning of the transition.
QUESTION: What would you say is the most positive step that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has announced so far?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think that first of all, the role that the army played during the last weeks as a guarantor of the Egyptian state, as a institution that was well-respected by the Egyptian people, was absolutely essential. Contrast what happened in Egypt with what is going on today in Iran where, once again, the Iranian Government is lashing out, using violence against people who are expressing the same desires as we heard from Egypt.
So I have a lot of sympathy for what has already occurred in Egypt, but I have a sense of realism about what it’s going to take to move forward. So far, what the supreme council has announced is in keeping with what they announced they would be doing, and in response to the desires of the Egyptian people and their demands. But I think everyone has to recognize that this transition where you have to rewrite a constitution, you have to pass new laws, you have to help form political parties – there’s a long to-do list, and everybody needs to be sort of focused on the task at hand. And that’s going to take an enormous amount of energy from everybody involved.
QUESTION: But you would have – one would have thought that because of the last three weeks of protests in Egypt, because of the discontent over about two decades about the issue of the state of emergency, that the first thing the army would do is to respond to the demands of young people and a lot of other Egyptians that it be lifted immediately. They haven’t done that yet. How do you – what would you counsel them to do?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, it’s not for me to counsel them. This is an Egyptian process that must be directed and defined by the Egyptian people. One of the demands, which we have supported for a long time, is to lift the emergency decree. There has been an announcement that that will be done, and we hope that it will be.
QUESTION: How soon would you want to see that happen, though?
SECRETARY CLINTON: I’m not going to substitute my judgment sitting here in the very beautiful comfort of the State Department for what is going on in Egypt right now. I think it’s important that the United States and others who wish to see a positive outcome of this struggle by the Egyptian people to achieve their own democracy be supportive, but don’t pretend that we know more than what the people in Egypt know. And we want to see changes. We’ve been for that for many years, both publicly and privately. But now, thankfully, the future really is in the hands of Egyptians themselves.
QUESTION: Madam Secretary, I’m sure you’re aware of this. A lot of people in the Arab world, particularly in Egypt, listening to you now, especially those people who thought that the U.S. had sat on the fence before Mubarak fell, whether you agree with that description or not – they all say the U.S. Government is doing it again – when they’re asked to make a clear choice, a clear decision whether they support the army or the demonstrators, the U.S. Government is sitting on the fence again.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I have to obviously object to that characterization. We were consistent and clear. We were against violence. We communicated that many times over and over again to every level in the Egyptian Government, and in particular to the army. We were in favor of the universal human rights of the Egyptian people, and we have long been in support of that and pushed the government to take reforms that would realize that. And we were in favor of political change. But I think it is inappropriate for us to do more than say what we have always said. We have said repeatedly the emergency law needs to be lifted. But now, this is a process that is being worked on by Egyptians.
The Mubarak era is over. There is a new effort that is just beginning, and I think it is an – it’s important that the United States be seen as supporting the transition to democracy, and that is where we stand. We are strongly in favor of it. We want to see it as soon as it can come. But we are also conscious that at many points in history, this incredible movement for change can be hijacked by external or internal forces that do not follow through on the promises made, do not realize the aspirations of the Egyptian people. So our goal is to keep our eye on the outcome. Let us get to democracy that will, once and for all, meet the needs of the Egyptian people and give Egypt a chance to serve as a model for the entire region that needs desperately to see that.
QUESTION: Now, what would you say to assuage the concerns of many Egyptians who say that this was supposed to be a revolution to actually get rid of military rule which has ruled Egypt for 30 years, and now they see that it is the army – at least for the foreseeable future – that is managing the affairs of the country and we have concerns about that? What would you say to them that they do not necessarily have to be concerned?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, that they need to keep up their political involvement and the real strength of their movement to get the changes necessary. I mean, those changes have been promised now. They need to be delivered on. And there needs to be broad-based inclusive representation going forward. So, different groups within Egyptian society have to step forward to take responsibility toward working in a unified way to achieve the goals that have all been set.
It is not going to work merely to stand on the outside and say, “We don’t like this and we don’t like that.” We now have the chance for broad-based participation. People need to step forward and make their views known and be part of getting this process moving so that all these timelines and these milestones about ending the emergency law, reforming the constitution, getting the laws for political parties, preparing for the elections – there’s a big effort. As big an effort as went into bringing us to this point will be replicated in achieving the outcomes that we seek.
QUESTION: And yet to many of these people, there are just – quoted to you – the fact that Egypt continues to be run by the army for the foreseeable future, the fact that even the civilian side of the government in Egypt was actually inherited from the Mubarak regime – many of them are described as his cronies. How concerned are you about that being either the reality or the perception?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, again, it is the opportunity to work through what exists now. What is the alternative? There was very – there are very good ideas being floated around about what could be the next step. But it is not for the United States, it is not for any other government, it is not for the media, it is not for those outside to dictate to the Egyptian people how they intend to proceed. There are some excellent conversations going on. We know that there is an effort to try to coalesce around certain ways forward that the opposition can all support. That’s what should happen.
But let’s take a little perspective here. It’s been less than three weeks, or just barely three weeks, and revolutions in and of themselves don’t produce the outcome that is sought. It is: Okay, now that you’ve achieved the goal of changing the government, what happens next? That is where Egypt is, and that is what the Egyptian people have to lead us through.
QUESTION: My time is up. I was wondering if there is time for one more question --
SECRETARY CLINTON: (Laughter.) Sure.
QUESTION: -- just broad-based, if I may. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
The United States has invested in the Egyptian army, it has invested in cooperation with the Egyptian army for 30 years. Given what the situation is in Egypt and given that the role it is playing – the role the army is playing in Egyptian politics today, would you say that the U.S. investment in the Egyptian army has been a success story?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, history will have to judge that, but I think that the relationships that developed over all those years between the leadership of the United States military and leadership of the Egyptian military made it possible for there to be continuing communications. It was a message that was delivered from many different sources – do not use violence against your own people – that was very readily received. It’s not like the United States had to tell the Egyptian military. They wanted to defend the Egyptian people, and I think they performed in an extraordinary way.
Contrast it to Iran, where the government has turned against the people. They’re more than happy to talk about look at what’s going on in Egypt, but when their opposition, when their young people try to express themselves, they come down with brutality. They have a record of such abuse and excess. Contrast that with the Egyptian military. I would bet on the process that the Egyptian military has announced going forward as being a pathway to a different future, whereas I look with such dismay at what Iran continues to do and just feel – my heart goes out to the Iranian people.
QUESTION: And yet the Egyptian army is accused of having – or it’s the Egyptian security forces are accused of having killed more Egyptians than the Iranian army Iranians.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Oh, I don’t think there’s any basis for that. I think that – as some of the leading protesters in Egypt themselves said, any loss of life is deeply regrettable, and certainly under those circumstances. But given what has been accomplished and the great opportunity for the Egyptian people now, it is something that Egyptians themselves say, “We now have it in our hands.” The Iranian people cannot say that.
QUESTION: Madam Secretary, thank you so much.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you.
QUESTION: Madam Secretary, first of all, thank you for talking to Al Jazeera at the State Department. As you know, the Egyptian army, the supreme council of the armed forces in Egypt, have announced certain steps following the success of the revolution, as many Egyptians call it. And yet there is still some skepticism among many Egyptians that these measures are not enough. Where do you stand on that?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think that where we stand is with the Egyptian people. We want to be a good partner and friend as they make this transition. Three weeks ago, no one would have guessed that so much could have happened that would have been so responsive to the needs and aspirations that we heard coming from Tahrir Square. And now, like so many kinds of movements for change, the hard work of actually putting into place the steps that are necessary must be pursued, and it needs to be pursued as expeditiously as possible with as broad and inclusive a group of Egyptians involved. But we’re just at the beginning of the transition.
QUESTION: What would you say is the most positive step that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has announced so far?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think that first of all, the role that the army played during the last weeks as a guarantor of the Egyptian state, as a institution that was well-respected by the Egyptian people, was absolutely essential. Contrast what happened in Egypt with what is going on today in Iran where, once again, the Iranian Government is lashing out, using violence against people who are expressing the same desires as we heard from Egypt.
So I have a lot of sympathy for what has already occurred in Egypt, but I have a sense of realism about what it’s going to take to move forward. So far, what the supreme council has announced is in keeping with what they announced they would be doing, and in response to the desires of the Egyptian people and their demands. But I think everyone has to recognize that this transition where you have to rewrite a constitution, you have to pass new laws, you have to help form political parties – there’s a long to-do list, and everybody needs to be sort of focused on the task at hand. And that’s going to take an enormous amount of energy from everybody involved.
QUESTION: But you would have – one would have thought that because of the last three weeks of protests in Egypt, because of the discontent over about two decades about the issue of the state of emergency, that the first thing the army would do is to respond to the demands of young people and a lot of other Egyptians that it be lifted immediately. They haven’t done that yet. How do you – what would you counsel them to do?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, it’s not for me to counsel them. This is an Egyptian process that must be directed and defined by the Egyptian people. One of the demands, which we have supported for a long time, is to lift the emergency decree. There has been an announcement that that will be done, and we hope that it will be.
QUESTION: How soon would you want to see that happen, though?
SECRETARY CLINTON: I’m not going to substitute my judgment sitting here in the very beautiful comfort of the State Department for what is going on in Egypt right now. I think it’s important that the United States and others who wish to see a positive outcome of this struggle by the Egyptian people to achieve their own democracy be supportive, but don’t pretend that we know more than what the people in Egypt know. And we want to see changes. We’ve been for that for many years, both publicly and privately. But now, thankfully, the future really is in the hands of Egyptians themselves.
QUESTION: Madam Secretary, I’m sure you’re aware of this. A lot of people in the Arab world, particularly in Egypt, listening to you now, especially those people who thought that the U.S. had sat on the fence before Mubarak fell, whether you agree with that description or not – they all say the U.S. Government is doing it again – when they’re asked to make a clear choice, a clear decision whether they support the army or the demonstrators, the U.S. Government is sitting on the fence again.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I have to obviously object to that characterization. We were consistent and clear. We were against violence. We communicated that many times over and over again to every level in the Egyptian Government, and in particular to the army. We were in favor of the universal human rights of the Egyptian people, and we have long been in support of that and pushed the government to take reforms that would realize that. And we were in favor of political change. But I think it is inappropriate for us to do more than say what we have always said. We have said repeatedly the emergency law needs to be lifted. But now, this is a process that is being worked on by Egyptians.
The Mubarak era is over. There is a new effort that is just beginning, and I think it is an – it’s important that the United States be seen as supporting the transition to democracy, and that is where we stand. We are strongly in favor of it. We want to see it as soon as it can come. But we are also conscious that at many points in history, this incredible movement for change can be hijacked by external or internal forces that do not follow through on the promises made, do not realize the aspirations of the Egyptian people. So our goal is to keep our eye on the outcome. Let us get to democracy that will, once and for all, meet the needs of the Egyptian people and give Egypt a chance to serve as a model for the entire region that needs desperately to see that.
QUESTION: Now, what would you say to assuage the concerns of many Egyptians who say that this was supposed to be a revolution to actually get rid of military rule which has ruled Egypt for 30 years, and now they see that it is the army – at least for the foreseeable future – that is managing the affairs of the country and we have concerns about that? What would you say to them that they do not necessarily have to be concerned?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, that they need to keep up their political involvement and the real strength of their movement to get the changes necessary. I mean, those changes have been promised now. They need to be delivered on. And there needs to be broad-based inclusive representation going forward. So, different groups within Egyptian society have to step forward to take responsibility toward working in a unified way to achieve the goals that have all been set.
It is not going to work merely to stand on the outside and say, “We don’t like this and we don’t like that.” We now have the chance for broad-based participation. People need to step forward and make their views known and be part of getting this process moving so that all these timelines and these milestones about ending the emergency law, reforming the constitution, getting the laws for political parties, preparing for the elections – there’s a big effort. As big an effort as went into bringing us to this point will be replicated in achieving the outcomes that we seek.
QUESTION: And yet to many of these people, there are just – quoted to you – the fact that Egypt continues to be run by the army for the foreseeable future, the fact that even the civilian side of the government in Egypt was actually inherited from the Mubarak regime – many of them are described as his cronies. How concerned are you about that being either the reality or the perception?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, again, it is the opportunity to work through what exists now. What is the alternative? There was very – there are very good ideas being floated around about what could be the next step. But it is not for the United States, it is not for any other government, it is not for the media, it is not for those outside to dictate to the Egyptian people how they intend to proceed. There are some excellent conversations going on. We know that there is an effort to try to coalesce around certain ways forward that the opposition can all support. That’s what should happen.
But let’s take a little perspective here. It’s been less than three weeks, or just barely three weeks, and revolutions in and of themselves don’t produce the outcome that is sought. It is: Okay, now that you’ve achieved the goal of changing the government, what happens next? That is where Egypt is, and that is what the Egyptian people have to lead us through.
QUESTION: My time is up. I was wondering if there is time for one more question --
SECRETARY CLINTON: (Laughter.) Sure.
QUESTION: -- just broad-based, if I may. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
The United States has invested in the Egyptian army, it has invested in cooperation with the Egyptian army for 30 years. Given what the situation is in Egypt and given that the role it is playing – the role the army is playing in Egyptian politics today, would you say that the U.S. investment in the Egyptian army has been a success story?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, history will have to judge that, but I think that the relationships that developed over all those years between the leadership of the United States military and leadership of the Egyptian military made it possible for there to be continuing communications. It was a message that was delivered from many different sources – do not use violence against your own people – that was very readily received. It’s not like the United States had to tell the Egyptian military. They wanted to defend the Egyptian people, and I think they performed in an extraordinary way.
Contrast it to Iran, where the government has turned against the people. They’re more than happy to talk about look at what’s going on in Egypt, but when their opposition, when their young people try to express themselves, they come down with brutality. They have a record of such abuse and excess. Contrast that with the Egyptian military. I would bet on the process that the Egyptian military has announced going forward as being a pathway to a different future, whereas I look with such dismay at what Iran continues to do and just feel – my heart goes out to the Iranian people.
QUESTION: And yet the Egyptian army is accused of having – or it’s the Egyptian security forces are accused of having killed more Egyptians than the Iranian army Iranians.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Oh, I don’t think there’s any basis for that. I think that – as some of the leading protesters in Egypt themselves said, any loss of life is deeply regrettable, and certainly under those circumstances. But given what has been accomplished and the great opportunity for the Egyptian people now, it is something that Egyptians themselves say, “We now have it in our hands.” The Iranian people cannot say that.
QUESTION: Madam Secretary, thank you so much.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you.
Interview Hillary Rodham Clinton February 14, 2011
QUESTION: Madam Secretary, first, thanks for your time. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has said today that an earthquake is on the way in the Arab world (inaudible). Do you share or do you agree with this description?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think change is happening and it’s something that the United States and this Administration and I personally have advocated for, because we believe that it is in the best interest of not just the region and individual countries, but most importantly, the people, particularly the young people, that they have a chance to enjoy economic, political, democratic reform.
QUESTION: Will you – as the United States – will you adjust your policy or strategy towards the Middle East after this change?
SECRETARY CLINTON: We have consistently said the same thing, but it is obviously a challenge to communicate clearly in a time of great, momentous occurrences like this. We’ve said we are against violence by whoever; we are for the universal human rights of all people, and in particular over the last three weeks the Egyptian people; and we are for political change. In the speech that I gave in Doha toward the end of last year, I said that the foundations of the regimes were sinking into the sand. And I said it because it’s frustrating for us to watch good friends and watch talented people not be able to make the most out of their circumstances. And so I’m only hoping that we will see change from within, because that’s the only way it can occur.
QUESTION: When you ask the leaders to make reform and change their society, they didn’t change. They didn’t have enough time to change. But do you think they still have time to (inaudible) reform, to make that reform?
SECRETARY CLINTON: I do. I think that in many different countries, a opening of the economic space and ending of corruption, a consultation with a broad base of civil society, moves toward political reform and eventual democracy, are all within the reach of every one of the governments in the region.
QUESTION: Madam Secretary, yesterday and during the weekend you talked to international leaders about Egypt. Were you satisfied with the steps that the Egyptian military has taken, and how do you view that going forward (inaudible)?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, this is up to the Egyptian people, but certainly, the – our hope is that everything which has been promised – the end of the emergency law, the movement for constitutional reform, political parties being allowed, all of the pieces that constitute a real transition to democracy – will be implemented. And we’re going to continue to stand for that.
QUESTION: There are some opposition leaders in Egypt, they raised worries about the future role of the military. Do you share these worries?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think it’s important that the opposition and civil society come together around a set of demands as to what needs to be done, with a timetable, because clearly, the military has evidenced its desire to move in the right direction. But there needs to be continuing efforts by the opposition to help guide where Egypt is going. So I am hoping that we see out of the very diverse opposition that was present over the last three weeks some unifying that would come, not behind personalities, but behind specific demands that have to be met in order for the transition to succeed.
QUESTION: How do you respond to those in the Middle East that have said that the U.S. has abandoned its allies in the region?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, we haven’t. In fact, we think part of being a good friend and partner is telling your friend and partner what you see happening. And for many years, both publicly and privately, Democrats and Republican presidents and administrations have delivered the same message to the Egyptian Government: There must be reform; there must be change.
We were not successful, and neither was the Egyptian opposition or civil society. And the pressure just built up, and then we saw the results over the last three weeks. So with our friends, we have a very consistent message: There has to be change. It is still very possible, in fact desirable, for that change to proceed in an orderly way, a peaceful way, but it has to produce results, particularly for young people.
QUESTION: After Tunisia and Egypt, demonstrations are taking place today in Algeria, Yemen, and Bahrain. What is your message to the protestors in these countries?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Remain peaceful, nonviolent. That is what worked so well in Egypt, and that’s what will work because it gives you a standing that is absolutely unimpeachable that you are going out and protesting but not using violent means. Continue to stand up for universal rights but recognize that change requires a process, and be willing to be part of that process.
QUESTION: President Ahmadinejad today has said that there will be a new Middle East after what happened in Egypt and there is no place – well, there is no place for the U.S. and Israel. What is your reaction to that?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I find it very ironic that Iran is trying to give lessons in democracy to anybody. Talk about a revolution that was hijacked; Iran is Exhibit A. What Iran is doing to its people, even as we speak, where there are protestors trying to have their voices heard in Iran who are being brutally suppressed by the Iranian security forces, I don’t think anyone in the Middle East – or frankly, anyone in the world – would look to Iran as an example for them. That is not where anybody wants to end up, where you are basically in a military dictatorship with a kind of theocratic overlay which doesn't respond to the universal human rights of the Iranian people. So I don’t think there’s much to be learned or really in any way followed coming out of Iran when it comes to democracy.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) would happen to the (inaudible) peace process now? Is it on the shelf (inaudible)? What are you planning to do?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, the United States continues to believe that moving toward a two-state solution is in the best interests of the Israelis and the Palestinians, the best interest of the region. And we are continuing to push that with both of our friends, the Palestinians and the Israelis. And we think that having a two-state solution would be a great tribute to what people are standing for, where you’ve got self-determination by the Palestinian people, a state of their own, and Israel is able to live securely in the neighborhood and contributing to the transformation of the region.
QUESTION: I have two more questions on Lebanon and Syria. On Syria, Syrian authorities (inaudible) five-year plan on Facebook, and President Bashar Al-Assad has said that he will push through political reforms (inaudible). How do you view this?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I would like to see positive actions taken. A commitment in word only won’t produce the changes that people are looking for. So I hope that what he has said will be followed up on.
QUESTION: And on Lebanon in the sixth anniversary of the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, you have called on the next government to honor its obligations to the international tribunal. Mr. Mikati has so far refused to commit to (inaudible). How are you going to (inaudible)?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, the United States believes strongly in the work of the tribunal, because we do not believe that there should be impunity for murder. And we do not believe that it is in Lebanon’s interest to avoid accountability for those who murdered not only Prime Minister Hariri but 22 other innocent people. So we’re going to continue to support the work of the tribunal. We think it’s important, and we believe that Lebanon itself would benefit from having this matter resolved. We also are very hopeful that the government that is finally formed will recognize the need for the tribunal’s work to continue.
QUESTION: After Egypt and Tunisia, who will be next (inaudible)?
SECRETARY CLINTON: That’s up to the people of the region. And what we hope is that there will be an ongoing commitment to reform – economic reform and political reform. I talked about it in my speech in Doha, and it was a warning to a lot of our friends in the region. And now, many of them are looking for ways that they can make progress, and we would like to see that happen.
QUESTION: Thank you so much.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you.
QUESTION: I appreciate your time.
SECRETARY CLINTON: My pleasure.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think change is happening and it’s something that the United States and this Administration and I personally have advocated for, because we believe that it is in the best interest of not just the region and individual countries, but most importantly, the people, particularly the young people, that they have a chance to enjoy economic, political, democratic reform.
QUESTION: Will you – as the United States – will you adjust your policy or strategy towards the Middle East after this change?
SECRETARY CLINTON: We have consistently said the same thing, but it is obviously a challenge to communicate clearly in a time of great, momentous occurrences like this. We’ve said we are against violence by whoever; we are for the universal human rights of all people, and in particular over the last three weeks the Egyptian people; and we are for political change. In the speech that I gave in Doha toward the end of last year, I said that the foundations of the regimes were sinking into the sand. And I said it because it’s frustrating for us to watch good friends and watch talented people not be able to make the most out of their circumstances. And so I’m only hoping that we will see change from within, because that’s the only way it can occur.
QUESTION: When you ask the leaders to make reform and change their society, they didn’t change. They didn’t have enough time to change. But do you think they still have time to (inaudible) reform, to make that reform?
SECRETARY CLINTON: I do. I think that in many different countries, a opening of the economic space and ending of corruption, a consultation with a broad base of civil society, moves toward political reform and eventual democracy, are all within the reach of every one of the governments in the region.
QUESTION: Madam Secretary, yesterday and during the weekend you talked to international leaders about Egypt. Were you satisfied with the steps that the Egyptian military has taken, and how do you view that going forward (inaudible)?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, this is up to the Egyptian people, but certainly, the – our hope is that everything which has been promised – the end of the emergency law, the movement for constitutional reform, political parties being allowed, all of the pieces that constitute a real transition to democracy – will be implemented. And we’re going to continue to stand for that.
QUESTION: There are some opposition leaders in Egypt, they raised worries about the future role of the military. Do you share these worries?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think it’s important that the opposition and civil society come together around a set of demands as to what needs to be done, with a timetable, because clearly, the military has evidenced its desire to move in the right direction. But there needs to be continuing efforts by the opposition to help guide where Egypt is going. So I am hoping that we see out of the very diverse opposition that was present over the last three weeks some unifying that would come, not behind personalities, but behind specific demands that have to be met in order for the transition to succeed.
QUESTION: How do you respond to those in the Middle East that have said that the U.S. has abandoned its allies in the region?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, we haven’t. In fact, we think part of being a good friend and partner is telling your friend and partner what you see happening. And for many years, both publicly and privately, Democrats and Republican presidents and administrations have delivered the same message to the Egyptian Government: There must be reform; there must be change.
We were not successful, and neither was the Egyptian opposition or civil society. And the pressure just built up, and then we saw the results over the last three weeks. So with our friends, we have a very consistent message: There has to be change. It is still very possible, in fact desirable, for that change to proceed in an orderly way, a peaceful way, but it has to produce results, particularly for young people.
QUESTION: After Tunisia and Egypt, demonstrations are taking place today in Algeria, Yemen, and Bahrain. What is your message to the protestors in these countries?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Remain peaceful, nonviolent. That is what worked so well in Egypt, and that’s what will work because it gives you a standing that is absolutely unimpeachable that you are going out and protesting but not using violent means. Continue to stand up for universal rights but recognize that change requires a process, and be willing to be part of that process.
QUESTION: President Ahmadinejad today has said that there will be a new Middle East after what happened in Egypt and there is no place – well, there is no place for the U.S. and Israel. What is your reaction to that?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I find it very ironic that Iran is trying to give lessons in democracy to anybody. Talk about a revolution that was hijacked; Iran is Exhibit A. What Iran is doing to its people, even as we speak, where there are protestors trying to have their voices heard in Iran who are being brutally suppressed by the Iranian security forces, I don’t think anyone in the Middle East – or frankly, anyone in the world – would look to Iran as an example for them. That is not where anybody wants to end up, where you are basically in a military dictatorship with a kind of theocratic overlay which doesn't respond to the universal human rights of the Iranian people. So I don’t think there’s much to be learned or really in any way followed coming out of Iran when it comes to democracy.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) would happen to the (inaudible) peace process now? Is it on the shelf (inaudible)? What are you planning to do?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, the United States continues to believe that moving toward a two-state solution is in the best interests of the Israelis and the Palestinians, the best interest of the region. And we are continuing to push that with both of our friends, the Palestinians and the Israelis. And we think that having a two-state solution would be a great tribute to what people are standing for, where you’ve got self-determination by the Palestinian people, a state of their own, and Israel is able to live securely in the neighborhood and contributing to the transformation of the region.
QUESTION: I have two more questions on Lebanon and Syria. On Syria, Syrian authorities (inaudible) five-year plan on Facebook, and President Bashar Al-Assad has said that he will push through political reforms (inaudible). How do you view this?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I would like to see positive actions taken. A commitment in word only won’t produce the changes that people are looking for. So I hope that what he has said will be followed up on.
QUESTION: And on Lebanon in the sixth anniversary of the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, you have called on the next government to honor its obligations to the international tribunal. Mr. Mikati has so far refused to commit to (inaudible). How are you going to (inaudible)?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, the United States believes strongly in the work of the tribunal, because we do not believe that there should be impunity for murder. And we do not believe that it is in Lebanon’s interest to avoid accountability for those who murdered not only Prime Minister Hariri but 22 other innocent people. So we’re going to continue to support the work of the tribunal. We think it’s important, and we believe that Lebanon itself would benefit from having this matter resolved. We also are very hopeful that the government that is finally formed will recognize the need for the tribunal’s work to continue.
QUESTION: After Egypt and Tunisia, who will be next (inaudible)?
SECRETARY CLINTON: That’s up to the people of the region. And what we hope is that there will be an ongoing commitment to reform – economic reform and political reform. I talked about it in my speech in Doha, and it was a warning to a lot of our friends in the region. And now, many of them are looking for ways that they can make progress, and we would like to see that happen.
QUESTION: Thank you so much.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you.
QUESTION: I appreciate your time.
SECRETARY CLINTON: My pleasure.
Sunday, February 13, 2011
The 4th Communiqué of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
Saturday, Feb 12/2011
In the name of God the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful,
The fourth statement of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces,
In light of the conditions that exist in the country, and the difficult times that have placed Egypt at a juncture that demands of us all to defend the stability of the nation, and the achievements of the people; And due to the fact that the current phase requires a reordering of the priorities of the state with the objective of meeting the legitimate demands of the people, and of delivering the nation from the current situation; And as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is aware that the rule of law is not only necessary for the freedom of the individual, but rather it is the only legitimate basis for authority; And with determination, clarity, and faith in all our national, regional and international responsibilities, and with recognition of God’s rights and in the name of God, and with His support, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces announces the following:
First: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is committed to all matters included in its previous statements.
Second: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is confident in the ability of Egypt’s people and institutions to get through this critical situation, and to that end, all agencies of the state, and the private sector must play their noble and patriotic role to drive the economy forward, and the people must fulfill their responsibility towards that goal.
Third: The current government, and governors shall continue as a caretaker administration until a new government is formed.
Fourth: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces aspires to guaranteeing a peaceful transition of authority within a free and democratic system that allows for the assumption of authority by a civilian and elected authority to govern the country and the build of a democratic and free state.
Fifth: The Arab Republic of Egypt is committed to all regional and international obligations and treaties.
Sixth: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces calls on the great people to cooperate with their siblings and children in the civilian police forces, for affection and cooperation must exist between everyone, and it calls on the civilian police forces must be committed to their slogan “the police serve the people”.
God is the source of success.
In the name of God the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful,
The fourth statement of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces,
In light of the conditions that exist in the country, and the difficult times that have placed Egypt at a juncture that demands of us all to defend the stability of the nation, and the achievements of the people; And due to the fact that the current phase requires a reordering of the priorities of the state with the objective of meeting the legitimate demands of the people, and of delivering the nation from the current situation; And as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is aware that the rule of law is not only necessary for the freedom of the individual, but rather it is the only legitimate basis for authority; And with determination, clarity, and faith in all our national, regional and international responsibilities, and with recognition of God’s rights and in the name of God, and with His support, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces announces the following:
First: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is committed to all matters included in its previous statements.
Second: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is confident in the ability of Egypt’s people and institutions to get through this critical situation, and to that end, all agencies of the state, and the private sector must play their noble and patriotic role to drive the economy forward, and the people must fulfill their responsibility towards that goal.
Third: The current government, and governors shall continue as a caretaker administration until a new government is formed.
Fourth: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces aspires to guaranteeing a peaceful transition of authority within a free and democratic system that allows for the assumption of authority by a civilian and elected authority to govern the country and the build of a democratic and free state.
Fifth: The Arab Republic of Egypt is committed to all regional and international obligations and treaties.
Sixth: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces calls on the great people to cooperate with their siblings and children in the civilian police forces, for affection and cooperation must exist between everyone, and it calls on the civilian police forces must be committed to their slogan “the police serve the people”.
God is the source of success.
Some good resources on egypt revolution 2011
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/world/middleeast/09diplomacy.html?_r=2&ref=world
UP with egypy- freedman
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1&ref=opinion
The real 'realism' on Israel
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-0208-goldberg-israel-20110208,0,2439664.column
From freedom agenda to freedom doctrine
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021005339.html
The Next Step for Egypt’s Opposition
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/11/opinion/11elbaradei.html?ref=opinion&pagewanted=print
Israel's post-Mubarak fear
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20110211gd.html
Why the Egypt Revolution Is Good for Israel
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/10/why_the_egypt_revolution_is_good_for_israel
The Nile, Then and Now
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703960804576119814106947184.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEFTTopBucket
Elated Egyptians express faith in military to bring democracy
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/11/AR2011021103606.html?hpid=topnews
Overcoming Fear and Anxiety in Tel Aviv
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/67211
UP with egypy- freedman
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1&ref=opinion
The real 'realism' on Israel
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-0208-goldberg-israel-20110208,0,2439664.column
From freedom agenda to freedom doctrine
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021005339.html
The Next Step for Egypt’s Opposition
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/11/opinion/11elbaradei.html?ref=opinion&pagewanted=print
Israel's post-Mubarak fear
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20110211gd.html
Why the Egypt Revolution Is Good for Israel
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/10/why_the_egypt_revolution_is_good_for_israel
The Nile, Then and Now
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703960804576119814106947184.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEFTTopBucket
Elated Egyptians express faith in military to bring democracy
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/11/AR2011021103606.html?hpid=topnews
Overcoming Fear and Anxiety in Tel Aviv
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/67211
Thursday, February 10, 2011
In the Middle East, a Catch-22 for the CIA
Washington Post
By David Ignatius
Thursday, February 10, 2011;
The CIA uses the term "liaison" to describe its contacts with foreign intelligence services. And in Arab capitals such as Tunis, Cairo and Amman, these relationships can be so seductively beneficial that they limit the CIA's ability to run its own "unilateral" operations to learn what's going on inside the host country.
This conundrum - how to work with your hosts and also spy on them - is one of the difficulties facing the CIA as it tries to understand the youth revolution spreading across the Middle East. The agency has cultivated its relationships with people such as Gen. Omar Suleiman, Egypt's chief of intelligence and now vice president, but it has not done as well understanding the world of the protesters.
It's a Catch-22 of the intelligence business, especially over the past decade, when counterterrorism became the CIA's core mission: The agency needed good relationships with Arab intelligence services to collect information about al-Qaeda, but to maintain those relationships, the agency sometimes avoided local snooping. The CIA did recruit some long-term contacts within the Egyptian establishment who are said to have provided crucial intelligence in recent days. But it's a far cry from the early 1980s, when the Cairo station chief would regularly meet the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition groups.
"We pulled back more and more, and relied on liaison to let us know what was going on," says one former station chief who's a veteran of the CIA's Near East Division.
These have been trying days for that fabled division, which runs clandestine operations from Morocco to Bangladesh. One agency veteran remembers how "NE" officers would boast to trainees at "the farm": "We are the elite of the operations directorate! We have the most important targets."
But this elite status gradually morphed: Not only were the division's targets important, but so were its liaison partners. Careers were made on a station chief's rapport with the head of Jordan's General Intelligence Department or Egypt's General Intelligence Service. An ambitious officer couldn't afford to have strained relations with his local host.
The problem of dependency became acute after Sept. 11, 2001, when the agency spent many hundreds of millions of dollars bolstering friendly services - especially from authoritarian, pro-American regimes such as Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and Pakistan. Those are the countries now shaken by protest.
Egypt posed a special problem. The military-backed regime was paranoid about foreign spies who might be meeting with domestic opposition figures. The Egyptians maintained such aggressive surveillance that every CIA officer sent there took a special six-week class, known as the "Hostile Environment Tradecraft Course," to learn how to operate in "denied areas."
It was a paradox worthy of the sphinx: Even though the United States was spending billions of dollars to assist Egypt and its military, the CIA had to treat Cairo the same way it did Beijing or Moscow. Thanks to extensive military-to-military contacts and other links, supplemented by clandestine polling, the agency did keep tabs on Egypt - but as the current crisis developed, the United States seemed behind the information curve.
Modern communications technology has aided spying, but it put station chiefs on an electronic leash, limiting the unconventional contacts that might warn what was ahead. Headquarters was now able to micromanage operations: One chief of the Near East Division sent so many nit-picking messages that he became known as "The Mailman."
The CIA's defenders say the agency can juggle liaison and unilateral operations, or as one senior official puts it, "walk and chew gum at the same time." This official notes that since January 2010, more than 400 of the agency's 1,700 intelligence reports on the Middle East and North Africa have focused on issues related to stability.
The revolution in Tunisia was a surprise, says this CIA defender, because it "wasn't clear even to President Ben Ali that his security forces would quickly choose not to support him." As for Egypt, he says, "analysts anticipated and highlighted the concern that unrest in Tunisia might spread well before demonstrations erupted in Cairo. They later warned that unrest in Egypt would likely gain momentum and could threaten the regime."
Here's the bottom line: The CIA is caught in a jam that's emblematic of America's larger problem in the Middle East. The agency has been so focused on stopping al-Qaeda that it has been distracted from other questions. America depends on good intelligence as never before, and the simple truth is that the CIA has to lift its game.
By David Ignatius
Thursday, February 10, 2011;
The CIA uses the term "liaison" to describe its contacts with foreign intelligence services. And in Arab capitals such as Tunis, Cairo and Amman, these relationships can be so seductively beneficial that they limit the CIA's ability to run its own "unilateral" operations to learn what's going on inside the host country.
This conundrum - how to work with your hosts and also spy on them - is one of the difficulties facing the CIA as it tries to understand the youth revolution spreading across the Middle East. The agency has cultivated its relationships with people such as Gen. Omar Suleiman, Egypt's chief of intelligence and now vice president, but it has not done as well understanding the world of the protesters.
It's a Catch-22 of the intelligence business, especially over the past decade, when counterterrorism became the CIA's core mission: The agency needed good relationships with Arab intelligence services to collect information about al-Qaeda, but to maintain those relationships, the agency sometimes avoided local snooping. The CIA did recruit some long-term contacts within the Egyptian establishment who are said to have provided crucial intelligence in recent days. But it's a far cry from the early 1980s, when the Cairo station chief would regularly meet the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition groups.
"We pulled back more and more, and relied on liaison to let us know what was going on," says one former station chief who's a veteran of the CIA's Near East Division.
These have been trying days for that fabled division, which runs clandestine operations from Morocco to Bangladesh. One agency veteran remembers how "NE" officers would boast to trainees at "the farm": "We are the elite of the operations directorate! We have the most important targets."
But this elite status gradually morphed: Not only were the division's targets important, but so were its liaison partners. Careers were made on a station chief's rapport with the head of Jordan's General Intelligence Department or Egypt's General Intelligence Service. An ambitious officer couldn't afford to have strained relations with his local host.
The problem of dependency became acute after Sept. 11, 2001, when the agency spent many hundreds of millions of dollars bolstering friendly services - especially from authoritarian, pro-American regimes such as Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and Pakistan. Those are the countries now shaken by protest.
Egypt posed a special problem. The military-backed regime was paranoid about foreign spies who might be meeting with domestic opposition figures. The Egyptians maintained such aggressive surveillance that every CIA officer sent there took a special six-week class, known as the "Hostile Environment Tradecraft Course," to learn how to operate in "denied areas."
It was a paradox worthy of the sphinx: Even though the United States was spending billions of dollars to assist Egypt and its military, the CIA had to treat Cairo the same way it did Beijing or Moscow. Thanks to extensive military-to-military contacts and other links, supplemented by clandestine polling, the agency did keep tabs on Egypt - but as the current crisis developed, the United States seemed behind the information curve.
Modern communications technology has aided spying, but it put station chiefs on an electronic leash, limiting the unconventional contacts that might warn what was ahead. Headquarters was now able to micromanage operations: One chief of the Near East Division sent so many nit-picking messages that he became known as "The Mailman."
The CIA's defenders say the agency can juggle liaison and unilateral operations, or as one senior official puts it, "walk and chew gum at the same time." This official notes that since January 2010, more than 400 of the agency's 1,700 intelligence reports on the Middle East and North Africa have focused on issues related to stability.
The revolution in Tunisia was a surprise, says this CIA defender, because it "wasn't clear even to President Ben Ali that his security forces would quickly choose not to support him." As for Egypt, he says, "analysts anticipated and highlighted the concern that unrest in Tunisia might spread well before demonstrations erupted in Cairo. They later warned that unrest in Egypt would likely gain momentum and could threaten the regime."
Here's the bottom line: The CIA is caught in a jam that's emblematic of America's larger problem in the Middle East. The agency has been so focused on stopping al-Qaeda that it has been distracted from other questions. America depends on good intelligence as never before, and the simple truth is that the CIA has to lift its game.
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Readout of the Vice President's Call with Egyptian Vice President Omar Soliman
February 08, 2011
Vice President Biden spoke today to Egyptian Vice President Omar Soliman to reiterate the United States’ support for an orderly transition in Egypt that is prompt, meaningful, peaceful, and legitimate. Vice President Biden urged that the transition produce immediate, irreversible progress that responds to the aspirations of the Egyptian people.
The Vice President reaffirmed that the future of Egypt will be determined by the Egyptian people. The Vice President took note of steps the government of Egypt has pledged to take in response to the opposition and urged the government to take immediate action to follow through on its commitments.
Based on our nation’s fundamental belief in the importance of universal rights and representative governments, as well as on consultations with Egypt’s opposition and a broad cross section of civil society, Vice President Biden and Vice President Soliman discussed additional steps that the United States supports, including:
•Restraining the Ministry of Interior’s conduct by immediately ending the arrests, harassment, beating, and detention of journalists, and political and civil society activists, and by allowing freedom of assembly and expression;
•immediately rescinding the emergency law;
•broadening participation in the national dialogue to include a wide range of opposition members; and
•inviting the opposition as a partner in jointly developing a roadmap and timetable for transition.
These steps, and a clear policy of no reprisals, are what the broad opposition is calling for and what the government is saying it is prepared to accept. Vice President Biden expressed the belief that the demands of the broad opposition can be met through meaningful negotiations with the government.
Vice President Biden spoke today to Egyptian Vice President Omar Soliman to reiterate the United States’ support for an orderly transition in Egypt that is prompt, meaningful, peaceful, and legitimate. Vice President Biden urged that the transition produce immediate, irreversible progress that responds to the aspirations of the Egyptian people.
The Vice President reaffirmed that the future of Egypt will be determined by the Egyptian people. The Vice President took note of steps the government of Egypt has pledged to take in response to the opposition and urged the government to take immediate action to follow through on its commitments.
Based on our nation’s fundamental belief in the importance of universal rights and representative governments, as well as on consultations with Egypt’s opposition and a broad cross section of civil society, Vice President Biden and Vice President Soliman discussed additional steps that the United States supports, including:
•Restraining the Ministry of Interior’s conduct by immediately ending the arrests, harassment, beating, and detention of journalists, and political and civil society activists, and by allowing freedom of assembly and expression;
•immediately rescinding the emergency law;
•broadening participation in the national dialogue to include a wide range of opposition members; and
•inviting the opposition as a partner in jointly developing a roadmap and timetable for transition.
These steps, and a clear policy of no reprisals, are what the broad opposition is calling for and what the government is saying it is prepared to accept. Vice President Biden expressed the belief that the demands of the broad opposition can be met through meaningful negotiations with the government.
Monday, February 7, 2011
U.S. Strategy Toward Preserving the Egyptian Regime
STRATFOR
February 3, 2011
Wednesday was another Egypt day, but the most important development did not take place in the country. Instead, it was in Washington, where White House spokesman Robert Gibbs used some pretty tough language in demanding that Egypt immediately engage in the process of transition: “The time for a transition has come, and that time is now…now is not September…now means yesterday,” Gibbs said.
Gibbs’ comments clearly show that the United States wants Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to step down and without much delay. Washington sees this as a way to try to defuse the street agitation. The fear is that should the unrest continue, the situation may get out of hand and even the Egyptian military might not be able to handle the situation.
“…the United States is not worried about the end of the “Mubarakian era” and is in fact demanding that the embattled president depart sooner rather than later.”
The critical element in this process is the Egyptian military, which is expected to ensure that Mubarak’s fall does not lead to a collapse of the existing order. As things stand, it seems the opposition forces would be satisfied if Mubarak stepped down, after which they are prepared to negotiate with his successors. Of course, such an event would herald the next phase when all sorts of issues (interim administration, elections, new constitution, etc.) would have to be sorted out.
But the bottom line is that regime change would not take place. Any new ruling elite — if and when it took office — would be dependent upon the military, internal security forces, intelligence service, bureaucracy and business community to govern the country. After all, these are the basic instruments of governance that any political force would be dependent upon.
A key thing to note in the case of Egypt is that the public agitation is not led by any political force. Rather, civil society is behind the protest demonstrations. So, when Mubarak throws in the towel and the public goes back home, the political parties will be left with little leverage vis-a-vis the state.
That weakens the ability of the political forces to negotiate with the regime from a position of relative strength. This is not to say that the ruling National Democratic Party sans Mubarak would be able to continue with business as usual with the military’s backing. There will be compromises but nothing that would lead to a fundamental shift in the nature of the Egyptian polity.
The important thing to keep in mind at this point is that the political forces depend upon the military for any political change. It is this dependency that will likely allow the military to ensure continuity of policy. This would be the case, even if the country’s most organized political group, the Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood, were to come to power.
On their own, political forces do not wield much power and in Egypt, where the political forces do not own the streets, this is all the more the case. Thus, the move toward a more democratic polity is an evolutionary process and will likely take many years to transpire — assuming, of course, ceteris paribus — all things being equal. Until then, the guarantor of state stability is the country’s armed forces, which means that the order established by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952 will not undergo any major change anytime soon.
It is for this reason the United States is not worried about the end of the “Mubarakian era” and is in fact demanding that the embattled president depart sooner rather than later.
February 3, 2011
Wednesday was another Egypt day, but the most important development did not take place in the country. Instead, it was in Washington, where White House spokesman Robert Gibbs used some pretty tough language in demanding that Egypt immediately engage in the process of transition: “The time for a transition has come, and that time is now…now is not September…now means yesterday,” Gibbs said.
Gibbs’ comments clearly show that the United States wants Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to step down and without much delay. Washington sees this as a way to try to defuse the street agitation. The fear is that should the unrest continue, the situation may get out of hand and even the Egyptian military might not be able to handle the situation.
“…the United States is not worried about the end of the “Mubarakian era” and is in fact demanding that the embattled president depart sooner rather than later.”
The critical element in this process is the Egyptian military, which is expected to ensure that Mubarak’s fall does not lead to a collapse of the existing order. As things stand, it seems the opposition forces would be satisfied if Mubarak stepped down, after which they are prepared to negotiate with his successors. Of course, such an event would herald the next phase when all sorts of issues (interim administration, elections, new constitution, etc.) would have to be sorted out.
But the bottom line is that regime change would not take place. Any new ruling elite — if and when it took office — would be dependent upon the military, internal security forces, intelligence service, bureaucracy and business community to govern the country. After all, these are the basic instruments of governance that any political force would be dependent upon.
A key thing to note in the case of Egypt is that the public agitation is not led by any political force. Rather, civil society is behind the protest demonstrations. So, when Mubarak throws in the towel and the public goes back home, the political parties will be left with little leverage vis-a-vis the state.
That weakens the ability of the political forces to negotiate with the regime from a position of relative strength. This is not to say that the ruling National Democratic Party sans Mubarak would be able to continue with business as usual with the military’s backing. There will be compromises but nothing that would lead to a fundamental shift in the nature of the Egyptian polity.
The important thing to keep in mind at this point is that the political forces depend upon the military for any political change. It is this dependency that will likely allow the military to ensure continuity of policy. This would be the case, even if the country’s most organized political group, the Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood, were to come to power.
On their own, political forces do not wield much power and in Egypt, where the political forces do not own the streets, this is all the more the case. Thus, the move toward a more democratic polity is an evolutionary process and will likely take many years to transpire — assuming, of course, ceteris paribus — all things being equal. Until then, the guarantor of state stability is the country’s armed forces, which means that the order established by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952 will not undergo any major change anytime soon.
It is for this reason the United States is not worried about the end of the “Mubarakian era” and is in fact demanding that the embattled president depart sooner rather than later.
Hillary Rodham Clinton Interview With Michele Kelemen of NPR
February 6, 2011
QUESTION: So, thanks for taking the time to talk to us.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Absolutely.
QUESTION: Do you think the Egyptian people can trust a transition process that is essentially in the hands of the military and former intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think that the Egyptian people are looking for an orderly transition that can lead to free and fair elections. That's what the United States has consistently supported. We are putting a lot of effort into making sure that the dialogue process that has begun is meaningful and transparent, and leads to concrete actions.
Now, the people themselves, and the leaders of various groups within Egyptian society, will ultimately determine whether it is or is not meeting their needs. Today we learned that the Muslim Brotherhood has decided to participate, which suggests that they, at least, are now involved in the dialogue that we have encouraged.
We are going to wait and see how this develops. But we have been very clear about what we expect.
QUESTION: But some people on the street are saying, you know, "Suleiman looks like Mubarak II," keeping a lot of the old structures in place. Is he reassuring you that he is really doing things differently?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Look, we have had numerous conversations with him and others, both the Vice President and I have spoken with him in the last several days. We hear that they are committed to this, and when we press on concrete steps and timelines, we are given assurance that that will happen.
But ultimately, we are not the arbiters. It's the people of Egypt who are the arbiters. And a number of voices that are now being heard recognize there has to be some process. And there is a desire to test this, to see how it unfolds, and we support that.
QUESTION: What about Hosni Mubarak, though? I mean is the U.S. encouraging him to leave the scene, or has the U.S. given up on that track?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Now, again, this is up to the Egyptian people. I want to make very clear that we have set forth the principles that we support. We are adamant about no violence, and have consistently reached out to the army and the government to reinforce that message. We want to see peaceful protests that are -- so far, anyway -- embodying the aspirations that are, in our view, very legitimate. And we want to see an orderly, expeditious transition.
But I think it's important for us to recognize that American or any outside interest or nation has an obligation, in my view, to make absolutely clear what we want to see happen. But ultimately, the Egyptian people are going to have to make these decisions for themselves.
QUESTION: But the Obama Administration did send a former ambassador, Frank Wisner, to Cairo to quietly tell Mubarak that it's time. Wisner was just -- told this Munich security conference last night that Mubarak's role was utterly critical in this transition process. So it sounds like the U.S. has at least accepted the fact that Mubarak is not leaving the scene any time soon.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, first of all, we deeply respect the many years of service that Frank Wisner has provided to our country. And he was asked to go and assess the positions of President Mubarak and those around him, having known them all for many years. But he does not speak for the American Government, he does not reflect our policies. And we have been very clear, from the beginning, that we wanted to see an orderly transition.
There is a debate within Egypt itself, and not just in the government, but among the people of Egypt, as to how best to ensure that. For example, under the constitution, the argument has been made by many who are in opposition, as well as in support of the government, that there would be a 60-day period to prepare for elections if he were to resign -- I am not an expert on the Egyptian constitution, I am not offering any opinion on it -- and that that doesn't give anybody enough time. I saw an interview reported this morning, one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, saying it's going to take time to prepare.
So, again, I want to stress our basic point, that we have set forth our expectations: no violence; peaceful protest; orderly transition; process that is transparent, expeditious, leading to free and fair elections. And yet we know that, ultimately, these decisions lie in the hands of the people of Egypt, themselves.
QUESTION: How are other Arab rulers viewing this situation? Are they coming to you and asking you, "Do you still support us?"
SECRETARY CLINTON: They are concerned, like everyone is, about what comes next. And we have said the same things to them that we are saying to you, that we think that this has to be viewed in light of the principles that we have set forth. Some are more concerned than others.
But, as you know, I gave a speech in Doha last month where I said, "The foundations are sinking into the sand. These governments, these leaders, have to recognize that they must respond to the legitimate needs for economic and political reform that the people have, particularly young people, who represent one-half to two-thirds of the population in many of these countries."
QUESTION: And here in Munich you called it a Perfect Storm.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Right.
QUESTION: So I wonder what sort of advice you give to Arab rulers to weather this storm.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, we give the same advice we have given for years through Republican and Democratic administrations alike. We believe that democracies are more stable than authoritarian regimes. We believe that economic reform that spreads prosperity broadly among the population, that builds a middle class, that doesn't just enrich the elite -- we believe measures against corruption are necessary to avoid destroying trust between leaders and their citizens. We have a very consistent American view of this, in part based on our own history, but also in observing what has happened in other parts of the world. So our message, publicly and privately, has been the same.
Some leaders listen better than other leaders. But all leaders have to recognize now that the failure to reform, the failure to open up their economies and their political systems, is just not an option any longer.
QUESTION: But over the years the U.S. has relied on autocratic governments in the Middle East to support U.S. policies that are very unpopular in the region. So I wonder. You know, a lot of analysts are telling me now, regardless of how any of this plays out, you're going to have Middle Eastern leaders that have to listen to their publics more. And that might be problematic for the U.S. on all sorts of policies. And I wonder if you are ready for that sort of new Middle East.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Michele, I think the forces that are at work, particularly because of the advances in communications technology, are not reversible. And the United States understands that. And we want to play a constructive role in helping countries move in the direction of more openness and more democracy and participation and market access, and the things that we stand for.
But it is the case that some countries will move at different paces. And we have historically had relations with a lot of countries whose governments we did not approve of. That is the case still today. There is no easy answer to how we pursue what's in America's interests. Because, ultimately, my job, the President's job, is to protect the security and the interests of the United States.
And do we do business with, do we have relations with, do we support governments over the past 50 years that we do not always see eye to eye with? Of course. I mean that's the world in which we live. But our messages are consistent about what we think is in the best interest of the United States, which is to have more democracy, more openness, more participation. And that is a consistent principle, and we then have to deal with what comes of that.
QUESTION: We are going to have to leave it there. Thank you very much for your time, especially on a trip -- I understand you've just broken a record of most traveled Secretary of State in your first two years.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, that's what I'm told. And many days I feel it. Thanks.
QUESTION: Thanks for taking time.
QUESTION: So, thanks for taking the time to talk to us.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Absolutely.
QUESTION: Do you think the Egyptian people can trust a transition process that is essentially in the hands of the military and former intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think that the Egyptian people are looking for an orderly transition that can lead to free and fair elections. That's what the United States has consistently supported. We are putting a lot of effort into making sure that the dialogue process that has begun is meaningful and transparent, and leads to concrete actions.
Now, the people themselves, and the leaders of various groups within Egyptian society, will ultimately determine whether it is or is not meeting their needs. Today we learned that the Muslim Brotherhood has decided to participate, which suggests that they, at least, are now involved in the dialogue that we have encouraged.
We are going to wait and see how this develops. But we have been very clear about what we expect.
QUESTION: But some people on the street are saying, you know, "Suleiman looks like Mubarak II," keeping a lot of the old structures in place. Is he reassuring you that he is really doing things differently?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Look, we have had numerous conversations with him and others, both the Vice President and I have spoken with him in the last several days. We hear that they are committed to this, and when we press on concrete steps and timelines, we are given assurance that that will happen.
But ultimately, we are not the arbiters. It's the people of Egypt who are the arbiters. And a number of voices that are now being heard recognize there has to be some process. And there is a desire to test this, to see how it unfolds, and we support that.
QUESTION: What about Hosni Mubarak, though? I mean is the U.S. encouraging him to leave the scene, or has the U.S. given up on that track?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Now, again, this is up to the Egyptian people. I want to make very clear that we have set forth the principles that we support. We are adamant about no violence, and have consistently reached out to the army and the government to reinforce that message. We want to see peaceful protests that are -- so far, anyway -- embodying the aspirations that are, in our view, very legitimate. And we want to see an orderly, expeditious transition.
But I think it's important for us to recognize that American or any outside interest or nation has an obligation, in my view, to make absolutely clear what we want to see happen. But ultimately, the Egyptian people are going to have to make these decisions for themselves.
QUESTION: But the Obama Administration did send a former ambassador, Frank Wisner, to Cairo to quietly tell Mubarak that it's time. Wisner was just -- told this Munich security conference last night that Mubarak's role was utterly critical in this transition process. So it sounds like the U.S. has at least accepted the fact that Mubarak is not leaving the scene any time soon.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, first of all, we deeply respect the many years of service that Frank Wisner has provided to our country. And he was asked to go and assess the positions of President Mubarak and those around him, having known them all for many years. But he does not speak for the American Government, he does not reflect our policies. And we have been very clear, from the beginning, that we wanted to see an orderly transition.
There is a debate within Egypt itself, and not just in the government, but among the people of Egypt, as to how best to ensure that. For example, under the constitution, the argument has been made by many who are in opposition, as well as in support of the government, that there would be a 60-day period to prepare for elections if he were to resign -- I am not an expert on the Egyptian constitution, I am not offering any opinion on it -- and that that doesn't give anybody enough time. I saw an interview reported this morning, one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, saying it's going to take time to prepare.
So, again, I want to stress our basic point, that we have set forth our expectations: no violence; peaceful protest; orderly transition; process that is transparent, expeditious, leading to free and fair elections. And yet we know that, ultimately, these decisions lie in the hands of the people of Egypt, themselves.
QUESTION: How are other Arab rulers viewing this situation? Are they coming to you and asking you, "Do you still support us?"
SECRETARY CLINTON: They are concerned, like everyone is, about what comes next. And we have said the same things to them that we are saying to you, that we think that this has to be viewed in light of the principles that we have set forth. Some are more concerned than others.
But, as you know, I gave a speech in Doha last month where I said, "The foundations are sinking into the sand. These governments, these leaders, have to recognize that they must respond to the legitimate needs for economic and political reform that the people have, particularly young people, who represent one-half to two-thirds of the population in many of these countries."
QUESTION: And here in Munich you called it a Perfect Storm.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Right.
QUESTION: So I wonder what sort of advice you give to Arab rulers to weather this storm.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, we give the same advice we have given for years through Republican and Democratic administrations alike. We believe that democracies are more stable than authoritarian regimes. We believe that economic reform that spreads prosperity broadly among the population, that builds a middle class, that doesn't just enrich the elite -- we believe measures against corruption are necessary to avoid destroying trust between leaders and their citizens. We have a very consistent American view of this, in part based on our own history, but also in observing what has happened in other parts of the world. So our message, publicly and privately, has been the same.
Some leaders listen better than other leaders. But all leaders have to recognize now that the failure to reform, the failure to open up their economies and their political systems, is just not an option any longer.
QUESTION: But over the years the U.S. has relied on autocratic governments in the Middle East to support U.S. policies that are very unpopular in the region. So I wonder. You know, a lot of analysts are telling me now, regardless of how any of this plays out, you're going to have Middle Eastern leaders that have to listen to their publics more. And that might be problematic for the U.S. on all sorts of policies. And I wonder if you are ready for that sort of new Middle East.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Michele, I think the forces that are at work, particularly because of the advances in communications technology, are not reversible. And the United States understands that. And we want to play a constructive role in helping countries move in the direction of more openness and more democracy and participation and market access, and the things that we stand for.
But it is the case that some countries will move at different paces. And we have historically had relations with a lot of countries whose governments we did not approve of. That is the case still today. There is no easy answer to how we pursue what's in America's interests. Because, ultimately, my job, the President's job, is to protect the security and the interests of the United States.
And do we do business with, do we have relations with, do we support governments over the past 50 years that we do not always see eye to eye with? Of course. I mean that's the world in which we live. But our messages are consistent about what we think is in the best interest of the United States, which is to have more democracy, more openness, more participation. And that is a consistent principle, and we then have to deal with what comes of that.
QUESTION: We are going to have to leave it there. Thank you very much for your time, especially on a trip -- I understand you've just broken a record of most traveled Secretary of State in your first two years.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, that's what I'm told. And many days I feel it. Thanks.
QUESTION: Thanks for taking time.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)